The comparison between the measures adopted in Eng land, when its national bank declared their inability to pay in cash, and those adopted in France on the present occa sion, cannot fail to strike the reader. In the former coun try, all that was absolutely necessary for the support of the bank was accomplished by individuals ; in the latter, it was the exclusive work of the government. In the former country, a temporary alarm had shaken public credit ; but the wealth and real confidence of the nation remaining the same, as soon as that alarm subsided, public credit was again placed on as solid a foundation as before : whereas, in France, the shock given to public credit arose from per manent causes, and the measures adopted only palliated, or put off the evil.
The state of the finances of France, thus artificially kept from falling into utter ruin, absolutely required the most rigid and systematic economy : indeed, no other means could restore them even to temporary strength ; and yet, not only were the forces not reduced, but all the deficien cies in the different regiments were made good. At this period, there could exist no alarm or probability of renew ed hostilities, though, shortly afterwards, the disputes be tween the Emperor and the United Provinces, respecting the barriers and strong towns in the Netherlands, excited the attention and jealousy of France. Before the late war, a French faction had scarcely existed, or, at least, had not been powerful in Holland ; but that event, by detaching Great Britain from the United Provinces, had opened up an opportunity for such a faction to establish itself at the head. This faction consisted of the hereditary enemies of the Orange family ; so that in Holland, as in America, the despotic government of France united itself with republi cans. As soon as the Emperor extended his pretensions to the navigation of the Scheldt, the Dutch implored the mediation of the King of France, their late hostility with Britain having deprived them of any claim for protection or mediation from that power. At this time, there were two parties at the court of Versailles, at the head of which were the Count de Vergennes and the Marshal de Castries ; the former, the favourite of Louis, was, like him, mild, hu mane, and a strong friend to peace ; the latter, supported by the Queen, was, like her, bold, intriguing, and enter prising, and the strong advocate for war. As the media tion of France had no influence with the Emperor, and the Dutch saw themselves threatened with hostilities, in con sequence of having opposed his designs on the Scheldt, they applied to Louis for a general to head their armies ; and the Count de Maillebois was sent to them. Count de
Vergennes, hitherto, had opposed any hostile or violent measures ; but, at this juncture, in consequence of the en croaching aggressions of the Emperor, he expostulated with the court of Vienna in more free and direct language. At the same time, the armies of France moved by degrees to the borders of Alsace, Lorraine, and the Low Countries ; and orders were given to form a camp at Lans of 80,000 men. The Queen of France, though ambitious and war like, by no means approved of these indications of hostile measures against her brother the Emperor ; and therefore endeavoured to bring back the mind of the Count de Ver gennes to its habitual feeling of moderation and love of peace ; but the Count, though sensible of the state of the finances of France, and therefore desirous, if possible, of averting hostilities, could not brook the idea, that the hon our or interests of his country should be sacrificed ; and, on the morning when a grand council was to be held, the result of which was to be conclusive with regard to the part France should take, and the Queen desired he would not on that day forget that the Emperor was her brother, he replied, that he certainly would not forget, but he must also remember that the King of France was her husband, and the Dauphin her son. Soon afterwards, the Emperor accommodated his differences with Holland, through the mediation of France, and thus the military preparations of the latter were rendered unnecessary.
The influence of France at the I ague, was thus consi derably strengthened ; and the Count de Vergennes did not fail to make use of it for the advantages of his country, by forming a new treaty of alliance. By this treaty, in case Holland was engaged in war, France was to furnish her with 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 12 ships of the line, and six frigates; and, in the event of a maritime war, or, in other words, in case England and France should recom mence hostilities, the United Provinces engaged themselves to furnish six ships of the line, and three frigates. If France were attacked by land, they were either to furnish 5000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, or a proportionate sum of money.