In a similar spirit the function of will and purpose as a fundamental element in experi ence is at present emphasized in many quarters. The intellectual or rationalistic account of cognitive experience is maintained to be in adequate, since it abstracts from the volitional element which alone gives to knowledge its function and significance. Concrete experience is the process of living, and living consists in the realization of purposes. So much may, I think, be granted: experience is essentially a teleological process and must be interpreted in terms of purpose. But purposes are only defined and realized through thought. Prag matism (q.v.) (as the popular theory of the present day is called) goes further, and inter prets knowledge solely in its relation to action. Knowledge is the instrument which the will employs to discover the means whereby prac tical purposes may be realized. It is thus never an end in itself, nor does its function consist in revealing the nature of a reality beyond experience. The function of thought is to effect the practical control of experience, and the only realities which it can define are terms within experience itself. Its problems are set by the particular situations and con crete demands which the developing process of experience presents. There is no intelli gible problem regarding the nature of reality in general, or reality that does not exist as a particular functional element in concrete ex perience. Against this position various ob jections have been urged by many writers; the chief of which are (1) that it does not reach a real organic unity of experience; (2) that it overlooks the fact that knowledge is an end in itself ; (3) that it is subjective, and fails to recognize the objective and rational ends without which no real experience can exist.
At the present time perhaps the most im portant function of Epistemology consists in a criticism and evaluation of the fundamental conceptions and principles which underlie the procedure of the special sciences. These sciences set out from certain definite assump tions regarding the nature of the phenomena which they investigate, and with certain de mands which their method of investigation has to fulfill. It is the function of Epistemology to make explicit the nature of these initial assumptions, and to show that the accounts given by these sciences are essentially deter mined by the character of these assumptions. Instead of assuming that the results of the special sciences are to be accepted at their face value as direct statements about the nature of reality, both philosophical epistemol ogists and workers in these sciences who have reflected on the problems of method (as e.g.,
E. Mach and Karl Pearson) now agree that the view of the world given by natural science —and especially the mechanical theory— is itself a logical construction, based on certain assumptions which are necessary to carry out the purpose of the scientific co-ordination and explanation of facts. This construction must not be read apart from the purpose for which it was designed. Indeed, the prevailing tend ency is to emphasize the merely methodologi cal character of scientific results to such an extent as to make them appear almost arbi trary and devoid of any ontological signifi cance. This is undoubtedly an extreme posi tion. It must, of course, be admitted that the results of the special sciences are largely hypothetical and possess only relative truth. But they are never mere logical constructions in the sense that they are entirely divorced from reality. The ultimate purpose of science, as of all thinking, is to exhibit the structure of the real world, and the assumptions and hypotheses of -the special sciences derive their significance and justification solely from their employment as means for the accomplish ment of that end. In its task of criticizing the assumptions of the special sciences, then Epistemology cannot escape the consideration of metaphysical problems regarding the nature of the external world and its relation to the human mind.
The bibliography of this subject is coextensive with that of general philosophy. A few works may be mentioned which deal with the more recent development of the subject : Albee, 'The Significance of Methodological Principles' (in Philosophical Review, Vol. XV, 1906) ; Bergson, Henri, (Creative Evolution) (Eng. trans., New Yorlc 1911) ; Creighton, James E., (Methodology and Truth) (in Philosophical Review, Vol. X, 1901) ; Dewey, (Studies in Logical Theory) (Chicago 1902) ; id., (The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy) (New York 1910) ; Jaines, (Pragmatism) (ib. 1907) ; id., (The Meaning of Truth) (ib. 1909) ; id., (Essays in Radical Empiricism) (ib. 1912) ; (The Will to Believe) (ib. 1909) ; Ladd, (Philosophy of Knowl edge); Marvin, (The New Realism) (New York 1912) ; Miinsterberg, (Psychology and Life); id., (Grundziige der Psychologie) ; Ormond, (Foundations of Knowledge) (1894) ; Rickert, (Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaf t lichen Begriffsbildung) (1902) ; Seth, (Episte mology and Metaphysics) ; id., (Problem of Epistemology) (in Philosophical Review,Vol. I, 1892) ; Ward, (Naturalism and Agnosticism.) JAmEs E. CREIGHTON, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Cornell University.