The natural humanity of the British public, excited by the horrible details of this siege, gave a popular aid to the outcry of the opponents of government at this proceeding. Ministers, too, in their own defence, were anxious to impress the public with a belief that specific information of the intentions of Denmark to throw her self into the scale of France, or, more properly speak ing, to submit to her, had been received from their foreign agents. It was even pretended, that Denmark had been forced to be a secret party to the treaty of Til sit, although it was afterwards proved that the date of our resolution against Copenhagen had been long ante rior to any communications that could be made respect ing the treaty of Tilsit. The most tenable grounds of defence which ministers exhibited, were, first, the ge neral probability of Denmark being unable or unwilling to make a last stand against France; and, secondly, the express overtures which had been made to the Prince Regent of Portugal, and which he had communicated to the British ministry. In these, the adherence of Den mark to the French interests was announced, both as the means and the motive for obtaining that of Portugal. It has been stated with confidence, that the Danish minis ter himself admitted the impossibility of defending Hol stein, Sleswig, and Jutland, from French invasion. The only doubt that remains, is, what the Danish court, dri ven to the solitary possession of Zealand, would have done ? Whether they would have stood, with passive heroism, faithful to alliance with us, as their defenders, or purchased their political, though still dependent exis tence, by submission to the power who could still give them much, and tekc every thing except Zealand and their fleet ? We think the weight of probability lies heavily against such an hypothesis.
But the system on which the Danish war was com menced, ifjustifiable, was not improved to the extent of which it was capable ; and the abandonment of the island of Zealand, left the acquisition of the object which would have best justified the expedition, to the mercy of a French army, as soon as the Danes should have a fleet worth seizing.
The treaty of Tilsit was hardly concluded, when Bo naparte turned his eyes towards the west of Europe, and resolved on the subjugation of Portugal and Spain. He demanded of the court of Lisbon, to shut up the ports of Portugal against England ; to detain all Englishmen residing in that country ; to confiscate all English pro perty ; denouncing war in case of refusal : And, without waiting for an answer, he gave orders for detaining all Portuguese merchant ships that were in the ports of France. The Prince Regent of Portugal, hoping to ward off the storm, acceded to the shutting up of his ports ; but refused to comply with the two other demands, as being contrary to the law of nations, and to the treaties that subsisted between the two countries. The court of Portugal then began to adopt measures for securing its retreat to the Portuguese dominions in South America. For that purpose, the Prince Regent ordered all ships of war fit to keep the sea to be fitted out ; and also gave warning of what was intended to the English, directing them to sell their property, and to leave Portugal, in or der thus to avoid an effusion of blood, which, in all pro bability, would have proved useless. He -resolved also
to comply, if possible, with the views of the French Em peror, in case he should not be softened to more mode rate terms. But Bonaparte peremptorily insisted, not only on the shutting up of the ports, but on the impri sonment of all British subjects, the confiscation of their property, and a dereliction of the project of retiring to America. The Prince Regent, when he had reason to believe that all the English not naturalized in the coun try had taken their departure from Portugal, and that all English property had been sold, adopted the resolution of shutting his ports against England, and even of com plying with the other demands of France : Declaring, however, at the same time, that should the French troops enter Portugal, he was resolved to remove the seat of government to Brazil, the most important and best defended part of his dominions.
It had been frequently stated to the cabinet of Lisbon, by the English ambassador Lord Strangford, that his Britannic majesty, in agreeing not to resent the exclu sion of British commerce from the ports of Portugal, had gone to the utmost extent of forbearance ; that, in mak ing this concession to the peculiar circumstances of the prince regent's situation, his majesty had done all that friendship could justly require, and that a single step beyond this line of modified hostility must lead to the extremity of actual war. Nevertheless the prince re gent, in the fond hope of preserving Portugal by conci liating France, on the 8th of November signed an order for detaining the few British subjects, and of the very inconsiderable portion of British property that yet re mained in Lisbon. On the publication of this order, Lord Strangford removed the arms of England from the gates of his residence ; demanded his passports ; pre sented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the court of Lisbon ; and retired to a British squadron, commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, who immediately established a most rigorous blockade at the mouth of the Tagus. A few days after, the intercourse between the court of Lisbon and the British ambassador was renew ed. Lord Strangford, under due assurance of protection and security, proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, when he found the prince regent wisely directing all his appre hensions to a French army which had entered Portugal, and was on its march to Lisbon, and all his hopes to an English fleet. The object of this march he was at no loss to understand ; for Bonaparte had declared in his journals, that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. Lord Strangford promised to the prince regent, on the faith of his sovereign, that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazils.