We may trace in the prevalent method of describing the nature of the noun, as distinguished from other parts of speech, some of the hurtful effects of the opinion enter tained by grammarians, that the history of language im plies a history of human knowledge and thought. Con dillac maintains that languages are analytic methods, and are necessary both for giving an account of our thoughts to our own minds, and conducting us to ideas which other wise we could not have possessed. He thinks that the investigation of them furnishes us with convenient means for the analysis of thought, and lie conceives it a radical mistake to regard them merely as the instruments of com munication. Conformably with this notion, that author, like many others, considers the different parts of speech as expressions for different kinds of thoughts. We hope gradually to exhibit, in the sequel of this article, an ample collection of facts in refutation of these opinions. We shall, in the mean time, illustrate their fallacy, by point ing out the fallacious character of the metaphysical spe culations with which, as applied to the noun, they have been associated.
Substantive nouns have been considered as the names of substances. The word "substance," is derived from sub and stare, because they are considered as beings ex isting under the qualities perceived by the senses, and giv ing these qualities support. It is granted by every person who endeavours to go a step farther back in this specula tion, that the nature of a substance, as separate from its qualities, and which metaphysicians, for the sake of dis tinction, denominate a substratum, is unknown. Notwith standing this, such words as " stone," " earth," " wood," and " iron," are regarded not as the names of particular instances and forms of hardness, weight, visibility, colour, and other qualities which are perceived, but of substrata which possess these qualitities.
Some grammarians, following a similar theory, have re presented the distinction betwixt substantives and adjec tives as having for its foundation a difference existing in nature betwixt things and their manner of existence. Things are said to be substances which exist by them selves, but the manner of existence of things is said to form accidents which only exist in consequence of the existence of substances. This is the opinion advanced by the authors of the Grammaire Generale a Raisonnee. Words which signify the objects of thought are, in that work, distinguished into those which signify substances, and which are substantives, and those which signify acci dents, and contain at the same time a notification that there is some substance to which these accidents belong. These last words are adjective nouns, or, to express each by a single word, the former are called nouns and the latter ad jectives.
It is, however, an obvious fact with regard to nouns, that many of them are the names of qualities. Such are the nouns, " hardness," 64 blackness," and 64 whiteness," which have as much the character of substantives in their use in language as the words, 66 iron," wood," and " stone." In order to surmount this difficulty, these have been re garded as a secondary or improper kind of substantives, and the ideas expressed by them as not originally entitled to be expressed in that form. They have been considered as originating in a figure of speech, by which qualities are treated as if they were substances. The authors of the last mentioned Grammar ingeniously attempt to solve the difficulty, by describing the qualities thus designated as subsisting by themselves in language, being so used as to have no need of another noun, although they are, in their Own nature, mere accidents. A very little more inquiry
would have led these writers to the true doctrine on the subject, that the mode of treating the sign of an idea, and the idea itself by means of it, in language, is the sole founda tion of the peculiarities of the substantive noun.
The difference betwixt a substance and its qualities, and the whole doctrine of a substratum, seem to be mere as sumptions of an excessively inquisitive species of philo sophy. The only real objects of our knowledge are quali ties. It is vain to tell us that the qualities are merely the media by which we obtain a knowledge of the substance. Our ideas of the qualities themselves are clear and pre cise ; but we never find that our knowledge of them con ducts us one step towards the knowledge of the substra tum. The doctrine of the existence of the latter ought therefore to be rejected as an unfounded assumption, and the objects which we call substances ought to be consider ed as consisting entirely of definite assemblages of sensible qualities. We cannot, indeed, disprove the existence of a substratum, nor can we prove that this substratum is not the cause of the qualities, and the bond of their union. Nature contains riches to which the human understanding has no access. But we must have some intelligible des cription before we can entertain any idea of it, and we must have some proof of its existence before we can rea sonably believe in it. If any person should assert that every particle of earth contains a miniature of the planetary system, we should understand his meaning, and it would not be in our power to disprove his assertion. But we should undoubtedly reject it as unsupported by evidence, and ascribe the belief of it on his part to extreme credulity, a passion for singularity, or some other of the sources of self-deception by which men are so often misled. But the doctrine of a material substratum is not merely destitute of proof ; it is unintelligible. The word is pronounced without any appropriate meaning. It is not probable that a notion of this sort obtains among mankind at large. it is probable that the vulgar never think of any substratum containing the sensible qualities which they perceive, and that their ideas of matter are restricted to qualities which are the solid and real objects of their knowledge. The doctrine of a substratum has been invented by men in quest of subtleties ; and it seems to have been supported by the other error already mentioned, that the structure of lan guage exhibits an analytical view of our thoughts, and that different kinds of thoughts must be expressed where dif ferent kinds of words are used. Man is liable, in such inquiries, to give way to a precipitate curiosity, which leads him to frame hypotheses on subjects beyond his reach. He does not repose in his actual discoveries, but labours to account for what he knows ; and, rather than leave this unattempted, he explains w hat he really knows by some thing which he does not know, and thus infallibly renders it more obscure. He imagines that he obtains solutions of his difficulties, while he only indulges a confused and mys tic feeling associated with the use of particular words.