The long and destructive contest between Rome and Carthage, gave occasion to some of the most fierce and obstinate battles of antiquity, in which the valour of the troops and skill of the generals were eminently displayed. In the battle of Cannes, the tactics of the contending parties, and of the age, are exhibited in the manoeuvres and disposition of the two armies in the field. Hannibal had previously de feated the Romans in the battles of Trebia and Thrasymene ; but they collected a numerous army to oppose' him, which was commanded by the two consuls Paulus Embus and Varro. The Romans, including their allies, amounted to fourscore thou sand foot, and about six thousand horse. The Car, thaginian army consisted of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand cavalry. The whole infantry of the .Roman army were in one line, closer and deeper than usual; the cavalry upon the two wings ; and the light armed troops advanced in front at some distance from the main body. Paulus /Emilins commanded the right wing, Varro the left, and Servilius Gremi nus the centre of the army. Hannibal also drew up his army in one line of equal depth, with the Spanish and .Gaulish cavalry on the left, and the Numidian horse on the right. The light armed troops were stationed in front facing those of the Romans. Hanno commanded the "right wing, Asdrubal the left, arid Hannibal the centre of the army, which was com posed of the Spanish and Gaulish legionaries, and advanced forward in such a manner, as that the whole line formed the figure of a crescent, with the Convex side towards the Romans. The light armed troops commenced the battle, and the horse of the left wing of the Carthaginian' army so furiously charged those of the Roman right, that they gave way and were totally dispersed. The infantry of the Carthaginian centre were unable to withstand the superior numbers of the Romans, and gave ground. Hannibal had calculated upon this circumstance, and was accordingly prepared to receive the eager Ro mans by a second line of battalions, which he had drawn from the wings, and were ranged in close or-, der. The front of the Carthaginian army HOW be came a crescent with the concave side towards the ene my, who impetuously pressed forward, exposed both his flanks to the assaults of the Carthaginian. wins, and being at the same time attacked in rear by the vic torious Asdrubal, who had also dispersed the cavalry of the left wing, the Romans were thus encompassed on all sides, and so much compressed, that they had MA room to wield their arms, and Were put to .the sword, to the number of seventy thousand.
Hannibal's disposition his army in the battle of Canna, has been admired by the tacticians of all succeeding ages. But it is evident, that the success of the horse of his left wing gave him a decided su periority over the Romans, whose only error arose from too keenly pursuing the Carthaginian centre, while their flanks were unprotected, in consequence of the dispersion of their cavalry.
In the celebrated battle of Pharsalia, the defeat of Pompey's horse gave the victory to Cmsar. Pom pey drew up his army with the veteran soldiers in the centre and on the flanks ; and the less expert be tween the wings and the main body ; with the whole of his cavalry on the left flank, the right being pro tected by.the river Enipeus. When Caesar observed that his great antagonist had drawn all his cavalry to one point, he conjectured that Pompey intended to turn his right flank, to prevent which, he stationed six cohorts, as a separ.ite body, behind the right wing. Pompey's horse compelled Cxsar's to give ground; but when they extended themselves with the view of flanking Cxsar's left wing, the cohorts vigorously attacked, broke, and dispersed them, and then fell upon the rear of Pompey's left wing. Cesar in the mean time brought up his third line, which till then had not engaged, and Pompey's in fantry being thus on all sides, could no longer resist, but fled to their camp. Caesar owed
his success, in a great measure in this battle, to the able disposition of his army, especially in forming the cohorts' as a corps-de.-reserve, which repulsed the enemy's cavalry, turned his right flank, and attacked his legions in the rear.
The Roman manner of drawing up an army for battle may be sufficiently illustrated by the instance of a 'single legion. The cavalry were stationed on the wings, and the infantry. formed on a line with the first cohort ; the second cohort drew up on the left of the first ; the third occupied the centre ; the fourth was next ; and the fifth closed the left flank. In the second line, the sixth cohort drew up behind the first on the right flank, the seventh next, the eighth in the centre, the ninth was next, and the tenths al ways closed the left wing. In the rear of. these two lines were the light infantry, armed with shields, javelins, swords, and missive weapons, and here also the archers and diners were posted. In the rear of these three lines the triarii were stationed. They were armed with shields, cuirasses, helmets, greaves, swords, and daggers, loaded javelins, and two missive weapons. They rested on one knee during the ac tion, that in the event of the preceding lines being defeated they might be fresh when brought up to the charge. In the beginning of the conflict, the first, second,, and fourth lines, remained immoveable, and the light armed troops advanced in front of the line and attacked the enemy. - If they were, successful, they pursued him; but if they were repulsed, they retired behind 'the heavy armed infantry, which now sustained the action, at first, with their missive wea pons, and then, sword in hand. If the enemy fled, he was pursued by the light armed troops and cavalry ; but if the contrary happened, and the legion was worsted,•it endeavoured t6 preserve its qrder in the retreat. A Roman legion was an army complete in all its contained every thing requisite for war within itself. A free space for his arms and motions was allowed to the soldier, and by the inter vals the exhausted ranks could be easily supplied with reinforcements. The Greeks and Macedonians formed their system of tactics on very different prin ciples; for the strength of the phalanx depended up on sixteen ranks of long pikes wedged together in the closest array. " But it was soon discovered, says Gibbon, " by reflection as well as by the event, that the strength of the phalanx was unable to con , tend with the activity of the legion." The people of antiquity were extremely addicted to superstitious rites, which preceded every great un and war, the must momentous business of mankind, called forth all their prejudices in favour of ;divination and sacrifices. Oracles and augurs were consulted, and lucky or unlucky days were consider ed, previous to entering into a war, or engaging in battle. This custom of soliciting the assistance of the gods, universally prevailed amongst the Egyptian, Assyrian, Grecian, and Roman nations. The Lace demonians' had no the'glorious battle of Ma , rathon, because, by a ridiculous superstition, they were prevented from marching before the day of full moon. But much were that people under the in fluence of divination, that, at the battle of Platma, they tamely remained in their ranks while the Per sians assaulted them, because their offer of sacrifice did not seem to be acceptable to the gods. Pausa 'nias, the Spartan general, by the fervency of his prayers, obtained at last the favour of heaven ; and the sacrifices appearing propitious, gave the signal for battle, when his army fell upon the Persians with such resolution that they were totally defeated.