We proceed now to consider the ques tion, which is the best form of govern ment ? And in considering this question, we make abstraction of all local and occasional circumstances which are inci dental to particular states, as well as of the present existence of some particular form of government in each particular state, and of the difficulties standing in the way of its removal.
Now a government is a means to a certain end. The best form of govern ment is that which is best adapted to the attainment of the end. " The question with respect to government" being then, as Mr. Mill begins his well-known essay by observing, " a question about the adaptation of means to an end," it is necessary that we should first enunciate the end.
The end of government is the produc tion of the greatest possible amount of happiness for the governed. Strictly and more largely, its ultimate end is the pro duction of the greatest possible amount of human happiness. But inasmuch as each government contributes most to increase human happiness generally by applying itself to the production of the greatest possible amount of happiness among that particular portion of mankind over which it is set, and inasmuch as the attainment of the larger and general end is thus included in the attainment of the smaller and special end, it is sufficient, while it is more convenient for our purpose, if we keep in view the latter of the two ends only. With regard to the term happi ness, by which we express the end of go vernment, it is unnecessary that we should here analyze it. Suffice it to observe, that the increase of knowledge and intel ligence, and the moral improvement of a nation, are among the most valuable of the objects included in the general end, happiness, which it is the duty of a go venment to strive after.
Now a government will have a greater or less tendency to increase the happiness of those who are governed, 1. According as it is controlled, whe ther in the way of participation, or of election and consequent responsibility to the elector, by a greater or smaller num ber of such as, having an interest favour able to good government, are fit respec tively to participate or to elect.
2. According as it tends, by its mode of construction, to prevent or to create diversity of interests.
3. According as it interferes less or more with those pursuits which are ne cessary to a very large majority of every community for the attainment of a live lihood.
The union of these three considers tions, whieh seem to be all that are per tinent to the subject, leads us to what we have called above a pure representative government. The first of the three makes for the existence of a democratic body, or union of such bodies, in the govern ment ; and while the second leads us to conclude against uniting with this body, or these bodies, a body of an aristocratic character, or an hereditary chief, the third points out one chief advantage of a democratic representative body, or union of such bodies, as compared with a go vernment in which the great majority of the state directly participate.
It is necessary to enforce at somewhat greater length the considerations which we have adduced, and by which alone we test forms of government. In doing so, however, we shall not observe the order in which we have named them, but shall adopt a line of argument which leads most directly and conveniently to the '• foregone conclusion" of a pure repre sentative government.
It is desirable, in the first place, that the powers of government should not be vested solely in an individual, or in an aristocratic body, or (in other words) that the form of government should not be an absolute monarchy or an aristo cracy, because there is a great probabi lity that the despot or the aristocratic body will pursue respectively his or their own interest, to the detriment of the great bulk of the community, and because fur ther the great bulk of the community are in such cases deprived of the means of improvement which a participation in go vernment supplies. This improvement, we have already observed, is one chief way in which government may contribute to increase the happiness of the commu nity. With reference to the probability of a despot or aristocratic body using his or their power, it is important to observe that we affirm no more than a probability. Some despots, or absolute monarchs, there have been in every way deserving of praise. There may have been also aris tocratic bodies whose use of the powers possessed by them has been conducive to the general interest. But these are the exceptions. It is clearly in the na ture of things probable that there will in such cases be an abuse of power ; and the abstract question concerning forms of government is, after all, only a question of probability,—which form of govern ment is it probable will conduce most to the happiness of a community ? Secondly, it is desirable that a share, whether direct or indirect, in the govern ment should be possessed by as large a number as are likely to be fit to exercise the power thus conferred on them. There are two reasons for this extension of power, correspondent to the two reasons which have been already stated against its restriction to one or a few. First, the greater is the number of those who have a share in the government, the greater is the probability of the general interest being regarded ; for the more widely are the powers of government distributed, the less division will there be in the community, and consequently the less will particular interests appear; and fur ther, there is a greater probability, in an extensive distribution of political power, that all the disturbing effects of particular interests will neutralize one another, and merge iu the pursuit of the general in terest. Secondly, the more political power is extended the more widely will the im provement to be derived from its exercise be diffused.