Commitment and Fines.—The power of commitment for contempt has always been exercised by both houses. It has been repeatedly brought under the cog nizance of the courts, and allowed with out question. Mr. Wynn in his Argu ment,' states that there are upwards of one thousand cases of commitment by the House of Commons to be found in their Journals since 1547. Breaches of privi lege committed in one session may be punished by commitment in another, as u• the well-known case of Murray, in 1751-2, who was imprisoned in Newgate for a libel until the end of the session, and on the next meeting of parliament was again ordered to be committed ; but he had absconded in the meanwhile. Con tempts of a former parliament may also be punished. The lords may commit for * definite period beyond the duration of the session or parliament ; but a commit ment by the commons holds good only until the close of the session.
The house of lords, in addition to the power of commitment, may impose fines. This privilege is no longer exercised by the commons; but amongst the most remarkable cases in which it was for merly used, we may mention that of Mr. Hall, a member who had incurred their displeasure, by publishing a work "very slanderous and derogatory to the general authority, power, and state of the house, and prejudicial to the validity of its proceedings in making and esta blishing laws," and was ordered to " pay a fine to the queen of five hundred marks." The house at the same time assumed a power not found to have been exercised in other cases. It com mitted Mr. Hall to the Tower, and ordered that he should remain there for "six months, and until he should make retraction of the book.'' This punish ment was commitment for a time certain without reference to the continuance of the session, and, in the event of a refusal to retract the book, amounted to per petual imprisonment. A practice still exists which partakes of the nature of a fine. There are certain fees payable by persons committed to the custody of the serjeant-at-arms. and it is usual on discharging them out of custody to attach the condition of the "payment of the fees." These fees are occasionally re mitted under particular circumstances— as, for example, on account of the po ver7 of the prisoner.
Freedom of Speech.—Freedom of speech 7.5 one of the privileges claimed by the Speaker on behalf of the commons, but it has long since been confirmed as the right of both houses of parliament by statutes. It was acknowledged by au act in the reign of Henry VIII., by which the pro ceedings of the stannary court with re spect to Richard Strode, a member, who was fined and imprisoned by that court for having proposed a bill to regulate the tiuners in Cornwall, were declared illegal, and the repetition of similar en croachments upon the privilege of par liament provided against. The language however was thought ambiguous, and it was by limiting its operation to the case of Strode, that a judgment was obtained in the King's Bench against Sir John Elliot, Denzil Hollis. and Valentine, in the reign of Charles I. A true inter pretation of the law was subsequently established by resolutions of both houses of parliament, and by a formal reversal of this judgment by the house of lords. The most solemn recognition of the pri vilege is contained in the Bill of Rights, which declares "that the freedom of speech and debates and proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament."
There are however certain legal inci dents to this privilege which it is ne cessary to notice. The law presumes that everything said in parliament is with the view to the public good and necessary for the conduct of public busi ness; but should the member publish his speech, he is viewed as an author only, and if it contain libellous matter, he will not be protected by the privilege of par liament. In 1795 an information was filed against Lord Abingdon for libel. His lordship had accused his attorney, in parliament, of improper conduct in his profession. He afterwards published his speech in several newspapers at his own expense. His lordship pleaded his own cause, and contended that he had a right to print what he had, by the law of par liament, a right to speak ; but Lord Kenyon said " that a member of parlia ment had certainly a right to publish his speech, but that speech should not be made a vehicle of slander against any individual ; if it was, it was a libel." In 1813 a much stronger case of the same kind occured. Mr. Creevey, a member, had made a charge against an individual in the house of commons, and incorrect reports of his speech having appeared in several newspapers, Mr. Creevey sent a correct report to an editor, requesting him to publish it in his newspaper. A jury found Mr. Creevey guilty of libel, and the court of King's Bench refused an application for a new trial ; on which occasion Lord Ellenborough said, "a member of that house has spoken what he thought material and what he was at liberty to speak, in his character as a member of that house. So far he is privileged: but he has not stopped there ; but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen to publish an account of that speech in what he has pleased to call a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out reflections injurious to the character of an individual." Freedom from Arrest.—The Speaker's oetition prays on behalf of the commons, "that their persons, their estates, and servants, may be free from arrests and all molestation." These words are not more extensive than the privilege as formerly enjoyed, and instances in which it has been enforced may be found in nearly every page of the earlier volumes of the Journals. This privilege has however been limited by statutes, the last of which (10 Geo. III. c. 50) states in the pre amble that the previous laws were in sufficient to obviate the inconveniences arising from the delay of suits by reason of privilege of parliament, and enacts that "any person may at any time com mence and prosecute any action or suit, &c., against any peer or lord of parlia ment, or against any of the knights, citizens, or burgesses for the time being, or against any of their menial or any other servants, or any other person en titled to the privilege of parliament, and no such action shall be impeached, stayed, or delayed by or under colour or pretence of any privilege of parlia ment." Obedience to any rule of the courts at Westminster may be enforced by distress infinite, in case any person entitled to the benefit of such rule shall choose to proceed in that way.