Some of Mr. Clerk's observations on this splen did victory are deserving of much attention, and we shall therefore, introduce them to our readers. First, the difficulty will be remarked of an enemy's fleet making an escape to windward. Secondly, that the crippling of some of his ships will be a ne cessary consequence of the efforts made to effect this escape. Thirdly, that the protection given to ships crippled in consequenee of these efforts, as it was the cause of bringing on the actions of both the 9th and 12th, and had nearly produced an action on the 10th, will also be a cause of bringing on an ac tion on all future occasions of the like nature.
The attack made by the British in the action of the 91h, may be considered as an example of the simple attack, and shows how little may be ex pected from any rencounter between two fleets on the same tack, when an attempt shall be made from the leeward.
The judicious movement made by the British fleet, from a northerly course to a southerly one, on the night between the 11th and 12th, as it shows the advantage that may be made by a change of wind, at the same time shows the necessity of at tention to such periodical changes. Indeed it was by this means only that the British fleet got within reach of the enemy on the morning of the 12th of April.
From the facility also with which Admiral Rod ney's ship kept her wind, and forced her passage through the line of the enemy, and the necessary consequence that the headmost ships of the rear di vision must thereby be forced and driven to lee ward, should with certainty establish, that breaking an enemy's line, by an attack from the leeward, is not only a practicable measure, but a measure at tended with little additional danger or risk of ship ping; and that with the same facility, and with equal probability of success, it might have been at tempted, in former rencounters. And although Admiral Rodney, in either of his former rencoun ters of the 15th or 19th of May 1780, had not been convinced of the importance of this manceuvre still, having been the first to put it in execution on the 12th of April, he has acquired a name renowned over the whole world.
The consequences resulting from cutting the enemy's line on this occasion, as they may be regard ed as affording complete illustrations of the impor tance of Mr. Clerk's principles, may also be ad mitted as a proof of what ought to be expected in future on every similar occasion.
The hurry and precipitation with which the rear division of the enemy made their escape through the gap in the British line, as it showed their ap prehension, should also be a proof of the danger of their situation.
The effort to escape, made by the van division of the enemy, as it confirms the general position, their desire of evading a conflict, confirms also the superiority of British seamen, which seems, in deed, to have been incontestible from the beginning of the whole affair to the end.
It must, however, be added, that the manner by which the van of the British was rendered almost without effect, shows that the rear division of the enemy, and not the van, ought to have been the ob ject of pursuit. This is demonstrated by Clerk in his attack with the Centre, part II. pages The proximity of the rear of the British to the rear division of the enemy, should sufficiently point out the object of pursuit they also should have chosen.
The British van and rear not having therefore been prepared to take advantage of their necessary mutual proximity to the rear division of the ene my, was a loss.
The rear division of the British also, by having been obliged to put about ship, in pursuit of the van of the enemy, already got some miles distant, is a full confirmation of the hypothesis laid down, that the pursuit of a rear division, cut off from the van of an enemy's fleet passing on contrary tacks, ought in general to be preferred.
Finally, the facility with which the rear of the British came up with the flying van of the enemy, shows that there was no inferiority in the sailing of the British ships.* With this we most reluctantly close a subject which has much to recommend it to the attention of the young sailor; much to the higher oflicers of the navy, and much to the board of admiralty which presides over the naval destinies of the country. We might have added that there is much to recommend it even to the attention of the man of science, and to the historian, who may review the brilliant pages of our maritime exploits. To the young sailor, in particular, it will afford the most useful and salutary lessons, and prepare him for all the difficult and ever varying circumstances of his splendid profession. Nelson, amidst the fatigues of his arduous duties, found an agreeable relaxion in the important pages of Clerk,f and was perpetually forming schemes how he might suc cessfully accomplish the conquest of an enemy, in every variety of position. The bright example of the immortal conqueror of the Nile and Trafalgar, ought ever to be present to the young officer's view. By making the subject of tactics a frequent object of contemplation, Nelson's energies were ever in action to meet the vicissitudes of his peril ous duties. In whatever position he found the enemy, his ready and comprehensive mind seized all the great points of action, and having commu nicated his brilliant purposes to the captains of his fleet, stimulated the lowest sailor by the immortal signal, "ENGLAND EXPECTS EVERY MAN TO DO HIS