ETHICS (from Gr. OA, having to do with conduct, from iBos, character, lengthened form of 100s, custom, manners; cf. morals, from Latin, mos mores, customs), that branch of the theory of conduct which is concerned with the formation and use of judgments of right and wrong, and with intellectual emotional, and executive, or overt, phenomena, which are as sociated with such judgments, either as ante cedents or consequents. As a branch of the theory of conduct, it is generically akin to the sciences of jurisprudence, politics and eco nomics; but it is marked off from such sciences in that it considers the common subject matter of human conduct from the standpoint of right ness and wrongness. Such terms as good and evil, the dutiful or obligatory, might be used in the definition as substitutes for the terms "right' and but good and evil are somewhat too wide in scope, including, for instance, eco nomic utilities, commodities and satisfactions; while duty is somewhat too narrow an idea, emphasizing the notion of control at the ex pense of the idea of the good and desirable. 'tRightb and "wrong') designate exactly those phases of good and evil to which the idea of the obligatory is also applicable. The terms moral philosophy, moral science, and morals have also been used to designate the same sub ject of inquiry.
In its historical development, ethics has been regarded as a branch of philosophy, as a science, and as an art — often as a composite of two or all of these in varying proportions. As a branch of philosophy, it is the business of ethics to investigate the nature and reality of certain conceptions in connection with fundamental theories of the universe. It is the theory of reality in its moral aspect. The term good is taken to denote or describe a property of ulti mate and absolute being. As such, it is usually co-ordinated with two other fundamental prop erties of reality, the true and the beautiful ; and the three philosophic disciplines are defined as ethics, logic and aesthetics. 'Even when so much emphasis is not thrown upon the place of the good in the general scheme of the universe, ethics may still be regarded as a branch of philosophy, because concerned with the ideal, with what ought to be, or with what is abso lutely desirable, as distinct from the actual, the existent, the phenomenal. From this point of view, ethics is regarded as normative in char acter, that is, concerned with establishing and justifying certain ultimate norms, standards and rules of action.
In contrast with such functions, ethics as a science is concerned with collecting, describ ing, explaining and classifying the facts of experience in which judgments of right and wrong are actually embodied or to which they apply. It is subdivided into social, or socio logical, ethics, and individual, or psychological, ethics. (a) The former deals with the habits, practices, ideas, beliefs, expectations, institu tions, etc., actually found in history or in con temporary life, in different races, peoples, grades of culture, etc., which are outgrowths of judgments of the moral worth of actions or which operate as causes in developing such judgments. Up to the present, social ethics has been developed mainly in connection, (1) with discussion of the evolution of morality, either by itself or in connection with institutions of law and judicial procedure, or of religious cult and rite ; or (2) with problems of contemporary social life, particularly with questions of philan thropy, penology, legislation, regarding divorce, the family and industrial reform —such as child-labor, etc. In both aspects it is closely connected with the science of sociology. It is sometimes called inductive, or in its second as pect, applied ethics. (b) Psychological ethics is concerned with tracing in the individual the origin and growth of the moral consciousness, that is, of judgments of right and wrong, feel ings of obligation, emotions of remorse, shame, of desire for approbation; of the various habits of action which are in accord with the judg ment of right, or the virtues ; with the possi bility and nature, from the standpoint of the psychical structure of the individual, of free, or voluntary, action. It gathers and organizes psychological data bearing upon the nature of intention and motive; desire, effort and choice; judgments of approbation and disapprobation; emotions of sympathy, pity in relation to the impulse of self-preservation and the formation and reformation of habit in its effect upon character, etc. In other words, it treats be havior as an expression of certain psychical elements and groupings, or associations: psy chological analysis.