CONCEPTION, in pnemnatology, is thus defined by Mr Stewart : " By conception I mean that power of the mind, which enables it to form a notion of an absent ob ject of perception, or of a sensation which it has former ly felt." (Elem. of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 132.) Again he says, p. 134, « The business of concep tion, according to the account I have given of it, is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived." According to this view of the subject, we ought to say, when we see an object with our eyes open, that we have a perception of it ; when we shut our eyes, we have a conception of it.
We have no objection to this use of the word concep tion ; but we arc strongly inclined to suspect that it ought only to be considered as a modification of another faculty of the mind, and not as a distinct and original principle. In as far as conception relates to objects, or feelings which have already been presented to the mind, we cannot perceive in what it differs from the memory of past sensations, or perceptions. We should be glad to know the difference between a distinct recollection of past feelings or occurs ences, and the conception of them. The object of memory is to store up in the mind the im pressions which we have already received, and to bring them forth for use, as circumstances may require. When we have a distinct recollection of what wc saw and felt yesterday, we may, in popular language, be said to have a clear conception, idea, or impression of it. But in all this we can sec nothing but an ordinary exercise of me mory : and we suspect that philosophers have created this new faculty of conception out of a figurative expres sion, which implies, at bottom, nothing more than a par ticular exercise of memory.
Mr Stewart confesses that conception is often con founded with When a painter, for instance, makes a picture of an absent friend, he is said to paint from memory. But then it is said, " every act of me mory includes an idea of the past ; conception implies no idea of time whatever." Philosophy of the Hum. Mind, obi supra. We apprehend there is no good reason for this distinction. The memory leaves out all idea of time, when it is conversant about mere relations, which are general, and have no reference to time. When the ob jects presented to our observation are of a singular na ture, and such as rarely occur, time becomes an impor tant accessary, and is recorded with a particularity cor responding to the rarity or supposed importance of the things. Hence when any thing remarkable occurs in the course of our lives, we commonly say, that we shall never forget the time. But nobody thinks of taking any account of time in considering those relations, which arc treasured up in the memory, when they are of such a kind as occur every day, and fall in with the usual course of nature. In the same manner, when our thoughts arc
directed towards feelings or events necessarily connected with the past, and of sorb a nature that we are led to wish or fear their recurrence, in that case, time neces sarily enters into our conceptions But in thinking on the general laws of nature, and their various connections and relations, we never once think of time, though a mo ment's reflection would convince us that we are running over ideas which have already been presented to the mind.
Mr Stewart makes this distinction between concep Lion and memory, that the former enables us to make our past sensations and perceptions, objects of thought ; the latter recognises them as exact resemblances of what has been already felt or perceived. We confess that, in this instance we cannot sec the slightest grounds for a distinction. Does not every act of memory enable us to make our past sensations, or perceptions, objects of thought at the very moment that it recognises them as old acquaintances ? Is it possible to recollect any thing without having an idea of it ? We take the word idea, in this sense, to be perfectly synonymous with conception ; and we maintain that no other power but that of recollec tion, or some modification of memory, is necessary to give us the idea, or conception, of past sensations or per. ccptions. A man remembers that he was hurt, that he felt pain, that he had a leg amputated, that he was long in recovering : in all this, what use is there for the inter position of any other power than memory to recal the idea of his misfortune ? Conception is often confounded with imagination. Mr Stewart has very properly stated the distinction: he con siders imagination to be that power which enables us to combine the parts of different conceptions, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. According to our view of the subject, the distinction is still more obvious. Conception, according to Mr Stewart, presents to the mind ideas already familiar to it ; which we consider to be merely an act of memory, whose object is to give a faithful copy of the past, and which, in its simple exer cise, is wholly uninfluenced by the will. Imagination, on the contrary, is memory, under the controul of the will, which, not satisfied with following the order pre scribed by nature, or suggested by accident, selects the parts of different conceptions or objects of memory, to form a whole, more pleasing, more terrible, or more aw ful, than has ever been presented by nature. When we wish to represent the terrible, we seldom find in one object all the circumstances necessary to produce the full effect. NVe therefore bring together all the circum stances of terror which our memories can recollect, and we can conceive no other, in order to deepen the horror and heighten the effect.