The framing of such a lease as we have described in general terms, must be the joint work of intelligent, liberal landlords, and good tenant fiirmers. It may require some time, some more experience, and suggestions from many quarters befoil such a lease is got into the best form. But it is an object worth the consideration of all persons interested in the cultivation of the land, and the attempt has been made already. We have received a copy of such a lease from the Vale of Evesham Agricultural Association, which has been circulated for the purpose of obtaining the suggestions of competent persons.
It has been said that some farmers do not care for having long leases : they are willing to go on as they have done. But can it be shown that there is a number of intelligent farmers with capital, who pre fer a yearly tenure to a lease of reasonable length? Besides, some of these agree ments for a tenancy from year to year, contain restrictions almost as numerous and absurd as those in leases for a term of years. If there are farmers who prefer dependence to the independence which is the result of a fair contract between farm er and landlord, these are not the men to improve our agriculture ; these are the men with little capital, and less skill, who have no hopes of improving their con dition, who rely on the easy temper or good-nature of an indulgent landlord, and are taught that they and their labour must be protected from foreign compe tition. The intelligent farmer with capital seeks no protection against the foreigner, and wants no indulgence from his landlord. He is ready to give, and he would he compelled by competition to give, to the landlord the full value for the use of his land, and he would ask for no more than the liberty of cultivating it in the best way.
Before, however, a good farmer could enter on the land with full confidence, he would have one favour to ask of his land lord ; and that would be, not to protect him. If he wanted beans or oats to feed his cattle with, to increase his manure and so increase his crop of corn, he would ask the favour of buying them where he could get them cheapest, in order that he might have a greater return for his outlay and so better pay his rent, or even an in creased rent. Under the protective system LCORN Laws] a man who is protected, as it is termed, in one thing, is taxed in an other ; he may be protected in what he has to sell, but he must pa•- that pro tection by being taxed in w nat he has to buy. The farmer in one part of the king dom wants something that he does not produce ; but it is produced in another part of the kingdom. Both parts are protected in what they produce, that each may be compelled to buy of the other ; and each is taxed in what he buys in order that the other may be protected. Thus the legislature interfere with the prices of things. They do not impose a tax on foreign produce that comes into the kingdom simply with the view of setting revenue from it ; they profess to interfere in order to keep up the prices of certain commodities that are produced in the kingdom. They profess to regulate
within certain limits the prices for which the farmer must buy and sell his agricul tural produce : they profess to do it ; but everybody who knows the history of the corn laws knows that they cannot do it, and never have succeeded in the attempt. But they have succeeded in breeding up a race of farmers, and of landlords too, who believe that their true interests are best consulted by the government attempt ing to raise the prices of all agricultural produce, both that which a farmer buys and that which he sells. As matters stand now, it is thus :—We have a land lord who by his lease directs his tenant how to cultivate, and at the same time reserves the power of walking over his ground when he pleases to kill the game which the farmer must not kill, but which he must feed ; a tenant with deficient capital and insufficient skill, and the shackles of a restrictive lease, or an agree ment for a lease which constitutes a te nancy from year to year ; and a legisla ture which interferes with prices and shuts out the farmer as well as others from buying in the cheapest market whatever agricultural produce he does not raise himself. Then there is a cry of agricultural distress, and when the ablest man in the House of Commons asks for a committee of inquiry into the cause of this distress, those who complain of the distress will not have the inquiry.
It has been shown [AGRICULTURE] that all duties levied on agricultural produce that is brought into these kingdoms, are protective duties, however small they may be. He who disputes this proposition is inaccessible to the cogent power of reason. He who admits it, and contends for the system, must contend that on the whole it does more good than harm. But the system continues, and we still hear of agricultural distress, so that the system at least does not prevent agricultural dis tress. Those who have handled the sub ject best attempt to prove, and we believe that they have proved, that the system causes agricultural distress, and that it is the chief obstacle to improved cultivation of land, the granting of good leases, the employment of fresh capital in the culti vation of land, and the employment of agricultural labour. All these subjects were urged by Mr. Cobden, in the House of Commons (1845), in a speech, when he moved for a select committee to inquire into the extent and cause of the alleged ex isting agricultural distress, and into the elects of legislative protection upon the interests of landowners, farmers, and farm labourers—a speech unequalled for per spicuity of statement, practical knowledge of the subject, clearness of expression, and sound argumentation ; a speech which would place Mr. Cobden, if he had not already earned that distinction, among the very few men who have views at once comprehensive and sound enough to entitle them to the honour of directing the affairs of an industrious people.