EPISTEMOLOGY ( irtoT6/4, knowledge or science, and lOyot theory or discourse), or theory of knowledge, is an account of the nature of lmowledge, treating of its origin and laws of development, its validity and relation to human experience as a whole. In vestigations of this character fall within the field of general philosophy and have usually been included under the heading of meta physics. The word °Epistemology* is said to have been first used by J. F. Ferrier in his 'Institutes of Metaphysics> (1854). Since its general adoption it has sometimes been talcen to denote a field of inquiry co-ordinate with, and largely independent of, Metaphysics. It has been proposed to keep the investigation of the nature of knowledge distinct from the problems regarding the nature of being, and to call the former epistemology, and the latter metaphysics. The best usage of the present time, however, seems to retain the historical sense of the term metaphysics as the name for the more general field of philosophical inquiry which embraces both epistemology and ontol ogy. (See also articles on PHILOSOPHY and METAPHYSICS). Moreover, a logical justi fication for this usage is furnished by the fact that it is impossible to carry on the two branches of inquiry in isolation. It must un doubtedly be granted that for an ultimate. ontology, or final view of the world, it is necessary to go beyond the merely cognitional aspect of experience and include in our syn thesis judgments based on other orders of value than the merely logical. But it is at once obvious that we cannot take one signifi cant step in investigating the nature of reality without some criterion of knowledge, i.e., some theory of the conditions under which reality is known, and of what constitutes truth. It is perhaps not so evident that the nature of knowledge cannot be made the sub ject of inquiry without any reference to meta physical theory. Indeed, it is not uncommon to speak of epistemology, as Locke does, as *a preliminary clearing of the ground* which is to be completed before any more ultimate metaphysical inquiries are to be undertaken,— if, indeed, these are to be undertaken at all. But this way of conceiving the matter is quite misleading. The figures which compare the knowing faculty to an instrument whose nature must first be understood, are here quite inap plicable. For knowledge has no existence by
itself, or apart from and external to its objects. What we want, as Hegel has observed, *is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete develop ment; they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. Hence they ex amine themselves; in their own action they must determine their limits and point out their defects.* In other words, knowledge is never a mere series of ideas or mental representa tions that can be investigated apart from its relation to objects. In so far as it is knowledge it refers to and implies reality. To investigate its nature, then, is at the same time to test its conclusions regarding the nature of the ob jects with which it deals. But even if one re fuses to take this standpoint, one must still admit the close connection of epistemology and metaphysics. For all theories of the nature of knowledge are based implicitly or explicitly on certain metaphysical assumptions regarding both the mind which knows and its relation to the objects known. Epistemology, then, cannot take one step without involving the ontological problems which some of its repre sentatives seek to avoid.
It is likewise impossible to distinguish sharply the discussion of epistemological prob lems from logic. If a division can be made at the present time it is only in degree of ulti mateness. It is possible, though perhaps not advisable, to limit the term *logic* to the somewhat narrow and abstract treatment which takes as its object the discovery of cer tain correct forms of thinking, or certain rules which are of practical value in testing argu ments. When, however, logic breaks away from this narrow program, as has been done by the more important recent writers, and carries on its inquiries in a philosophical spirit, it becomes identical with epistemology. Epistemology, logic, and metaphysics may thus be said to denote certain main points of view, differing somewhat in the treatment of various writers in emphasis and inclusiveness, rather than three independent and isolated sciences.