1800.—For the personal feuds which rent the -Federalists in twain, see ADAMS, JOHN, and HAMILTON, ALEXANDER; but the influence of these in defeating the party is always overrated. If Hamilton had loved Adams like a brother, and all Adams' Cabinet had been loyal and united, the general result of the election would not have been different ; unless we are to sup pose that New York Federalists voted for Jef ferson because their chiefs hated each other, or that the party's recent policy had gained it votes. since 1796, which is notoriously the re verse of truth. It had not only angered the Democrats, but displeased many of its own moderates, by the Alien Law for deporting all foreigners politically disagreeable to it, and the Sedition Law to shut the mouths of its oppo nents (see ALIEN and SEntriort Laws) the Hamilton wing had tried to force through a war with France to strengthen its domestic policy; the growing popular sentiment now was to make the United States a political island, severed from all relations with the rest of the world which would cause us difficulties. The election was decided for Jefferson by the re versal of New York's 12 electoral votes: local feuds had something to do with it, Burr's politi cal "bossship" much ; but beyond all, the growth of the country was away from Federalism, and at best the party had not one electoral vote to lose without being displaced.
1804.— Had the relations of the parties re mained the same as in 1800, there is still no rea son to think there would have been any return to a Federalist administration. From 1789 to 1797 their program had been not merely the best, but the only one as a whole possessing either utility, dignity or even safety; yet the disintegrating forces were so strong, and the squalor of the Confederation so thoroughly for gotten, that the party barely escaped expulsion in the very prime of its usefulness. Even in the next four years, its errors were trivial compared with its services, especially in creating the navy; yet it was beaten — not very heavily, but with incidents proving that its lost sections would not come back to it. But so far from the issues remaining the same, the Federalist representa tives, with that egregious blindness to the sources of popular strength which is never seen except in "practical politicians," committed the amazing folly of attempting to tie their oppo nents' hands by borrowing all their discarded doctrines. The Democrats in power had at once become converts to a strong government and a liberal construction of the Constitution; the Federalists, instead of outdoinK them and claiming support as the originators of the policy, adopted the strict-construction theories and the decentralizing policy of their oppo nents. The Democrats having appropriated the Federalists' strength; the latter revenged themselves by appropriating their enemies' weakness. This was especially glaring in the case of the Louisiana Purchase, an extreme Federalist measure, and by far the greatest title of Jefferson to the name of statesman: it is quite incredible that the Federalists should have opposed this, even as partisans, or as pos sessing the rudiments of political common sense. Their astute policy received its fitting
reward ; in 1800 Jefferson had won by 73 to 65; in 1804 he received 162 to 14.
1808.— The Democrats, having had full power to put in force their cherished theories of insularity and independence of international ties, at once proceeded to make a reductio ad absurdum of them, and hang them like a sack of stones about their town necks. Jefferson was placed between the upper millstone of the English right of search and impressment, ending in the bloody outrage of the Leopard on the Chesapeake (q.v.), and the nether of his own resolve not to fight, the disbelief of all parties alike in our ability to fight a naval war with England, and the determination of the North, which possessed most of the fighting resources, not to use them against England. He solved the problem by the Embargo (q.v.), which saved the need of fighting by sacrificing the commerce he did not value, and the prosperity of a section he was quite resigned to see un prosperous. The moribund Federalist party gained a galvanic life from this, which for the time looked like a real one: in 1804 it had car ried only Connecticut and Delaware and part of Maryland; in 1808 it carried all New Eng land but Vermont (the one State which had no commerce to lose), three votes from North Carolina and Delaware, and the two Mary landers as before,-47 in all.
1812.— The same causes which had operated during the previous four years had continued with ever-growing efficacy during this four. The feeling against England among the Demo crats, the feeling among the Federalists that England was fighting the world's battle against Napoleon and must not be crippled, ever grew in intensity; the misery and hate in New Eng land with its hamstrung commerce kept pace with either; a generation of youths was grow ing up who never saw the Revolution,— The War of 1812 was officially determined by four Southerners between 26 and 29; and the con quest of Canada, instead of a naval war where it was universally believed our entire fleet would be at once seized and impressed into the British navy, had struck the war party as a happy resource. The political campaign of 1812 was made on the issue of war or a repeal of the Non-Intercourse Act. Madison was given a second term on the express condition of his approving the war ; he detested it as strongly as Jefferson, but as the majority had its teeth set, felt that he might as well head it as any one else. He secured it by 189 to 89; the Federalists by a fusion had carried, besides their old States, New York and New Jersey and more of Maryland. A new era seemed com ing for the Federalists ; but it was an illusion.