In his progress, Sir John Moore found the consti tuted authorities reluctant to afford hint support : reluctance which continued, either from treachery or sluggishness, throughout the woole of his campaign To increase his embarrassments, Lord Castlereagh, after dispatching an inadequate supply of money, wrote to the general, that silver was not to he found in Eng land, and that he must expect no more for some months. Before he arrived at Salamanca, he learned, that the Spaniards had been defeated at Burgos. At Salamanca, he learned that the French had advanced to Valladolid, within twenty leagues of him. Thus, instead of finding, as he had been taught to expect, his entry into Spain covered by 60,000 Spaniards, he found the enemy within three marches of him, and not a Spanish picquet in his front. He saw, also, that the advance of the French had produced no sensation in the country. The people were all tranquil, and employed about their ordinary occupations, knowing and caring little about public matters. Four days after his coming to Salamanca, the British general received the news of Blake's total defeat, in a letter from Mr Stuart, our resident at Madrid, who described the imbecility of the Spanish junta, and justly inferred from it, that there was room for the most desponding flews. The accounts of the other armies already stated, prepared him to hear of the most disastrous events. In the mean time, Sir David Baird had arrived at. Corunna. (October 13.) In his march from that place, au alarm, communicated to him by Blake, that the French were penetrating by Rio Seco, made him prepare to retreat back to Comma ; but the alarm was discovered by Sir John Moore to be false, and he received orders to continue his advance. Every day, however, brought intelligence of new dis asters, and more clearly disclosed the dangers of the British army in front. Yet was it, at this time, that General Aloore received from Mr Frere, our ambas sador at Madrid, the most pressing solicitations to ad vance, and push forward to the Spanish capital under any circumstances. This was also the opinion of the traitor Morla, who recommended that he should hasten with a part of his army, if he could not bring forward the whole of it. But the intelligence of Castanos' defeat, and the utter dispersion of all Spanish force in the north, made it doubtful whether he might be able to effect a junction with either Sir David Baird, or with General Hope, who commanded that division of his army which had come from Portugal by a different route, and which had not yet joined him. Even the united army was totally inadequate to meet the French. The general therefore determined to retreat deliberately to Portugal ; to order Sir David Baird back to Corunna ; and to join General Hope.
A large reinforcement of more than 30,000 French were, to Sir John Moore's certain knowledge, on their march through Biscay, which, independent of other sources of reinforcement, could be instantly augmented from the victorious army which had routed Castanos at Tudcla. The whole force destined to act under General Moore, did not exceed 28,000, now divided into three bodies, whose rcjunction ryas endangered by the advance of the main body, and whose continued strength, even after a junction, was utterly unfit to turn the scale against at least an hundred and fifty thousand disciplined Trench, driving the remnants of Spanish armies before them. Mr Frere, however, had arrived at Madrid with fresh instructions from the British cabinet. He was not empowered, it is true, to dictate orders to Sir John Moore ; but the general was directed by the British minister to receive requisitions or representations from Mr Frcre, or from the Spanish government, upon all occasions, with the utmost deference and respect : if a Spanish commander in chief was appointed, Sir John Moore was to obey him implicitly. Already Sir John Moore had discovered what was to be expected from Spanish co-operation. Ile knew that there was no Spanish army to support him, only Romana, who was assembling the fugitives of Blake's army in Leon. He had distinctly stated, nearly a month before, that four times his force would be numbered and beaten, tudcso the mass of the Spanish people could resist the enemy themselves. He saw that there was no energy in their government ; and whatever accounts had reached Eng land of the general enthusiasm of the nation, he saw no appearance of it in the provinces which were now to be the scene of action.
Mr Frere, however, had brought from England those exaggerated ideas of Spanish armies and Spanish suc cess, which the false statements of the juntas had first inspired. He described the delays and difficulties likely to attend the reinforcements of the French ; he informed Sir John Moore of a Spanish army 20,000 strong in Ne w Castile, on which Castanos was falling back ; he exhort ed him to advance to Madrid ; and added, this step, he was convinced, would be approved of by the British government; whilst he ventured even to menace the general with the indignation of his country and govern ment, if he refused to adopt his frantic scheme of the British army to the defence of Madrid. A
second communication reached the general, together with two Spanish generals, whom the junta had sent to exhort him to march to Madrid. They declared, that the Spanish general St Juan had fortified the passes to Madrid against the French, with 20,000 men. General Graham, however, arrived with intelligence that St Juan's corps had been utterly routed. General Moore still persevered in his resolution to retreat, until the 5th of December, when the strong representations of the junta ; the resolution which he was told the people of Madrid had adopted of defending the capital to the last ; the reported weakness of the French ; and the duty which he conceived his country exacted from him, of rather hazarding considerable danger, than saving his army by retreat, induced him to change his resolu tion. In the mean time Madrid surrendered, but it did not shake the purpose of the British commander to attempt a diversion which might favour the rallying of the discomfited Spanish armies. Having been joined by General Hope, he continued to take measures from the 5th to the 14th of December, for collecting his whole force at Valladolid for the purpose of effecting a diver sion in favour of the southern patriots. He would thus have General Baird in his rear. But his troops had only proceeded a single march, when it was known that Bonaparte was advancing towards Lisbon, on the natural supposition that the British would retreat from Sala manca, and that Soult was at Saldanna with a corps of 18,000 men. The general instantly perceived an open ing, of which advantage might be taken. With a view to attack Soult before he should be reinforced, he moved, not to Valladolid, but to the left, and joining General Baird, advanced rapidly to the Carrion. An affair between the advanced posts of the two armies, gave marks of the superior valour of the British cavalry, but the attack of the main body was suspended ; for it was learnt that Bonaparte was recalling his troops from the road to Portugal ; had left Madrid in person, with 40,000 men, to throw himself in the rear of the British ; and that Soult, whose position gave him a choice of retreating, as well as a power of taking our army in flank, had been strongly reinforced. There was not a moment to be lost. Soult's army alone was superior to the British. Junot, with another corps, threatened their right flank. Bonaparte pushed on so rapidly, that the advanced guard of his cavalry passed through Tordesillas the same day that the van of the British left Sahagun. Both French and British were moving to the same point, Benevente, which was dis tant from the English about 40, and from the French about 60 miles. In fine, the whole disposable force of the French army, forming an irregular crescent, was moving with rapid steps to surround the British. Bona pane's cavalry, and part of his artillery, actually came up with the rear of the British at Benevente, but were repulsed by the skill and gallantry of Lord Paget. Bonaparte, however, although disappointed in overtak ing our army at Benevente, was confident that Soult would reach Astorga in sufficient time to cut off their retreat. In this attempt Sunk also was foiled, by the able dispositions of the British general, who drew off his whole forces before the enemy could come up with him. General Moore had at first entertained hopes of being able to make a stand in Gallicia. Whether such a stand could have been of avail had the Spaniards given us support, is doubtful ; but their total apathy left no room for the experiment. The delay of a day's march would have enabled the enemy to surround our army. Had General Moore halted at Astorga, the retreat to Corunna would have been cut off. Bonaparte formed a junction at Astorga with the army of Soult ; and finding, by the retreat of the British from thence, that they could not be surrounded, he detached a large force to harass and pursue them. Three Mar shals of France, with as many divisions, were com manded to follow them. Although the enemy had hitherto been frustrated in his view of surrounding the British army, yet a multitude of severe distresses were accumulating un their retreat. The weather was severe, and provisions were scanty and irregularly supplied. The inhabitants of Spain gave no aid to their per severing allies, and made no attempt to annoy or retard the enemy. Instead of this, they fled from their houses, barring their doors, and carrying off cattle, provisions, and forage ; every thing that could be useful to the British, or lessen their distresses. It is a melancholy truth, which must be added, that the conduct of the Britisn soldiers, in every thing except courage, was unworthy of their cause and character during the great er part of the retreat, and was such as to draw censure from their commander.