In comparatively modern times, a French standing army, inconsiderable as to numbers, but formidable from its discipline, conquered Italy. Florence, Pisa, and Rome, opened their gates to Charles VIII. ; and from Naples he intimidated or gave law to every state in Italy. The impetuosity of French valour appeared to the Italians irresistible ; and this expedition was the first exertion of the new powers which the princes of Europe acquired from standing armies. The American war furnishes another proof of the total inability of militia to resist well disciplined regular troops. The American army never ventured to attack or to resist the British, unless with the advantage of ground, or supported by vastly superior numbers. The new levies of France, at the commencement of the revolution war, notwithstand ing their enthusiasm, were unsteady and cowardly. Raw and they were often panic struck, and on one occasion 25,000 of Dumourier's army fled before 1500 Prussians. These, and a thousand such instances, to be found in history, sufficiently establish the irresisti ble power of a well organized, well disciplined, standing army.
In a free country, such as Britain, a standing army has always been an object of jealousy. It may cer tainly be a tool in the hands of a despotic monarch, for the exercise of oppression and injustice ; or, at the dis posal of an ambitious or favourite leader, may overturn the governilent. The standing army of Cxsar de stroyed the Roman republic, and that of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors. But similar events have been occasioned by popular commotions ; and the cities and states of Greece often experienced political changes and fluctuations in their governments, without the interference of standing armies. In a free country, the necessity of maintaining standing armies arises from the conduct of ambitious neighbours. It is the duty of a nation to resist force by force, and that can only be done by adopting means adequate to the object. If a kingdom be attacked by a standing army, it must oppose the aggression by another standing army ; for we have seen, that every other species of force is incompetent to withstand a regular well disciplined army. The aug mentation of the standing army of every country is occasioned by the same principle, that is, the necessity of defending itself; and the extent of population or sub sistence, is the only limit to the increase of armies. Montesquieu (Spirit of Laws, vol. i. p. 287,) says, " a new distemper has spread itself over Europe, infecting our princes, and inducing them to keep up an exorbi tant number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For, as one prince augments his forces, the rest of course do the same ; so that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin.
Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exterminated ; and they give the name of peace to this general effort of all against all :" and farther he adds, " by thus augmenting our troops, we shall be all soldiers, and be reduced to the very same situation as the Tartars." This predic tion of the great Montesquieu, as to the magnitude of armies, and the extent of arming, or the military force of Europe, is in part verified, by the immense and unprecedented establishments of France and Britain ; and it is impossible to say how far this system may be carried, or rather, how nearly these countries will ap proach to the limits of their resources.
The resources of any country for war, depend upon the population, the produce of the soil, and its wealth arising from manufactures and commerce. The amount of these must form its capability for war, especially such wars as are carried on by the European powers. Long and protracted contests require great preparation ; and an army must not only be raised, trained, and disciplined, but provided with many indispensible necessaries, which are drains from the productive industry of the people. Population is constantly limited by subsistence, but it is the surplus produce of the land only that can be applied to the maintenance of armies, engaged in offensive operations. No nation can encroach upon the cultivation of the soil, and withdraw her agriculturists from their peaceful occupations, for the purpose of dis tant warfare, without trenching- on her resources, and cutting up the very vitals of her strength. A diminu tion of her subsistence would infallibly induce famine, and unhinge her armies. We here find a limit as to the numbers that a nation can possibly embody for the pur pose of conquest; and if we pursue this subject, we shall discover the boundaries which the wealth or in dustry of the country also prescribes to the war system. A soldier needs something more than food ; he requires clothing, arms, ammunition, and all the apparatus of war. These things must be drawn from the surplus of manu factures ; and were the quantity to be lessened by taking off the labourers, or, what is the same thing, by crea ting an unusual or extraordinary demand, it could not possibly be supplied, because the manufacturer has no thing to exchange for his food, but the spare produce of his labour, and he could not give it away to the manifest injury of himself and family. Here again we find a check to the unlimited increase of armies, from a cause independent of mere population.