VOL. II.
Bribery is one means by which voters are induced to give their votes ; and the enactment of laws against bribery is founded on the assumption that bribery should be prevented, that voters should give their votes without pay or reward. Under the system of open voting there is much bribery in the election of mem bers for the Commons' House. It cannot be asserted that secret voting would de stroy bribery, but perhaps it would render it more difficult. This subject is consi dered under the article BRIBERY.
The condition of the Roman voters was very peculiar. They were very numerous, and many of them very poor. Bribery existed to a great extent when the voting was secret, and there were severe penalties against the candidate who bribed, and probably against his agents also. The Roman voters did not undervalue the ballot, if we may take Ci cero's testimony (Pro Plastic), 6): the ballot (tabella), he says, is a favourite with the people, for it discloses a man's face, but closes up his mind, so that he can do what he chooses, and promise what he is asked. If this representation is true, a Roman might promise his vote to one man and vote for another, and be well pleased that he had the power of doing so.
The kind of immorality here suggested is not a matter for severe censure. He who is permitted by the form of the con stitution and by law to ask for a vote and gets a promise, may not get the vote which Is promised. The immorality of him who buys a vote, or tries to get it by threats, or unfair means, is the same whether the voter keeps his promise or not. The immorality of the voter who promises his vote to one man which his judgment gives to another, and keeps his pro mise, appears to be at least as great as that of the man who promises his vote to the man whom he does not like, and gives it to the man to whom he wishes to give it.
Secret voting is much used in England, in clubs, in committees, and on many oc casions. Its use is recommended by its convenience. It enables a man to vote as he pleases without giving offence, and without getting into personal quarrels The practice is maintained to be good on 3L the whole, though occasionally there is evil in it. A spiteful, ill-tempered fel low may, by a secret vote, sometimes in flict injury or at least great pain on an honest and respectable man. Yet the advantages of the secret voting in all cases where it is used, are supposed to be greater than the disadvantages.
If secret voting is in any case good, or if in many cases it is good, as we believe it is admitted to be by all persons, those who object to its being extended to other modes of voting than those in which it is at present practised are loaded with the hurden of showing in each case to which it is proposed to extend it, that there are good reasons against such extension. Those who are in favour of the ballot must reply to such reasons. It is suffi cient for them to open the case of any particular extension of the ballot, by de claring that in such case the introduction of the ballot would be beneficial.
This matter sleeps at present, but when more urgent reforms are accomplished, it is probable that the discussion of it• may be revived.