CAN NEE, in ancient geography, a small town of Ita ly, situated on the river Aufidus in Apulia, not far from the sea. The traces of Cann are at present very faint, consisting of a few fragments of walls, gates, and altars, with some excavations. Even the river seems to have degenerated from its ancient grandeur,—its sounding stream, so much celebrated by the poets, being, when visited by Swinburne, but a tame muddy rivulet. The embankments, however, by which its encroachments are restrained, sufficiently attest its force in winter, when it is swelled by the mountain torrents. Canna is chiefly remarkable for the battle fought in its vicinity, between Hannibal and the Romans in the second Punic war. This great engagement, which nearly annihilated the power of Rome, and which, in that case, would have to tally altered the destinies of the world, was fought in the year of Rome 536, before the Christian xra 216.
After the battles of Trebia and Trasimenus, in which the flower of the Romans perished, nothing short of mad ness could have prompted the senate and people to op pose to the victorious veterans of Hannibal their raw tumultuary levies, however numerous and brave. Fa bius Maximus accordingly adopted the wise policy of protracting the war ; and contenting himself with a mo derate number of troops, took care never to lose sight of the enemy, but at the same time not to come to a regular engagement. By this mode of warfare, the only one that has ever been successful in similar circumstances, the Carthagenians, in an enemy's country, were speedily thinned by the sword, famine, and disease. In propor tion as the Romans increased in numbers and experience, the invading army was diminished and disheartened ; and so nearly was Hannibal worn out by this plan, that his mercenaries were on the point of deserting, and he himself entertained the project of escaping into Gaul with his cavalry alone. lint his affairs were destined soon to be retrieved by the foolish impatience of the Ro man populace. A few successful encounters, hazarded contrary to the injunctions of Fabius, raised the spirits of the giddy rabble to such a pitch of frenzy, that they now began to impeach the courage and even integrity of Fabius, to demand a new system of war, and to look out for generals of a more enterprising description. Even the senate became infected with these sentiments ; and though they made some opposition to the election of Varro, a headstrong fiery character, and gave him for his colleague Paulus Emilius, a man of the same de scription as Fabius, they undeniably empowered these two consuls to seek the enemy, and bring the war to the issue of a general engagement. The preparations made for this event were such as Rome had never before wit nessed. Each of the four veteran legions already in the field, was recruited to the strength of 5000 foot, and 300 horse. In addition to these, four entirely new legions
were organised, consisting of the same number as the former ; and the whole being joined by an equal num ber of auxiliary foot, and twice the number of horse, a magnificent armament was thus quickly formed of about 88,000 combatants, of whom 7200 were cavalry. Han nibal's army was only 50,000 strong, composed chiefly of Gauls and Spaniards ; but of these, 10,000 were cavalry in the highest state of discipline. This superiority of the Romans in point of numbers was more than counter balanced by the inexperience of their troops, and by the opposite dispositions and unbecoming quarrels of the two consuls. Varro, all eagerness for engaging, and /Emilius, attached to the Fabian system, soon found it utterly impossible to carry on a joint command. From a partition of the troops, they were imperiously deterred by the recent disastrous example of Fabius and Minu cius : they therefore resolved on the equally dangerous expedient of taking the supreme command each his day alternately.
When the two consuls came up with Hannibal, whom they had followed from the north, they found him en camped near the village of Canna:, but on which side of the Aufidus is uncertain. Their first care, as usual, was to fortify a camp, which they pitched not far from Hannibal's, on the same side of the river ; and to se cure a free communication with the opposite bank, they pushed across a strong detachment, who fortified them selves in a lesser camp on the other side. It is proba ble, however, that the river was at this season, which was summer, easily fordable in most places, and that it presented no other obstacles than those arising from a rugged channel and steep banks. To Hannibal, who was apprised of every transaction within the Roman camp, the consular dissensions augured well ; and on the hot temper of Vary() he resolved to practice some of his old artifices. With this view, he ostentatiously offered battle, insulted the enemy by every means in his power, and while he thus encouraged his own troops, who were at first terrified by the amazing numbers of the Romans, he succeeded in bringing on, what was necessary to him in his present embarrassed circum stances, a general engagement. By a trivial event, he completely exhausted the patience of Varro ; for after having repeatedly insulted the greater camp of the Romans, he despatched a party of Numidian horse across the river, who falling suddenly on the water ing parties of the lesser camp, drove them with great slaughter before them, and advanced to the very ram parts. Had ./Emilins not happened to have the com mand this day, Varro would have crossed the river in Mandy to revenge the affront ; hut dila measure he was compelled to put off for a few hours longer, by the au thority or his colleague, who was entirely averse to a ge neral action.