They had no party principles, and not even a party candidate except a borrowed one (George Clinton) ; and their entire basis of life now was on an issue by its nature temporary.
1816-20.— The close of the War of 1812 ex tinguished the old issues. The mostly inglori ous land war had been forgotten in the blaze of New Orleans; we had proved that our navy not only could fight the queen of the world on equal terms, but would never again be wantonly defied; the people were full of satis faction at coming out so well, and of anger at the Federalists, whose chief section had carried opposition to the point of discussing secession. Federalism was in many minds tainted with treason. Furthermore, the New England capi tal driven out of commerce by the embargo and the war had begun to re-embark in manu facturing, wished for a protective tariff, and could only have it from the governing element, which was hopelessly Democratic. Rhode Is land, the first to establish mills, was the first of the Southern tier to break away from its old allegiance. Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware, by small majorities, clung to the ancient faith; but in 1816 the Democrats car ried 16 States with 183 votes, including the rest of New England. The government had bid for these votes by a United States Bank and a light protective tariff ; and in 1820, the of Good Feeling," or rather of °No Is Monroe was elected unanimously save for the vote of one elector, disgusted with the business growing up around the administration.
1824.—The administration still further car ried out Federalist ideas by a great system of internal improvements and by strengthening the tariff. In a word, while nominally Democratic Republican, its policy had become so Federal ized as to have a stronger hold on its new allies than on its old constituents, and the issue in 1824 was whether that policy should be sus tained or reversed. John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay represented the former, in different sections; Andrew Jackson the reaction to old fashioned Democracy, with strict construction, economy and no intermeddling with business development; William H. Crawford the regular Democratic (qnachine," with no ulterior purpose but office. Thus divided, no candidate had a majority. Jackson had the most ; Adams was elected by the House of Representatives, still so far dominated by educated politics as to con sider Jackson an ignorant and pestilent dema gogue; he made' Clay — who had the lowest vote of the four, but was the Southern leader most in accord with his policy and the most of a statesman— Secretary of State. This
•Coalition)) (q.v., No. 2) was denounced by the enraged Jacksonites as a corrupt bargain, and the Holise election as defeating the peoples will; but there is no reason for assuming, as is currently done, that the anger gained Jackson any electoral votes.
1828.— The Democratic reaction had gained strength and the Jackson enthusiasm swept all the factions into his fold, by virtue of the State conventions which had now assumed the office of nominating. On that side the issue was much more Jackson than any definite party pro gram ; but Jackson as representing the hatred of the masses, especially the Southern and Western masses, for the °money for n11 activities of government beyond keeping itself alive, for tariffs and government subventions, and for all claim of superiority in the educated class and all political initiative except by spon taneous popular movements. In short, Jackson was the agent of a Democratic revolution, which supported him with a swarm of new men and approved his policy of turning out the trained officials neck and heels. Adams held his vote well; the stock reasons for his defeat —his ungraciousness, his refusal to employ patron age, his revival of charges against the New England Federalists — are absurd in face of the fact that he had but one vote less than in 1824 and of Jackson's enormous plurality. No can didate representing trained statesmanship, cul ture and a liberal government policy, could have won this election.
1832.— The Democratic tide swept on over whelmingly. Jackson's unprecedented use of the veto power to defeat internal-improvement schemes voted for by members of his own party only bound the majority more tightly to him his war against South Carolina for attempted nullification cost him her votes, but brought him reinforcements from the nationalist sec tion; his hostility to the Bank of the United States was a prominent issue in the canvass, and was that of his constituents. Nothing better proves the senselessness of accounting for great political. results by personal factions or squab bles than the fact that Adams in 1824 and 1828 had more electoral votes than all Jackson's op ponents together in 1832.