VOTING. Voting means the giving of a man's voice or opinion is rose matter which is to be determined by a majority of voices or opinions of persons who are empowered to give them. The commonest case of voting in countries where there is an elective branch of the supreme power is that of voting for mem bers of a Legislature, as in Great Britain and Ireland.
The vote may be given either orally, in which case it is notorious for what person or persons a man gives his vote ; or it may be by ballot, that is, by the voter writing on a tablet or paper the name or names of the person or persons for whom he votes, and patting the tablet or paper into a closed box. When the voting is oral, it is open voting ; when it is by ballot, it is secret voting, or at least secret so far as the voter chooses to keep it se cret, if the business is properly managed; for secrecy is the object of the voting by ballot.
There has been much discussion on the vote by ballot. The question is re solvable into various parts : first, is it a matter of public utility that a man's vote for a member of the House of Commons (to take this as an instance, and the main instance here in Great Britain) should be open or secret? There is something to say on both sides, though those who have argued in favour of the one or the other of the two modes of voting have perhaps not discussed this part of the question fully. There is a short answer to those who say that the non-voters, or the whole body of voters, or that all people have a right to know how a man votes The answer is, that they are abusing the term Right. The fran chise is not given under any such condi tions, and there is no Right of the kind, if we use the word Right in its strict and proper sense. What is meant is probably this, that it is for the general interest that a man's vote for a member of the Commons' House should be open, in order that opinion may operate upon him ; for if this is not the reason, it is difficult to see that there is any other reason for open voting. But opinion may be wise or unwise, favourable to a good candidate or against him. Open voting, there fore, if it is to be affected by opinion, any have lad results as well as good results. On the whole, however, it must be admitted in a country in which there is a representative system, that the opinion of the majority of the voters must be considered to be right, and we must con sistently admit that under a system of open voting, the whole influence of opinion, if it has any influence, bears a balance in favour of the majority. As then there must be a majority in any given case of voting, and as that majority represents the right opinion, the opinion of the majority before the voting ought to operate, and it can only operate effectually when the voting is open.
On the other side when a man has a vote, it is implied that he has a voice and a will of his own, and that it is intended that he shall exercise it. But he can only exercise it freely when all restraint is re moved. So far as public opinion has any value, so far as arguments have any weight, he may learn what opinion is, he may listen to the arguments, and he may vote as he thinks best. If his vote is to be more the expression of his own opinion than of the opinion of other people, which seems to be implied in the phrase of " hav ing a vote," he ought to be allowed to give his vote in that way which gives him most freedom to do as he wishes, which ever of the two ways that may be. Again,
opinion and power and influence and threats may and do operate largely on many persons who have votes, and ac cordingly they vote in a different way from what they would vote if they were free from all influence. We believe this fact is not denied by those who are in favour of the ballot or those who are against it. But then it may be urged that if voting were secret, improper means of working on the voter would still be resorted to. It must be admitted that they might and would ; but the question is, would they be so efficient in making him vote contrary to his wish as when the voting is open? A great many people have no opinions of their own : they follow the opinions of others. If the voting is secret, they can follow that opinion which they are in clined to follow, at least if the secrecy of their vote is effectually guarded. If the voting is open, they are exposed to the risk of being led for some other reasons than their own choice to vote not as they wish to vote ; and it does not follow that because the voting is open, they will be guided by tae opinion of the majority, which is here assumed to be the right opinion. The opinion of the minority may be exercised as efficiently on any given voter as that of the majority. In fact one individual or a few individuals chiefly operate on voters either by them selves or by their agents, and the opera tion of the individuals who belong to the minority will be as efficient as the opera tion of the individuals who belong to the majority, in proportion to their numbers, other things being equal.
Suppose it to be determined, though it is not determined here, that secret voting is on the whole more consistent with the notion of a man " having a vote" and " giving a vote," and that it is at least as beneficial to the community as open voting, there remains the objection that there is no contrivance by which the secrecy of a man's vote can be secured. The two chief objections then to vote by ballot are—that it is not for the general interest, and that secrecy cannot be se cured: to which may be added a third objection, that from the attempt to secure secrecy more mischief will ensue than arises from open voting.
That it is possible to devise means by which the bare giving of the vote may be secretly effected, can hardly be denied. If the giver of the vote does not keep his own secret, which sometimes he would not do, that is his own affair. If secrecy is se cured for him against everybody except himself, that is all that can be attempted. But it is urged that there would be many attempts for many reasons and in various ways on the part of persons who were interested in elections, to ascertain a man's vote, and that these attempts would give rise to many evils and inconveniences to the voter himself, and subject him to much annoyance. Granted that this may be so or will be so, it does not fol low that a greater amount of tree ex pression of opinion, which is the thing assumed to be aimed at in taking men's votes, will not be gained by secret than by open voting.