as an art is concerned with discover ing and formulating rules of acting in accord ance with which men may attain their end. These rules may be considered as of the nature either of injunctions or commands, which pre scribe as well as instruct ; or as technical formula which indicate to the individual the best way of proceeding toward a desired result, thus not different in kind from rules of paint ing, or of carpentry. Which view is taken depends usually upon the kind of philosophy with which ethics as an art is associated. Ethics as an art may also be an outgrowth of either a general philosophy of conduct, or of a scien tific analysis of it. Thus, from the philosophic point of view, a recent writer, Sorley, in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Vol. I, p. 346, 1902), says of ethics: GIt has to do not merely with actual conduct, but with right or good conduct, and accordingly with an ideal from which rules may be laid down for actual It is clear that the philosophical establishment of the ideal is cbnsidered to terminate in rules for its attainment. On the other hand, Jeremy Bentham in his of Legislation' (1789), having before insisted that ethics is a science whose truths are to be discovered by investigations as severe as mathematical ones, and beyond all comparison more intricate and goes on to define ethics Gas the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness,'" and says it is the business of private ethics Eto instruct each individual in what manner to govern his own conduct in the details of life.) Thus as an art ethics may be grounded upon either a philosophy or a science.
As may readily be inferred from the above account, some of the most serious problems of ethics at present are concerned with defining and delimiting its own scope, basis and aims. From a purely abstract point of view, all three conceptions can exist harmoniously side by side. It is possible theoretically to regard certain topics as assigned to ethics as a branch of philosophy, others to its scientific phase, and others to the practical, or to ethics as an art. But no consensus as to these various possible assignments exists. Usually those who insist that ethics is a branch of philosophy deny that it can be anything else; they deny that any descriptive and explanatory account of actual, as distinct from ideal, conduct, deserves the name of ethics. What we have above treated as belonging to the science of ethics is by them treated as really a matter of history, sociology and psychology, not of ethics proper at all. Thus Green, Prolegomena to Ethics' (1883), begins by attempting to prove that a natural science of ethics is inherently impossible, be cause moral conduct by its nature implies an ideal that transcends actual conduct which alone can be made a matter of observation and experiment, and sets up an obligation which in its absoluteness transcends all the sanctions of experience. On the other hand, those who have occupied themselves with the scientific analysis of moral behavior and character, have usually denied the legitimacy of the philosophic aspect. Thus Bentham expressly regards all philosophi cal inquiries as doomed to result in sterility, in mere dogmatic personal assertions, or, as he calls them, "ipso disits?) A more recent writer, Leslie Stephen, of Ethics' (1882), without absolutely denying the possibility in the remote future of a metaphysics of conduct, says that the metaphysical view is entirely ir relevant to a scientific treatment. Along with
this uncertainty as to the defining aim and characteristic methods of ethics, are naturally found a large number of subordinate and secondary controversies and divisions of opinion.
As a matter of fact, however, in every his torical period there have been found in ethical theories some connection with general philo sophic thought, and with the data of behavior exhibited in experience (or the scientific aspect) and with the further direction and conduct of life— the practical aspect. Historically, ethics has passed through three epochs : (I) the Graeco-Roman; (2) the Patristic-Mediaeval; (3) the Early Modggn ; terminating with say the French Revoluti4h, and may now be re garded as having entered upon a fourth stage. In each period, a certain practical interest is upperrnov in social life. and this interest serves to and direct attention toward certain relevant theoretic problems. An ade quate account of ethical thought accordingly is possible only in connection with the larger civilization and culture of which it is a part. Brief characterizations of the mainproblem of each epoch in its wider social tendencies will serve, however, to point out (a) the philosophic, (b) the scientific, (c) the practical centre of ethics in each period.
The Graeco-Roman period was characterized by the disintegration of local custom, tradition and institution, civil and religious, coincident with the spread of cosmopolitan learning and the formation of an inclusive political organization taking effect in both legislation and administra tion — Greek culture and the Roman empire. With the disintegration of the habits and modes of life which had previously defined the sphere of legitimate individual satisfaction, and which supplied the sanctions of the moral life, there was necessarily coincident an inquiry which attempted to establish through reflection ade quate substitutes for the waning institutional modes of control. One of the results of modern historical science is the proof of the extent and stringency of the force of custom in early life. It is custom which defines the morally right and obligatory, and it is custom which enforces its own demands. In it are bound together morals, law and religion, and all are bound into the very life of the people, emotional and intellectual, as well as practical. Where custom rules, moral theory is unnecessary and indeed impossible. In the 6th and 5th centuries before Christ, this regime of custom was irretrievably shaken in the Greek world, and with a twofold result upon morals. Many thought that all sanctions for morality had disappeared, or at least lost validity, and that pure individualism in thought and conduct— tempered at best only by some judicious regard to consequences — was the proper outcome. Others, prevented by what they regarded as the low moral standards of customary morality from coming to its defense, •were also shocked by the demoralization attend ant upon ethical individualism, and set to work to discover a universal and unassailable basis for a higher type of ideal morality. In this conflict, ethical theory was born.