After the fatal and dreadful battle of Averstadt, Bonaparte pursued his career to Berlin, with no resis tance from the broken remains of the Prussian army, except from the small and single band of the gallant Blucher, who at last surrendered at Lubeck, after the city had been taken by storm. At Berlin, the con queror, whilst he was erecting new kingdoms and dukedoms, published his famous decree against the commerce of Britain, by which he declared the whole island in a state of blockade. He set out from thence to pursue the king of Prussia across the Oder, whilst the garrisons of that unfortunate monarch, either front panic or treachery, seemed to bo emulous which should be the first to surrender.} One of the capital errors of Prussia had been to rush into the contest with France, without waiting for the co-operation of Russia. On the first intimation of her danger, the Russian troops advanced through Poland, and, as if they had hoped to retrieve one fault by com mitting another, exactly imitated the example of their defeated ally, in precipitately meeting the French. General Beningsen, at the head of their first division, reached Warsaw before the French. A check, which he received on the Vistula, taught him the necessity of retreating behind the Narew, where he was joined by the divisions of Buxhoveden and Kamenskoy, the latter of whom was appointed to the chief command of Alex ander's forces. From the Narew, the Russian columns made a second retreat, broken and discomfited, and were saved only by the badness of the roads, which im peded the progress of the French artillery. At that critical moment, the Russian generalissimo Kamen skoy left his army, and retired to Ostrolenka. It was given out that his understanding was deranged. A very different account of his conduct is not discredited by the issue of the campaign. He was old in military experience, and is said to have been the only one of the Russian generals, who saw the danger of their situation, and to have left the army in disgust and des pair, when lie found his authority insufficient to curb the impetuosity of the younger generals, who were determined on risking another engagement. J3enning sen and Buxhoveden accordingly fought at Pultusk, and at Golymyn. The latter claimed a victory, his an tagonists did the same. Of the murderous conflicts on these new scenes of warfare, it is not easy to separate the real from the falsified accounts on both sides ; but the indisputable trophies of 80 pieces of cannon taken from the Russians, which their enemies brought back to Warsaw, left room to suppose, that the severest loss was not upon the side of the French. After the battle of Pultusk, the French retired into winter quarters on the Vistula ; the Russians fell back to Ostrolenka, on the Niemen. The command of the army after the bat tle of Pultusk, was given to Benningsen, who joined with Buxhoveden, after the undeniable defeat of that general at Golymyn.
The plan of Benningsen was to turn the left flank of the French army, and his eye was therefore kept upon the Vistula; while Bonaparte, perceiving that his ene my meant to give him no rest in his winter quarters, directed his view to the Pregel and the Niemen, and determined to anticipate the attack. At Mohringhen, a general action was brought on, where, as usual, both sides claimed the victory. In this, as well as in the tremendous battle of Eylau, which succeeded to it, the claims of the Russians, to the honour of checking Bo naparte, are not without appearances of justice. if the French emperor buried their dead at Eylau, took a num ber of their artillery, and remained seven days on the field after the latter battle, he failed, through the obsti nacy of their resistance, in fulfilling his promise of being at Koningsberg. Inspired by the unexpected circum stance of even a doubtful contest with Bonaparte, the public sanguine expectation made no distinction be tween the efforts which might keep him at bay for a short time, and those which should destroy him. But if Russia possessed, at any moment, either generalship or physical force to combat France, it can only be said, that they both declined instantaneously after the battle of Eylau. It seemed as if the understanding of her leaders, as much as the numerical power of her armies, had been wasted in the agony of her struggle. A num ber of actions in the spring campaign of 1807, in the intermediate time between those of Eylau and Fried land, displayed the superior tactics of the French, and in spite of all her reinforcements, the decreasing strength of her army. Yet, alter all the successes of Jerome Bo
naparte in Silesia, and even after 40,000 French troops were added to the main army of Bonaparte, by the cap ture of Dantzic, the Russians persisted in the plan of coming to a general and decisive action. The battle of Friedland was indeed decisive.
With a wanton and ambitions confidence in her own strength, Russia had so timed her attack upon Turkey, as to have 30,000 of her troops invading Wallachia and Moldavia during the crisis of her struggle with France. A revolution in Constantinople, which placed Mustapha IV. on the throne of the empire, took place during the approach of the Russian armies. It was ascribed, by the French, to the influence of English gold ; but it was, in truth, unconnected with politics, and wholly prompt ed by the resentment of the Janissaries, at some recent innovations which had been made by the government, supposed to be favourable to the Christians. The new Turkish sovereign fell, like his predecessor, into the French influence ; a natural consequence of the hostility of Russia, although the Russians declared, that they only wished to rescue the Ottoman empire from the grasp of Bonaparte. Whilst the influence of Sebastiani, the French resident, was sensibly gaining ground, our minister, Mr Arbuthnot, wrote home to our govern ment the state of affairs, and, at his instance, as well as by the advice of the Russian minister at Petersburgh, a British fleet was sent out under the command of Sir John Duckworth,' to give weight to the joint negotia tion of England and Russia with the Porte, tor concluding a peace. Our naval force cast anchor at the isle of nedos about the middle of February, where it was joined by a British frigate from the harbour of Constantinople, on board of which Mr Arbuthnot, in the fear of personal violence, made his escape. On the 19th, our fleet passed the Dardanelles, and, at the outer castle, as a mark of forbearance, made no return to the fire of the Turks. But in passsing the narrow strait between Scs tos and Abydos, they were obliged to answer a very heavy cannonade, which was opened from the inner castles. Within these, a small Turkish squadron was destroyed by Sir Sydney Smith, and a formidable bat tery was spiked by the marines. After this a fruitless negotiation commenced, which lasted for several days, during which time the Turks had time to construct most formidable batteries along the shore. In this work, the population of the Turkish capital and its neighbour hood, inspired by unbounded enthusiasm, were employ ed from the highest to the lowest orders, till they had mounted batteries and breast-works with 600 pieces of artillery. They were directed by French engineers, whom the sultan had obtained from Dalmatia at the breaking out of hostilities with Russia. In the mean time, the British admiral and ambassador offered to with draw beyond the Dardanelles, even should the proffered amity of England and Russia be declined, if the Porte would deliver its fleet and naval stores. In the event of a refusal, they threatened Constantinople with bombard ment. But during the whole negotiation, if we may credit Sir John Duckworth, it was not in the power of the British squadron to put their threat in execution; for although they had cast anchor within a few miles of the city, the state of the weather would not have per mitted them to maintain a station so near as to bombard it. Had the Turks been allowed another week to com plete their batteries, the very return of the British squa dron would lrive been doubtful. From this peril the British admiral was glad to make his escape,. and to. forego the threatened assault of a city, defended by 200,000 enemies, of which the destruction, had it been possible, would have been an unprofitable act of ven geance. On the first of March, he weighed anchor to repass the Dardanelles, a return, which was not effect ed without peril and loss. The Turkish mortars, in short, discharged bullets and blocks of marble of in credible size upon our ships One of these, weighing 800 pounds, cut the main-mast of the Windsor Castle man of war in two, and the ship was with difficulty saved. In this unhappy enterprize, we lost 250 men.