To those who have not previously considered this sub ject, the brevity of imperatives may appear, in point of fact, liable to some exceptions. The Chinese language is said to have no imperatives. That language, however, in so far as we can judge from our scanty knowledge of its structure, seems to owe this apparent defect to affectation and refinement, which have induced men in speaking to prepare the hearer by means of distant and respectful cir cumlocutions, instead of using direct imperatives, in or der to avoid the apprehended indelicacy of dictating an ab rupt change of direction to his thoughts. This modifica tion probably took place after men had learned to keep their own objects and their own influence out of view, and to appear solely attentive to the convenience and pleasure of others. In a light nearly similar we are to consider those forms in the languages of modern Europe, originating in ceremony, by which single persons are addressed in the plural number.
Another question may here be asked, Why does this alleged brevity of the imperative not extend to the third person, and the plural number ? Why are the words, amato, amble, amatote, and amanto, comparatively long ? Would not this fact seem to intimate that the circumstance of be ing imperative does not of itself determine this brevity of form To this we answer, that the word called the third person of the imperative, is not properly an imperative as directed to the person addressed ; it expresses either a simple wish, or specifies some consequence of an action which the speaker wishes him to perform. The command is then learned by inference, and not conveyed in the word. The imperative in the second person of the plural number is, indeed, a real imperative ; but it is to be observed, that it is not of so early natural origin as the imperative sin gular. It requires a particular arrangement to render it applicable. It implies not merely a wish that a certain action should be performed, but a knowledge that it is ca pable of being performed by a plurality of people, and that their concurrence in it will promote the same object, or fulfil a variety of objects that are alike desirable. Hence it probably deserves to be considered as equally remote from the original imperative with the other uses of the signs of locomotion.
Since, then, imperatives are not to be considered as contracted affirmations, it remains to inquire in what re lation they stand to sentences of the latter kind ? Whether these are originally two distant species of sentences, merely agreeing in the general character which is common to all language, that of being intended to produce appropriate thoughts in the person addressed ? In tracing the nature and origin of human language, it appears to us, on the whole, most strictly agreeable to the natural history of our species, to consider all language as n'IPERATIvE; that is, as always implying the imperative of a verb.
Even when we merely mention an object by making use of a noun, an imperative is implied, desiring the person addressed to think of it. Some more particular intentions on the part of the speaker may be left to be inferred from the occasion on which it is uttered, or may be expressed by some circumstances of manner, or conveyed by means of some further verbal sign ; but toe noun itself, in the moment of utterance, always implies the general act of demonstration, that is, the imperative of the verb " look," or " think." Assertions may be advantageously reduced to the im perative form, and may be considered as originally and es sentially partaking of that character. Imperatives, we have remarked, are deprived of their characteristic ani mation when reduced to assertions. Assertions, on the contrary, preserve more completely that interest which originally belongs to them, when viewed as imperative di rections for regulating the volitions and active thoughts of others. Our opinions proceed from impelling causes which bear a resemblance in their nature to the motives which prompt us to action, and assertions resemble the exhibi tion of such motives to other persons.
But if each single word possesses an imperative power, it may be asked, in what respects that power can be as cribed to the copula " is ?"—When the intention of asser tions is considered, this copula will he found equivalent to the imperative of the verb "believe." Au opinion assert ed by means of it does not retain the simple character of one which remains quiescent. Hence it is always expect ed to be of a nature fitted to interest the person addressed, and possessing a just claim on his attention. NVithout this, the declaration is regarded as unmeaning. Keeping this circumstance in view, we shall find nothing forced or exaggerated in representing the "is," in English as equi valent to " believe," and the est in Latin to crede.
When sentences constructed by means of this copula arc not intended for conveying information, but for exhi biting pleasing objects already known, or objects of ima gination, as in poetic description or fictitious narrative, the copula has the power of the imperative " contem plate." One objection might be made to this theory, that est be ing placed betwixt two nominatives, cannot be equivalent to a word which governs nouns in the accusative. If such an objection should occur, it is sufficient to observe that the cases of nouns arc refinements of language, intended for marking in a convenient manner certain uses of the words, and certain analogous connections which are formed among them in the composition of sentences, but that our present inquiries relate to a period of language much ear lier than such contrivances; and, where the meaning can be shewn to be the same, diversities arising from these causes do not fall under our consideration.