In turning our view to Spanish affairs during the year 1809, we find, that after the embarkation of the British army from Corunna, the arms of the French seem to have met with no material resistance except at Saragos sa. The Duke del Infantado's army was chased out of Valencia, and took the route to Granada. Ferrol, be fore which the Duke of Dalmatia (General Soult) pre sented himself eleven days after the battle of Corunna, surrendered without resistance. King Joseph again made his public entry into Madrid, on the 22d of Janu ary 1809. Saragossa alone, which had before made the French fly from before its walls, made a second and most honourable defence, till the ravages of an epide mical distemper had thinned the ranks of its defenders. Palafox, who had so nobly guided the courage of the Spanish patriots, was, immediately after the surrender of the town, sent under a strong escort to France. From the time that Bonaparte left the peninsula, to organize the Austrian campaign, the operations of the French grew for some time more desultory, and less effective. The Spanish army of Cuesta, however, which, about the beginning of March, was posted on the Tagus, to op pose the'entrance of the French into Portugal, was obliged to leave the passage of that river open to the French, who directed their first efforts in Portugal against Oporto. The city, though defended by 24,000 men, and 200 pieces of cannon, opposed only a feeble resistance, and the enemy proceeded against Chaves. The Portuguese general Silviera, who commanded there, made a prudent retreat from it, and permitted the French to enter ; ,ut he returned with reinforcements, and retook it by surprise, together with 1500 prisoners.
In the mean time, the patriots of GalBela, who had rested so perfectly neutral during the appearances of a British army among them, made a partial insurrection when it could be of least service, and, assisted by two British frigates, compelled the inhabitants of Vigo to surrender.
In the beginning of April, the principal French and Spanish armies were thus situated: The Marquis de Romana, with a handful of his forces, was at Villa Fran ca. Cuesta having been joined by a sm..11 corps under the Duke of Albuquerque, had halted, in his retreat be fore the French, in Vera Cruz. General Reding, who had been several times defeated near Terragona, and who had been foiled in an attempt to surprise Barcelo na, had been reinforced by some troops from General Blake, and both were employed in harassing the pro gress of the French in Catalonia. Marshal Soult (the Duke of Dalmatia) was at Oporto; the Duke of Elchin gen (General Ney) occupied the neighbourhood of Co runna and Ferrol ; and the Duke of Belluno (Marshal Victor) was advancing towards Lisbon on the north of Badajos, whilst Cuesta and Albuquerque retreated be fore him. After the junction of these commanders, the former thought himself sufficiently strong to give battle to the French under the Duke of Beiluno, who had ad vanced to Medellin with 20,000 foot and 5,000 cavalry. Cuesta suffered a severe defeat, and some of his regi ments behaved with notorious cowardice ; but other bo dies of his troops were deemed to have displayed so much gallantry, and the conduct and spirit of the Gene ral appeared in such a light to his countrymen, that the Supreme Junta issued from Seville a decree appointing him captain-general of their forces, and honorary as well as pecuniary rewards to his soldiers.
The resolution of Britain still to make common cause with the Spaniards, was expressed early in the year by a solemn treaty between the two powers. Don Pedro Cevallos (the author of the Exposition of Bonaparte's Conduct towards Spain) came to London,as ambassador from the Junta, with full powers to ratify an alliance which had hitherto received no formal ratification. His Britannic Majesty bound himself, by the treaty, not to acknowledge any other king of Spain and the Indies, than Ferdinand the VII. or his lawful successors acknow ledged by the Spanish nation.
The war between France and Austria had scarcely commenced, when the ministry, who had so loudly con demned their predecessors for having failed to co-ope rate in the last continental campaign, determined on sending to the Continent a very powerful expedition. The Earl of Chatham was appointed to command,—a choice which was exceedingly unpopular, and cast an "ominous conjecture on the whole success." The pro verbial indolence of that nobleman's character was the first reproach of minister's respecting the expedition ; and it was their last, though tacit, apology for its failure. But the real history of the commander's proceedings fully proved that the object of the expedition, not the hand to whom it was entrusted, was the blameable cause of disaster. The public learnt, when it was too late, that Mr. Pitt, to whom the same expedition had been suggested, had seriously sounded the difficulties of it, and, after consulting the able st military and naval autho rities, men who knew and had examined the enemy's strength on the spot, had renounced it as utterly inad visable.
Towards the end of July, this armament was assem bled on the shorts of England, the largest that had ever been prepared in this country. It consisted of a mili tary force of 34,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 16 com panies of artillery ; the whole was commanded by Lieu tenant-General the Earl of Chatham ; and of a naval force of 39 sail of the line, and 36 frigates, besides mor tar-vessels and gun-bots, under the orders of Rear-Ad miral Sir Richard Strachan. This conjoint expedition had for its object the capture or destruction of the ene my's ships either building at Antwerp or Flushing, or afloat on the Scheldt ; the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing; the reduction of the island of Walcheren; and the ren dering (if possible) the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war. The arrangements with respect to the debarkation of the army, were, for the most part, en trusted to Sir Home Popham : indeed, by many, it was supposed that he was the original mover of the expedi tion, and that the general disposition of attack had been suggested by him. The plan of the expedition was thus traced in outline before it sailed. The occupation of Walcheren was confided to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, and the left wing of the army, consisting of 13,000 men. The naval arrangements of this division were under the immediate direction of Rear-Admiral Otway. The point of debarkation depended upon the directions of the wind, and farther operations on the state of the defences of the island ; for such was the in formation of those who planned the expedition, that it was doubtful whether Veere, Middleburgh, and Flush ing, were not places of considerable strength, each re quiring a separate attack. Lieutenant-General the Mar quis of Huntly, with 5000 men, was to land upon the island of Cadsand, and to maintain himself in an en trenched position, with a view to cut off the communi cation between the town of Flushing and the Continent. Commodore Owen was to in this part of the service. A force of 5000 men, under Lieutenant-Ge neral Grosvenor, was destined to occupy the island of Schouwen ; while Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, with the reserve of 7500, was to land, and carry the island of South Beveland, and to act as a corps of ob servation during the attack of Walcheren. Sir Richard Keats had the naval charge of the reserve. The re mainder of the army under Lieutenant-General the Earl of Roslyn, was to remain embarked until their services should be required for the ulterior object of the expe dition. The commander-in-chief, with the divisions of Sir John Hope and the Marquis of Huntly, sailed from the on the morning of the 28th of July, and an chored in the evening off Walcheren. Sir Eyre Cootc's division sailed a day later, and joined the head-quarters on the morning of the 30th. General Grosvenor's divi sion, sailing from Harwich, anchored in the channel called the Roompot, (between North Beveland and Schouwen,) on the 1st of August. On the same day, Sir Eyre Coote's division, which had already landed on Walcheren, obliged the garrison of Veere (amounting to 519 officers and soldiers) to capitulate, and established its head-quarters at Middleburgh, which capitulated also. The commander, at the same time, detached a corps to reduce the fort of Rammikins. This place sur rendered on the 3d of August, and a way was opened to our vessels into the West Scheldt. A British flotilla, in the mean time, had advanced through the Sloe-pas sage ; so that we now commanded the approach to Flushing by our troops on the north, and by our naval force on the east and west sides; but the investment to the southward was not yet effected. While Sir Eyre Coote's division was thus employed, the reserve took possession of the island of South Beveland ; but this corps, from the 2d of August, remained merely as a corps of observation. In the mean time, the shores of the East Scheldt having been unexpectedly found de fenceless, General Grosvenor's division, instead of dis embarking on the island of Schouwen, landed on the of Walcheren, and proceeded to assist in the ope rations before Flushing. The original plan of attack was to reduce the place by means of bombardment; a mode of capturing places by no means so certain in its effects as a regular and scientific siege. It is also contrary to every principle of humanity, as well as policy, to aggravate the horrors of war, and excite the hatred of the peo ple, which, after the conquest of the place, may be of the most serious disadvantage to ourselves. It was a part of the plan as we have seen, that the Marquis of Huntly should land upon the island of Cadsand, and cut off the communication between Flushing and the Conti nent. Unhappily this part of the plan was frustrated, by the force of the enemy being stronger than expecta tion. Before our smaller armed vessels could intercept the communication between this island and Flushing, the enemy had thrown from thence into the latter garri son about three thousand men.