NVe are aware that imagination is considered to depend chiefly on the association of ideas. But we are disposed to contend that even this associating principle, to which such wonder fnl effects are ascribed, has no claim what ever to be reckoned an original power of the mind. 'We conceive it to be also a modification of memory : and if it should be asked, how the recollection of one event suggests all its relations, and produces an unceasing flow of connected ideas. we answer, that it is merely the me mory recording what has been presented to the mind, and running over that connected order, which has Lim.
exhibited in the course of nature, or in casual or arti ficial arrangements. Every event, and every object, is either the natural or the artificial sign of something con nected with it ; and memory may be called the recorded history of these relations. It places before the mind what has been felt or perceived ; and it is as natural for it to recollect the order, and other circumstances under which objects were presented, as it is to recollect the objects themselves. And if we consider how almost in finite these relations may become, from time, or place, or circumstances, or feelings, we may easily conceive how the memory may expatiate over this boundless field, " and find no end, in wandering mazes lost." From the statement which we have given, it will ap pear, that we consider the ultimate principles of our nature as much fewer than have usually been represent ed: and we fear it is a proof of the little progress which has lately been made in the philosophy of mind, that whilst those facts in physical science, which were for merly considered as ultimate, are daily diminishing in number, in consequence of the extension of knowledge, an opposite process has taken place in the science of mind ; and philosophers have shown a disposition to multiply, unnecessarily, the original principles of our nature. Every science is improved by the simplifica tion of its principles ; and this is an improvement which has not as yet been introduced into pneumatology.
The observations which have been made on this sub ject arc chiefly applicable to Mr Stewart's view of con ception, which he represents as an exact transcript of past sensations or perceptions. But the term is used in a much more extensive sense by Dr Reid, who consi ders it as necessary in every operation of the mind. " It may be observed," says he, " that conception enters, as an ingredient, in every operation of the mind: our senses cannot give us the belief of any object, without giving some conception of it at the same time." Intel!. Powers, p. 358. So, then, to see an object with our eyes, or to handle it with our hands, is not sufficient to give us an idea of it : this mysterious power of conception must in terpose, to introduce to the mind the ideas communicated through the organs of sense. The senses are the doors by which the visitors are admitted ; conception is the gentleman usher who introduces them to the presence. Arc we then to consider conception as the connecting link between the senses and the mind ? We must first see the shadow of a proof in support of such an opinion. The senses are quite sufficient to do their own office, though the imperfection of philosophy has been woefully exposed in attempting to explain the manner in which they accomplish their end.
Conception, considered as an original power of the mind, must mean the power of forming conceptions, no tions, or ideas. Dr Reid himself confesses, that these words are used synonymously, Intellect. Powers, chap. 1. On the same principle, then, we might say, that the power of forming ideas is an original power of the mind. But
it is perfectly evident, that some of our ideas may be tra ced to one simple faculty, whilst others result from the combined operation of different powers : and is not this the true origin of our conceptions, taking the word in the extensive sense in which Dr Reid employs it ? They can be traced to simple powers of the mind, or to their com binations : and whatever idea, or conception, arises from the exercise of one or more of our faculties, is, insofacto, presented to the mind, without requiring the intervention of any power distinct from those in which it originates.
It has been assumed as a maxim inphilosophy, that whatever we can conceive is possible : 'gut this has been strenuously contested by Dr Reid, Intellect. Powers, p. 400. According to Mr Stewart's doctrine on concep tion, however, the proposition is self-evident. If it gives us an exact transcript of what we have perceived or felt, then, whatever we can conceive is possible ; for its possibility has been demonstrated by its having al ready been an object of our perceptions or sensations. And even taking conception in its most extensive signi fication, as the power which gives us the knowledge of every combination which the mind can form, we appre hend that, even in this sense, whatever we can conceive is possible. In the most extravagant workings of the imagination, though the combinations may be new, yet they are all composed of old materials, and though the images may be incongruous, they are not contradictory ; however absurd, therefore, they may be, yet they are not impossible. The meaning of the proposition, con tested by Dr Reid, evidently is, that whatever we can conceive to be possible, is possible. This explanation would obviate his objection, drawn from the Reductio ad absurdum, in mathematical propositions ; in which, he says, we are required to conceive things that arc impos sible, in order to prove them to be so. We can conceive what is meant, when it is affirmed that three and three make seven, but we cannot for a moment conceive it to be possible. But then, says Dr Reid, what one man judges to be possible, another judges to be impossible ; the maxim therefore in this sense cannot be true. But whenever two men are found to differ respecting the possibility or impossibility of any proposition, fact, con ception, Sce. it will probably be found that their concep tions are both correct, according to the view which they have taken of the subject. From limited views, or false principles, a man may conceive a very obt ious truth to be impossible : according to his conception of the sub ject, he is perfectly right : it cannot be possible, on the principles which he has assumed : but remove his pre judices, and correct the errors of his judgment, and then his conceptions will keep pace with the enlargement of his knowledge, and he will see the truth of what he be fore conceived to be impossible.
We have ventured, in this article, to call in question the opinions of some eminent philosophers, whose abili ties we highly respect, and whose labours we duly ap preciate. They have done much more, indeed, than could have been reasonably expected in the infancy of : their ingenious observations, and valu able facts, must facilitate the investigations of future en quirers : and much certainly vet remains to be done. We conceive the science of pneumatology to be, at present, much in the same state in which chemistry was in the days of the alchymists, when false but in genious theories stimulated enquire, and evolved facts, which a more accurate method of philosophizing has reduced to the regularity of science. (g)