APPETITE, in MoRALs, in its most general sense, signifies an inclination or desire after any thing that is supposed to be conducive to our happiness. Taken in this general view, our appetites have been divided into two classes, the sensitive, which proceed from the im mediate impulse of the senses, and are not at all under the government of reason ; and the rational, which re sult from reflexion on the real value of the object, and a desire founded on that reflexion.
The best writers on morals have restricted the term appetite to the first of these classes of active principles, the sensitive, or those which are characterised by some peculiar bodily sensation. Thus Hutcheson defines the appetites to be such of our desires as have a previous painful or uneasy sensation, independently of any opi nion of good in the object ; so, that when the object is pursued, it is chiefly with a view to allaying this unea siness, rather than because of the positive pleaure which ensues : and which cannot, at first, have entered into our consideration. These principles, however, can not be termed entirely corporeal, or considered as seat ed solely in the animal part of man ; since there is a mental appetency, or desire, always accompanying the bodily sensation and prompting us to action.
The word appetite, Dr Reid remarks, is sometimes limited so as to signify only the desire of food when we hunger; sometimes it is extended so as to signify any strong desire, whatever be its object. This author seems, with propriety, to limit the term to a particular class of desires, which, he observes, are distinguished from all others by the following marks : " 1. Every ap petite is accompanied with an uneasy sensation proper to it, which is strong or weak in proportion to the de sire we have of the object. 2. Appetites are not con
stint, but periodical, being sated by their objects for a time, and returning alter certain per ads." Tue appe tites that are chiefly observable in man, as well as in most other animals, are, according to the same author, hunger, thirst, and lust ; the purpose, or natural inten tions of which are sufficiently obvious, the first two of these being necessary for the preservation of the indi victual, and the last for continuing the species. It is no doubt agreeable to the suggestions of reason, that man should take the necessary steps for preserving his ex istence, and propagating his species ; but, as we are at present constituted, the calm voice of reason is too li able to be drowned in the hurry of business, or the charms of amusement. Nature, therefore, has entrust ed these important objects to the operation of appetite, which becomes powerful enough to call off our attention from any other employment.
It becomes us, however, to be moderate in the indul gence of our appetites; which are the lowest and most animal principles in our nature ; and peculiarly liable to be vitiated, or impaired by excess. By improper in dulgence we not only deprave our appetites, but create desires of this kind which nature never gave. Such as the passion for tobacco, and for intoxicating liquors, one of the most pernicious indulgences to which the weak ness of man has ever induced him to give way. Sec Huteheson's Moral Philosuphy. Kames's Edon. of Grit. v. I. Reid's _Essays on the dictive Powers, 17c. (rn)