The subsequent positions of the two fleets be come now of the greatest interest. So soon as the van division of the enemy had stretched past the rear of the British line, in bearing away, it broke into two divisions; one, consisting of seven ships, steering west as at II, Fig. 6, and which we may now call the middle division; the other taking a S.S.W. course, consisting of about 12 or 13 ships, and where Count de Grasse was himself, making the southern division of flight, as at F. A denotes Lord Rodney's ship, with part of the centre, putting about in pursuit of the enemy's van; and B, the rear of the British line, performing the same evo lution. The signal for the rear to close with the centre being soon after made, both these divisions followed in pursuit of the southern division F.
The object now with the Count de Grasse, in the division last referred to, was to obtain a junction with the other divisions of the fleet at G and H. This was apparent by his abandoning his S.S.W. course, which he first pursued at Fig. 7, and turn ing his ship's heads to the northward as at F, and to form a new line of battle. A natural effect of' this change, of course, was an alteration in the course of' the centre and rear of the British fleet to the position AB, thereby causing the two divisions to approximate. The Count soon perceived this, and accordingly, at about two in the afternoon, he resumed his original direction as at I. The two fleets, therefore, at this moment occupied the fol lowing positions: A and B, the centre and rear of' the British fleet, were in pursuit of the southern division of the enemy. The van of the British fleet continued in the same course as at C. The rear division of the enemy continued to advance to the westward, as at G; and the middle division of the enemy, not being pursued,repaired their dama ges under an easy sail.
Fig. 8 represents the tu o fleets again under the most interesting circumstances. The southern di vision at six o'clock, having been outsailed by their pursuers, turned their heads again to the north ward, and the result was, that the centre and rear of the British fleet formed on each side of it. Five ships were taken from the enemy, the Ville de Paris striking at sunset to the Barfleur and At this tiine Count de Grasse had got above five leagues to the westward and leeward of the field of battle; and night coming on, Admiral Rodney thought proper to give over further pursuit.
It may be necessary to add, that the rear divi sion at G had, at this time, advanced above ten leagues to the westward and to the leeward of the field of battle; and that I, the middle division of the enemy, consisting of seven ships, having waited for, rejoined the ships of the southern division, which afterwards effected an escape.
Such was the result of this new and splendid evo lution. It may be asked, however, why did not the British admiral follow up his able attack, and make the signal for a night battle? He did so; but on looking about him—prudence in a conqueror being even much more necessary than in ordinary men, he observed that his fleet was greatly dispersed; that two of his 90 gun ships were greatly disabled; his own, the Formidable, greatly damaged; that his van and centre were also much hurt; that none of the prisoners from the captured ships were taken out;—that a very dark night of twelve hours was coming on—weighing all these—and the science of naval tactics is made up of contingencies—he thought it most prudent to make sure of the vic tory, and not run the risk of a reverse of fortune, or the danger of a night battle, wherein his own fleet might receive more damage from one another than from the ships of the enemy; that by running to leeward in the night, the enemy might deceive him, by ordering some of their frigates to hoist the lights of their admirals, and steer a course to lead the British admiral from them; and as the night was extremely dark, being the first day of a new moon, they might have hauled their wind to the north or to the south without being seen; at the same time they most carefully concealed all lights whatever. The British fleet, moreover, by pursuing, might have found themselves far to lee ward in the morning, without the possibility of their getting to windward, by the crippled condi tion they were in. These reasons, and his expe rience of a night battle, induced the admiral to se cure his splendid victory, and not to hazard a re verse of fortune. Rodney, therefore, made the sig nal for the British fleet to bring to, on the star board tack, then so dark that one ship could not see another. Day light the next morning proved the wisdom of that signal; for, notwithstanding it was the duty of every ship to obey it, thirteen made sail, yet not one of them fired a shot, or came up with an enemy. This was a convincing proof of what might have happened had the whole fleet gone to leeward, and the enemy have hauled their wind; not only the captured ships might have been retaken, but some of the British crippled ships cap tured. Every sailor and man of science will ac knowledge the wisdom of this decision.