Secondly, the practice of duelling is disadvantageous, as increasing the amount of injury which one man can do to ano ther by an affront.
Thirdly, the practice of duelling affords means for the gratification of vengeance ; and thus tends to hurt the characters of individuals, by the encouragement both of that feeling, and of hypocrisy in those who, thirsting for vengeance, and daring not to own it, profess (in the common ambiguous phrase) to be seeking for satisfaction.
Fourthly (which is the most important consideration), there are the evils entailed by the deaths which the practice of duel ling brings about—evils entailed both on the persons dying, and on their surviving relatives and friends. It is an evil that a man should be cut off from life, " un houseled, unappointed, unaneled." It is an evil that he should be taken from rela tives and friends to whom his life is, in different ways and degrees, a source of happiness ; from parents who have cen tred in him their hopes, and to whom, in their declining years, he might be a com fort, or from a wife and children who look to him for support.
Such are the evil effects of the practice of duelling ; and there being no list of good effects to set against them, it follows immediately that the tendency of the practice is, on the whole, evil. There arises, then, the question, how is it to be got rid of? A mild and judicious legislation—one which takes into account, and does not set itself violently against, public opinion, may do much. The punishment assigned to the crime of duelling should be popular. It should be a punishment which does not tend to excite sympathy for the criminal, and thus defeat its own object ; for where an opinion prevails that a punishment is too severe, witnesses, jurors, pdges are provided by the punishment itself with motives to shield the criminal. It is clear that the punishment of death, which the law of England now assigns, is not popu lar ; and it is clear farther that, in conse quence of this, it is almost entirely nuga tory. Public opinion, which favours duelling, sets itself against the punish ment of death, and renders legislation vain.
Were a man who had killed his an tagonist in a duel compelled by the law to support. or assist in supporting, some of
his surviving relatives, this, so far as it would go, would be a punishment popular and efficacious. Public opinion would then infallibly be against the man who, having incurred the penalty, should en deavour to avoid it. And such a punish ment as this would furthermore be supe rior to the punishment of death, as being susceptible of graduation—as furnishing reparation to a portion of those who have been most injured, and as preserving the offender, that he may have all those op portunities, which his natural life will afford him, of improving himself and of benefiting others.
A mild and judicious legislation would tend to guide and improve public opinion ; whereas such a legislation as the present tends only to confirm it in its evil And as legislation may and should assist the formation of a right public opinion, so is it possible and desirable to operate independently on public opinion, either that the absence of good legislation may, as far as is possible, be compensated for, or that good legislation may be assisted. This operation on public opinion must be brought about by the endeavours of individuals. It is the duty of each man to oppose this practice to the utmost extent of his power, both by precept and example,—to abstain from challenging when he has received an affront, and to refuse a challenge when he is considered to have given one, making public in both cases, so far as his situation allows, his reasons for the course which he takes, and thus producing an impression against the practice as widely as he can. In the second of these two cases, he must either be able to defend, or he must apologize for, that which was considered an affront. If he can defend it, or show that the evil to the person insulted was overbalanced by the good accruing to others, he refuses rightly to be fired at for having been the author of a benefit ; or, if unable to de fend the affront, he apologizes for it, he performs a manly and a rational part in refusing to fire at a man whose feelings he has wantonly injured.