During the first part of the discussions respecting Malta, it appears that Bonaparte, confiling in the pacific wishes of the British government, was anxious only for the positive stipulation of the treaty, viz. our sur render of Malta ; the conditional part, that is, the gua rantee of the independence of the island by the powers of Europe, he hoped would have been dispensed with, and that the island would thus be left to his power and influence, as a stepping-stone to Egypt, the great object of his wishes. As his strides to universal dominion in Europe became bolder, and more rapid, he perceived an alarm in the British councils, which he probably feared might occasion a war prematurely for his pur poses. Ile wished, at all events, to throw the appear ance of aggression on our court, and, instead of delay ing the guarantee of Malta, used his influence so suc cessfully at Petcrsburgh, that the emperor Alexander gave in his projet respecting the island, and agreed to guarantee its independence. The British court, which had so lately pushed all Europe to guarantee this inde pendence, were now solicitous to find pretexts for re jecting the sponsors. Alexander's projet was sent back for alteration ; and an objection to the very restora tion of the island to the knights, founded on the dislike of the inhabitants to their government, was studiously brought forward, after the treaty had been signed. On the 25th of January 1803, M. Talleyrand informed Lord Whitworth, that the difficulties respecting the emperor Alexander's guarantee of Malta would be speedily removed, and requested to know the intentions of his Britannic majesty respecting the 10th article of the treaty. From the embarrassment of this question, our ambassador was delivered by the conduct of the first consul, who had published the report of his military missionary Sebastiani, a report, which brought to light his design of occupying Egypt and the Ionian islands. Britain declined any promise about Malta, till this offen sive report should be explained.
At this unfavourable stage of the negotiation, a mes sage came from the king to parliament, stating, that such preparations had taken place in the ports of France, as called upon his majesty to increase his armaments by sea and land. The French government protested, that they had no view in these preparations, but the quieting their own colony of St Domingo.
The resolution of France, to consider our refusal to evacuate Malta as the signal for hostilities, was an nounced in the ever memorable interview, when the French ruler insulted Lord Whitworth before all the ambassadors of Europe. Yet, as it was evidently not the interest of the first consul to go so soon to war, he recovered his irritation so far as to protract the negotia tion. In the ultimatum offered by Britain, it was pro posed, that we should retain Malta for ten years. France in return, proposed, that it should be ceded to Russia. Lord Whitworth left Paris with this offer to return thither no more, war being declared against France by his Britannic majesty, on the 18th of May 1803.
The invasion and occupation of Hanover by the French, was the most important of the early fruits of the war. (See HANOVER.). The preparations on the part of Britain, in the mean time, corresponded to the magnitude of her resources, and the patriotic spirit of her people, and the threats of invasion which were held out to her. Independent of the army of reserve, and of the regular and supplementary militia, 300,000 volunteers were immediately under arms. Expeditions
were fitted out, which captured the settlements of St Lucia, Tobago, Essequibo, and Demerara ; and the island of St Domingo was enabled to set France at defiance, by a British squadron which assisted the efforts of the blacks.
In a view of affairs so limited as the present, we should deem it unfair to pronounce upon the merits or demerits of Mr Addington's administration. After main taining, for some time, a divided opposition, the par tics of Lord Grenville and Mr Fox coalesced; and Mr Pitt, who at first had favoured the Addingtonian cabinet, was gradually estranged, and at last avowedly hostile to it. As the country was supposed to be now in the most critical situation which she hat ever experienced, the general voice of the community was in favour of an union of all men of weight and talents. This capable and comprehensive administration Mr Pitt, it was said, was as desirous as any man of seeing formed. lie is said, by his friends, to have strongly urged his sove reign to the measure. But if such were his wishes, he acted in contradiction to them, and again consented to come into office in a new administration,* which com menced in May 1804. While the exclusive system of the restored minister was generally blamed, yet an in crease of vigour in the conduct of affairs was expected from his superior talents. A considerable time, howe ver, elapsed, without a single event to justify their hopes. Gores was taken by the French, but recovered. The only conquest within the year was the capture of Surinam, by a force which sailed from Barbadoes under General Green, and Commodore Hood. Some attempts were made on the enemy's flotilla by our single sloops and frigates, but with little success ; and the experi ment of blowing up the enemy's marine in their har bour by clock-work explosions, brought only ridicule on its projectors. Since the recommencement of hosti lities, Spain had been suffered to preserve a neutrality, though obviously under the controul of France, and paying her a yearly tribute. Information, however, be ing received, that active preparations were making in her ports, and that French troops were passing through Spain to co-operate in her harbours, a British squadron was dispatched to intercept the Spanish frigates, which were conveying her specie from America to Cadiz. This service was promptly performed by captain Moore in the Indefatigable, and three frigates under his com mand. On the 5th of October, that officer fell in with four large Spanish frigates, and an engagement ensued, in which one of the enemy's vessels blew up, with the loss of 240 lives. The captured treasure was brought to England ; but the justice of striking such a blow, be fore a declaration of war, was justly questioned. It was said, that the treasure ships were only meant to be re tained as pledges, till satisfaction for her rumoured pre parations should be given by Spain; and the blame of incurring bloodshed, was imputed to the obstinacy of the Spanish commander. That Spain was, at this period, left without a free will, and incapable of supporting even the limited neutrality which she had hitherto enjoyed, may well be supposed ; but if war was necessary, it should have been openly declared ; and, if it was intended to lay hold of the treasure ships without bloodshed, a larger force should have been sent, to which a Spanish commander could with honour have submitted.