Many landholders have several objects in view in letting their lands besides the getting of rent. One of these objects is to maintain their political weight by commanding the votes of their tenantry and this is mainly effected by not grant ing them leases of their lands for deter minate periods, such as seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years ; but by making them very nearly tenants at will, or liable to quit at six months' notice. He who de pends for his subsistence on having a piece of land to cultivate, out of which he may be turned on a short notice, will not be an independent voter. Nor can the landlord expect to have a good tenant who will improve his land, and a political tool at the same time. The uncertainty of the tenure will prevent a man of skill and capital from investing his money upon so uncertain a return. There may be many cases in which the personal cha racter of the landlord is a sufficient gua rantee to the tenant that he will not be disturbed in the possession of the land, even where he has no proper lease, so long as he cultivates it fairly and pays his rent. But the most intelligent land lords themselves admit that the only pro per tenure of the tenant is that of a lease for a determinate period ; and it is on this condition alone as a general rule, that a landlord can get men of capital and skill to cultivate his land. It has been maintained by arguments that are unanswerable, that if lands were let to farmer tenants on leases for a determinate number of years, and on conditions which should not interfere with the land being cultivated in the best mode, there would be a great amount of fresh capital applied to the cultivation of the land, with all the improvements of modern husbandry. It is contrary to experience and to all rea son to suppose that a good farmer will apply his skill and capital to improve ment of another man's property, unless he has the security that he will be remu nerated.
The improvements which would follow from a good system of leasing would be the abolition of the evils which now exist in consequence of uncertain tenure and of bad leases. It is affirmed by the best au thorities that the amount of capital which is now applied to the cultivation of the land in England is very inadequate, that a large part of the farmers have not suf ficient capital to improve their lands, nor the necessary skill and enterprise ; and it is maintained that these evils are mainly owing to the want of a sufficient security of tenure or the want of a lease, or, where there is a lease, to the absurd restrictions with which many of them abound.
It has been said, and truly enough, that there is no advantage to the landlord in granting a lease to bad cultivators, and that there are many such. Such a lease would not indeed be any advantage to the farmer himself or the community in ge neral; but he who has land to let, an will let it on terms that are mutually pro fitable to the landlord and the tenant, will be much more likely to get a tenant of competent skill and capital than he who gives the farmer an uncertain tenure or binds him in the fetters of a bad lease.
The preservation of the game and the enjoyment of the pleasures of the chase, or of the profits derived from the wild ani mals, is another object which some land lords secure by their lease with as much minuteness and strictness as they do their rent. [GAME LAWS.] Thus, in addition to getting a rent from his land, the landlord often wishes to command the votes of his tenant and secure his game. With re ference to these objects and certain other imaginary advantages which he purposes to secure by directing the mode of culti vation, he has a lease drawn up with con ditions, restrictions, penalties, and feudal services, which no care on the part of the farmer can prevent him from breaking in some particular, and which no man of capital, skill, and independent feeling would consent to sign. Specimens of
such leases have been printed and circu lated. One of them appeared in the ' Leicester Chronicle' for June 28, 1845. This lease prescribes a mode of cultiva tion which is absolutely inconsistent with good farming. The landlord in such a lease directs the tenant how he must cul tivate the land. If the directions which the landlord gives, comprehended the best modes of cultivation, they would be un necessary if he had a good tenant, and they would not be observed by a had one. A good tenant with sufficient capital will farm the land according to the system best adapted for the land, and he will be ready to avail himself of all improve ments. A bad tenant, whether he has capital or not, will not farm well simply because he is prevented from doing some things and bound to do others ; for farm ing, like other matters, consists not only in doing a thing, but in doing it well. These conditions and restrictions, if en forced at all, can only be enforced by constant supervision, and must be an end less source of trouble and dispute.
But these farming leases are often copies of old leases, made in other days, and are unsuited to the present state of agriculture. The things which they re quire not to be done and those which they require to be done, are often incon sistent with good agriculture, or, in other words, they prevent the land from yield ing that amount of produce which it would yield under the best system, not only without thereby being impoverished, but with the certainty of permanent im provement. Ignorance on the side of the landlord of his true interest is one of the reasons why many of these absurd leases still exist.
There can be no principle in the letting of land, if the object is simply to secure the best rent to the landlord and the per manent improvement of the land, which makes it different from the letting of any other piece of property. The good farmer hires land to cultivate, with the hope of deriving profit from the applica tion of his skill and capital. He does not want the advice and direction of an other man: he trusts to himself. The first object of the landlord is to get as much rent as his land is worth, and to secure it against deterioration during the tenant's occupation. The terms of the lease, then, should simply be, the pay ment of the rent agreed on, and the ob servance of such conditions as are found by experience and known to practical agriculturists to be necessary to secure the permanent value of the landlord's land. It is admitted by all reasonable people that the landlord should have ample security by the lease for his land being given up to him at the end of the lease iu as good condition as he gave it to the tenant. The tenant wants no di rections from the landlord, and no con ditions in his favour, beyond the simple condition of being allowed to cultivate the land in the best way that he can for his own profit during a period sufficiently long to secure him a return for his out lay ; and he acknowledges that he must submit to all conditions in favour of the landlord which are not inconsistent with his free cultivation, and which shall se cure the permanent value of the land lord's property. Perhaps many landlords who now grant hard leases would admit this general principle : but when they came to details, they would insist on many conditions as necessary to secure their permanent interest, which a good farmer would object to as not necessary for that purpose. and also as inconsistent with his profitable cultivation.