Next morning's dawn discovered to the eyes of both armies the red flag, the signal for battle, flying over the (Alt of Varro ; who immediately after conducted his forces across the Aulidus, and joined them to those from the lesser camp. Xmilius, seeing now that all opposition was fruitless, accompanied Varro to the field, and, like a faithful soldier, seconded all his measures. The reasons which determined Varro to this movement with his main body, scent to have been both the desire of a position better adapted for his infantry, in which his chief strength lay, and the consideration, that on that side Hannibal had no camp to which he could retire in case of a defeat. The whole Roman army, with the ex ception of those left to guard the two camps, being now united, was drawn up by the consuls in the following array. In the right wing were posted the knights, the flower of the Roman cavalry, having their right flank protected by the river, and their faces turned to the south. Next came the legions, drawn up, on this occa sion, in one very deep compact line, on account of the smallness of the space for such a multitude, and proba bly the better to resist the shock of cavalry. On the left of the legions were drawn up in similar array, the whole body of the allies, having their own numerous cavalry posted on their left, who terminated, on that hand, the general line. An advance or first line was composed of the light infantry, armed with bows, slings, and javelins. The two consuls commanded the wings, fitImilius the right, and Varro the left, and to Servilius, a consul of the preceding year, was committed the con duct of the centre.
During these proceedings among the Romans, Han nibal was not idle. As soon as he discovered their in tention, he hastened to meet them beyond the Aulidus, on the ground which they themselves had chosen for the field of battle. Sending over his Balearic clingers and other light troops before him at break of day, to cover his passage, he himself soon followed at the head of his regular forces, which were conducted into the field according to their intended stations. While his men were coming up, Hannibal rode forward to an emi nence with a few attendants, in order to reconnoitre the enemy, whom he found already ranged in order of bat tle. Cisco, a Carthaginian nobleman, observed to him, with symptoms of alarm, that the number of the enemy was very astonishing; Hannibal, with a serious counte nance, told him, that there was something yet more astonishing ; c, for," said he, a in all that immense army, there is not one man whose name is Gisco !" This un expected jest made all the company laugh, and soon produced a similar effect through all the army, who, by this well-tinted pleasantry of their general, were at once relieved from all their apprehensions.
The disposition of Hannibal's army was regulated, in a great measure, by the arrangement of the enemy. On the left extremity cf his line, and nearest the river, were posted the Gaulish and Spanish cavalry, as being best calculated to cope with the Roman horse ; on the right extremity were the Numidian cavalry, excellent in pur suit, though not firm enough for a shock, but altogether proper antagonists to the social cavalry of the Romans. Between these two wings extended his main line of infan try, which was so arranged, that the African who were heavy armed, composed both its extremities; while the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, who were not so regu larly armed, occupied the centre. The light troops v. Prt a little in advance, before the main battle. By this di• position Hannibal had two objects in view ; to oppose corresponding descriptions of force n, the Roman line, and to break down and intermix his various nations, so as to make them a the' k upon each other. I laving assign
ed the left wing to Ifasdrubal, and the right to Nlaharbal, lie himself, with his IA other Mago, commanded the cen- • tee. Livy affords us a most lip ely view of this various as semblage of nations, when drawn up in line, and ready for battle. The Africans, he tells us, might well hat e been mistaken for a Roman army, being equipped with the armour of the Romans, vanquished in the battles of Trebia and Trasimenus. The shields borne by the Gauls and the Spaniards were nearly of the same form ; the swords of these nations were dissimilar. The sword, of the Gauls, like those of our own ancestors the Cale donians, were excessively long, and without point; while those of the Spaniards, who were accustomed more to thrusting than to cutting, were remarkable for their shortness and their sharp points. The general appear ance of these two nations, conspicuous for the gigantic size of their bodies, and their barbarous aspect, was ter rible to the view. The Gauls were naked from the waist upwards ; the Spaniards were dressed in linen habits of a surprising whiteness, the effect of which was magni ficently increased by a rich border of purple.
In the direction of his line, as well as in the choice of his ground, Hannibal was evidently compelled, in some degree, to conform to the arrangements of Varro, who had first taken his station in the field. This being the case, the left of the Carthaginians touched the river, their line ran parallel to that of the Romans, and their faces wt rc turned to the north, independently of the fore sight of Hannibal, who yet is mentioned by Plutarch as having drawn up his men, so as to have the wind Vul turnus to their back, while that hot and suffocating wind blew clouds of dust into the eyes of the Romans. The meridian sun, and the wind Vulturnus, were indeed in his favour ; but the merit was not his, for Varro, who had overlooked and probably despised these advantages, had forced them unavoidably upon his antagonist. Some difficulties have been started by Chaupy, respecting what quarter the armies faced, founded on topographical con siderations, and the direction taken by the fugitives after the battle. But it is abundantly obvious, that a rapid stream flowing through a sandy plain, and restrained at present from changing its course only by moles and em bankments, must have occasioned, in the space of 2000 years, many alterations in the aspect of the s icinity ; and also that in a tumultuary engagement, bodies of men may escape in all directions. In our opinion, the expres sion of Polvbius is no more equivocal than that of Livy. As the Aufidus runs generally in a north-easterly direc tion, we must suppose such a large elbow as Swinburne observed in the vicinity of Canna, in order to make the armies, while their faces arc tumid respectively to the north and south, to have each of them an extremity rest ing on the river. But the supposition of that traveller is altogether inadmissible, that Hannibal, after fording the stream, drew up his men within the bending of the river in front of the Romans, his troops forming the chord, of which the river in his rear was the arch. In this case Hannibal would have had both his wings resting en the a circumstance never before heard of ; and his danger, in the estimation of every military man, must have been prodigiously increased by his entangled position.