It was now in vain that the brave Archduke Charles defeated Massena with the French Italian army at Caldiero, and that the Emperor of Russia put him self at the head of his auxiliary force for the salvation of Austria. It was in vain tbat Nelson got the bril liant victory of Trafalgar. Prussia would not stir ; and England, as on many other occasions, sent her gallant troops to fight against the storms of the north sea, and the winters of Germany, long after any thing they might atchieve could possibly avail herself or her allies. One disaster succeeded another. Bona parte entered Vienna ; passed the Danube on the same day, with infinite pleasure and composure, by the Tabor-bridge, which the Austrian commander Prince Auersperg had politely left free and entire for his accommodation ; and in a very few weeks afterwards, discomfited and disgraced the Emperors of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz.
Of all the blunders committed by Austria since the commencement of the revolution war, fighting this battle, before the arrival of the Archduke Charles, was the most notorious. That gallant prince was at the head of a victorious army of 95,000 effec tive men, within six days march of the French, and was rapidly advancing to put Bonaparte between two fires, at the very time when the action, so fatal to Austria, was resolved upon. He accordingly en tered Neustadt, took the military chest of the French army there, within 30 miles of Vienna, on the 10th of December. It was too late. The field of Aus terlitz had produced, on the 2d of that month, an armistice, which, on the 4th, consummated the shame of Russia, and the degradation and political death of the Austrian monarch.
By the treaty of Presburg, which was signed six months after the commencement of hostilities, Aus tria lost, besides other provinces, her right arm of de fence, Tyrol and the Swabian principalities. These might be considered as a vast fortress towards Italy, Germany, and France. They had been, for 300 years, constituent parts of the monarchy ; and their popu lation, brave, magnanimous, and warlike, had been for ages conspicuous for their attachment to the house of Austria. Their country had long been deemed impregnable, and, indeed, might justly be so reckoned, when backed by the resources of a power ful empire. Francis II. also lost Dalmatia, Istria, Frioul, and Cattaro ; and, in short, cut himself off from every prospect of becoming the head of a ma ritime power in the Mediterranean.
In return for these sacrifices, and for heavy con tributions paid in specie to the French armies, he received for his brother, the late elector of Salzburg, the bishopric of Wurtzburg, with its dependencies, and annexed Salzburg and Bcrchtolsgaden, which his brother had enjoyed since the treaty of Luneville, to the Austrian crown.
The treaty of Presburg was the most humiliating and disastrous to which Francis had hitherto been obliged to subnait. It was talked of at Vienna in a style rather inconsistent with the apathy usually ma nifested on such matters by the public. Many per sons spoke their minds freely against it ; and the best friends of government seemed to be ashamed of the condition to which a powerful empire had so sud denly been reduced. The same feeling pervaded the court, and all the princes of the imperial family ; especially the archdukes, who had shared in the cam paign in Italy, and who attributed wholly to misma nagement the reverses which had produced this scan dalous and disastrous peace. Meanwhile, however,. the finances had gone into the most alarming disor der. The florin in paper had fallen, between the breaking out of the war and the signing of the peace, from 2s. sterling to Is. 2d., and specie of every sort. had totally disappeared. The armies were destitute of all supplies. Hungary had manifested symptoms, if not of disaffection, yet, at least, of lukewarmness towards the emperor, and had not exerted herself, during the war, in any degree proportionable to her resources. Officers in high situations had prrwed unworthy of their trust, and were to be tried. The arsenals of the empire were empty. Every necessary for carrying on the war was scarce, and extravagant ly dear. Nothing could be expected from Prussia or Russia. Repose became indispensably necessary.
In 1806-and 1807, France occupied the period of Austrian palsy, occasioned by the war of 1805 and the treaty of Presburg, in destroying Prussia, and humbling Russia. It is.foreign from our purpose to.. dwell upon the phrensy of those powers, who timed their exertions precisely in a way to accommodate their enemy, and to ruin their own resources. When Russia, in particular, which had on foot 435,000 men in her European states, chose to meet the French ar mies, upon her own frontier, with only 78,000 men, (as appears from her own statements of the battles of Pultusk and Eylau,) and when, after the enemy had spent many months inactive in her neighbour. hood, she did not call forth above 40,000 men to re cruit her wasted forces, and to enable her to drive: him back from her dominions ; Austria plainly saw, that there must have been some radical defect, some ruinous and irretrievable evil in the Russian councils,, which would speedily lay that country, as well as. Prussia, prostrate at the feet of France. Any exer tions which she might make, were therefore consi dered as inexpedient and unavailing, and were ac cordingly withheld..