SOCIAL CONTRACT, oa ORI GINAL CONTRACT. Blackstone i. p. 48) writes as follows Though Society had not its formal be ginning from any convention of indivi duals actuated by their wants and fears, yet it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together, that demonstrates the necessity of this union, and that therefore is the solid and natural foundation as well as the cement of civil society. And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and applied in the very act of associating together—namely, that the whole should protect its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or in other words, that the com munity should guard the rights of each individual member, and that, in return for this protection, each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which submission of all it were impossible that protection could be cer tainly extended to any." Blackstone in a previousdenies " that there ever was a there was no such thing as society, either natural or civil ;" and in the passage just quoted he denies that it " had its formal beginning from any convention of individuals." The ne cessity of the "union" is demonstrated from the sense of weakness and imper fection which keeps mankind together : and this (it is not exactly clear what) is what be means by the original contract, which he further proceeds to tell us, "perhaps in no instance has ever been formally expressed." Bentham, in his ' Fragment on Government' (chap. i.),
has in a very amusing manner exposed the absurdities and contradictions which characterise I3lackstones chapter Of the Nature of Laws in General.' Locke's doctrine is more distinctly expressed (Essay on Civil Government, ch. 8, Of the beginning of Politioal So cieties'). He says that "men being by =are all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent." By can he does not mean to say that it maT not happen that one man shall be subjected to the political power of another, but that he cannot properly or justly be subjected without his consent; which appears from what follows : —" Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a com munity must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite in society, to the ma jority of the community, unless they ex pressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is or needs be between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world." This doctrine is open to obvious objection. The conclusion as to