But, in the third place, it is improbable that any very large number will be fit in any community to be members of a deli berative body, and have a direct share in legislation. Further, besides their being unlikely to possess the requisite amount of intelligence, it is unlikely that any very large number of men could spare time from such pursuits as are necessary to the attainment of a livelihood for the work of deliberation. Again, an assembly consisting of a majority of the commu nity, or of a number approaching to the whole of the community, would, from its size, be unfit for the purpose of delibera tion. For these three reasons it is desira ble that the power which is extended through a large number should be one merely of election ; and that the demo cratic body should be one not large, and in which the great bulk of the community have a direct share, but small, elected by the great bulk of the community, and (in the common phrase) representing them. A large number will be found fit to elect, though not to deliberate; to judge of the amount of intelligence and honesty pos sessed by candidates for representation, though not to decide upon the many and important subjects which the representa tive is required to consider. The act of election, however frequent, will not inter fere with the toils necessary fur subsist ence; and the amount of attention to political subjects occasioned by the duty of election will be sufficient to ensure the general intellectual development which we have spoken of as one of the tests of a good government.
Thus far we have merely been arguing for an extensive distribution of power, with which an hereditary chief or an aristocratic body might very possibly co exist in the government. It remains to complete the argument by pointing out the objections to a mixed government, or to a government which, by its very mode of construction, creates a diversity of interests. First, in so far as particular interests are embodied and made sepa rately influential in a state, the attain ment of what is for the general interest is impeded; secondly, from the separate embodiment of these particular interests collision ensues (for the much-talked-of balance of powers is only an imagination), and by collision is engendered On the bad moral effects of the thus engendered it is unnecessary to lilate.
Such is a rapid sketch of the abstract argument in favour of a pure representa tive government ; and such may be con sidered a brief general view of that sci ence of government which employs itself in determining which form of government is best adapted to increase the happiness of the governed, or (briefly) is the best.
It cannot need to be remarked that when, abstracting ourselves from all par ticular circumstances of time and country, we conclude that a pure representative government is the best form of govern ment, we do not contend either that such form of government should now be esta blished in any particular states or state, or that it ought to have existed in all states in all periods of their histories. It were absurd even to think of a general distribution of political power, such as is employed in a pure representative go vernment, in the early periods of igno rance and mental inactivity. And it were outrageous to attempt to establish in each state, in defiance of the many habits and interests which must lime grown up around the forms of govern ment already established, a new one, which is abstractly the best, or (in other words) is the best if we leave these habits and interests out of consideration.
Yet must not this science of govern ment be pronounced idle and unprofit able. It may be out of the question, as generally it will be, to establish imme diately, or perhaps even ultimately, that government which the abstract science tells us is the best. But though the goal of perfection be unattainable, it is useful to have it constantly in view. And while it will be the duty of each existing go vernment, learning the feelings of its subjects and profiting by the opportuni ties of the time, to seek to approach nearer and nearer to that form of govern ment which is abstractly the best, all such changes as are made with distinct reference to this abstract form of perfec tion will, as being made on the soundest principles, be the best.