SLANDER consists in the malicious speaking of such words as render the party who speaks them in the hearing of others liable to an action at the suit of the party to whom they apply. The mere speaking of the defamatory words instead of the writing of them is that which constitutes the difference between Libel and Slander. [LIBEL.] Slander is of two kinds : one, which is actionable, as necessarily importing some general damage to the party who is slan dered; the other, which is only actionable where it has actually caused some special damage. The first kind includes all such words as impute to a party the commis sion of some crime or misdemeanour for which lie might legally be convicted and suffer punishment, as where one asserts that another has committed treason, or felony, or perjury. It also includes such words spoken of a party, with reference to his office, profession, or trade, as im pute to him malpractice, incompetence, or bankruptcy; as of a magistrate, that he is partial, or corrupt; of a clergyman, that " he preaches lies in the pulpit;" of a barrister, that "he is a dunce, and will get nothing by the law ;" and so on : or that tend to the disherison of a party, as where it is said of one who holds lands by descent, that he is illegitimate. Where a party is in possession of lands which he desires to sell, he may maintain an action against any one who slanders his title to the lands; as by stating that he is not the owner. With respect to the second kind of slander, the law will not allow damage to be inferred from words which are not in themselves actionable, even although the words are untrue and spoken mali ciously. But if, in consequence of such words being so spoken, a party has ac tually sustained some injury, he may maintain an action of slander against the person who has uttered them. In such case the injury must be some certain actual loss, and it must also arise ...a a natural and lawful consequence of speak ing the words. No unlawful act done by a third person, although he really was moved to do it by the words spoken, is such an injury as a party can recover for in this action. Thus, the loss of the so ciety and entertainment of friends, of an appointment to some office, the breach of a marriage engagement caused by the slanderer's statement, are injuries for which a party may recover damages.
But he can have no action because in con-. sequence of such statement certain per sons, to use an illustration of Lord Ellen borough's, "have thrown him into a horse-pond by way of punishment for his supposed transgression." With respect to both kinds of slander, it is immaterial in what way the charge is conveyed, whether by direct statement, or obliquely, as by question, epithet, or exclamation. But the actual words used must be stated in the declaration, and upon the failure to prove them as stated, the plaintiff will be nonsuited at the trial : it is not sufficient to state the meaning and inference of the words, They will be interpreted in the sense in which they are commonly used, but where they are susceptible of two mean ings, one innocent, the other defamatory, the innocent interpretation is to be pre ferred. Where words are equivocal either in their meaning or their application, a parenthetical explanation may he inserted in the declaration. This is called an inuendo. It may be employed to explain and define, but not to enlarge or alter, the meaning or application of the words spoken. The declaration must state the publication of the words, that is, that they were spoken in the hearing of others, and spoken maliciously. Two cannot join in bringing one action of slander, except in the case of husband and wife, or of part ners for an injury done to their joint trade; nor can an action be brought against two, except a husband and wife, where slanderous words have been spoken by the wife. Where the knowledge of extraneous facts is necessary to show the application of the slander, these should be stated iu the introductory part of the declaration.
In answer to an action of slander the defendant may plead that the words spoken were true, or that they were spoken in the course of a trial in a court of justice, and were pertinent to the case; or formed the subject of a confidential communication, as where a party on ap plication bond fide states what he believes to be true relative to the character of a servant, or makes known facts merely for the purpose of honestly warning another in whom he is interested. (Com., Dig., Action on the case for Defamation,' D. 1, 84e.)