Frederick's judicious disposition of his battalions, and his seizing the critical moment to attack tha enemy in flank, decided the battle of Craslau ; and by similar manoeuvres, he defeated the Austrians in the battle of Hohenfriedberg. In the battle of Sohr, the success of his cavalry enabled the Prussian infan try to carry the Austrian batteries, and to turn and attack the flank of their army, which decided the victory. In the battle of Rosbach he displayed the same manoeuvres, and the same promptitude of ac tion. The enemy's army ivas composed of battalions arranged alternately in column and in line ; but his right flank was unsupported; and Frederick, adopt , ing Cxsar's plan at the battle of Pharsalia, traversed his left wing with two battalions. The enemy ad vancing to the attack, these battalions wheeled half a circle to the right, which threw them on his flank. The French, being galled by the fire of the Prus sians, pressed towards the left, which made the co lumns and battalions a heavy and compressed line, that was exposed to the discharges of the whole Prus sian front. By this judicious disposition of Frede rick's battle, a handful of men overcame a great ar my. In the decisive battle of Leuthen, the disposi tion and rrialazuvres of the Prussiars were exactly si ..milar to those of tin' Theban in toe haul.; og I t Their right wing threatened to cunt and t.t.
tack the enemy's left, while the rest of their line d formed in an oblique direction, gradually diverging as it extended. The Prussian right wing according ly attacked and repelled the Austrian left, and, seizing an eminence which it had occupied, planted a battery of cannon, that decided the fate of the day. In this battle the Austrians were 60,000 strong, and the Prussians no more than 30,000; but still the science and able disposition of Frederick reduced the supe rior number of the enemy to nothing, and gave him a most important victory.
The motives that may induce an experienced gene •al to hazard a battle arise from various considera tions. The consequences that may result from it, when decisive, are so important and momentous, that nothing but the fullest confidence of success, on the one hand, or imperious necessity on the other, could induce a man of reflection to venture so great a stake, especially as he must be aware that the issue depends upon so many contingencies. The greatest captains of all ages have occasionally committed errors, and miscalculated the extent of their own powers, as well as those of the enemy ; but in many instances, a tri vial circumstance, unempectedly occurring, has deci ded a battle, contrary to all expectation. The dis cipline and spirit of the troops, conjoined to a confi dence in the skill of their commander, are great means of ensuring success ; and the expectation of victory often stimulates to extraordinary exertions.
There are certain common rules which ought to be observed by every general before he engages in battle. He ought to know the nature of the enemy's
ground as well as his own ; the strong or weak posi tions which it presents ; and by what local advantages his own flanks can be supported, or those of the ene my attacked ; and also to be acquainted with the weak points of his own and antagonist's disposition, that he may be prepared to strengthen the one, or to assault the other. For the purpose of supporting or attacking weak points, a corps-de.re.scrve is ge nerally stationed in rear, and the exertions of that body have sometimes produced the most important consequences. The reserve under Dessaix decided the battle of Marengo in favour of the French, by charging the Austrian centre, which had been too much weakened.
A genius for war is a peculiar gift which few men possess ; and although it may be improved by study and experience, yet no man can ever be a great gene ral, unless he be naturally active, and at the same time cool and considerate, but above all, endowed with a quickness of perception, that enables him instantly to discover every contingency that may arise amidst the bloody scene of a battle. He must be capable of opposing the sudden movements of the enemy, by new schemes instantaneously adopted, and readily ex as it is by. a general's address that he can take advantage of circumstances, and may sometimes make a motion conducive to the whole success of the battle.
The order and disposition of the troops depend en. tirely upon the commander, whose duty it is to give them every possible advantage ; but the faithful exe cution of his orders depend upon his general officers, who ought to have as.much knowledge of the busi ness of the day, as to be able to vary them according to circumstances, when in such situations as that the commander himself cannot direct their operations. The multiplicity of intricate movements that must necessarily occur in battle, and which are connected with many unforeseen circumstances, preclude the possibility of previously arranging all the different parts of an army, so as not to require, during action, the constant patchfulness of those who command ; and he is the best general who is able to profit from every varying incident that may be presented to him in such a scene of bloodshed, uproar, and confusion. See Rollin's Ancient History, vol. ii. p. 123, 126, 132, 244, 215 ; vol. iii. p. 95, 99 ; vol. iv. p. 310, 311, 410 ; vol. v. p. 251 ; vol. vi. p. '21 ; vol. ix. p. 79. Gillies' History of Greece, vol. i. p. 397, 398 ; vol. iii. p. 257, 368 ; vol. iv. p. '208, 220. Rol lin's Roman History, vol. v. p. 60, 61 ; vol. xiv. p. 11. Polybius, book iii. Adams' Roman Antiq. p. 378, 379, 382, 383. Vcgetius, book ii. and iii. Potter's Antiq. vol. ii. p. 76-79. Gillies' View of the Reign of Frederick of Prussia, p. 12, 116, 16`2, 255, 262.
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