EXTRADITION, Interstate. The New England Confederation of 1643 provided for mutual extradition of criminals between the different provinces.; the Articles of Confedera tion did likewise; and the Constitution pro vides for it between the States, which are independent countries in all save the functions they have resigned to the general government. But the wording of the provision, though as definite as it can safely be made, leaves room for the widest difference in construction, and the evasion of the mandate in a large share of the cases that arise. It is: *A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.)) But must the offense be a crime by the law of the State requisitioned as well as of the State demanding? The iu dicial decisions say decidedly no — that ((the obligation to surrender the fugitive . . . is the same as if the alleged act was a crime by the laws of both.)) On the other hand, the State executives, for obvious reasons, have stubbornly refused to tie their hands from exer cising discretion, and have again and again acted on the theory that the offense must be a crime by the law of their own State. Thus, in the Dorr Rebellion (q.v.), Governor Cleveland of Connecticut refused to extradite Dorr — though Dorr was actually using Connecticut soil to organize an attack on Rhode Island—on the ground that the latter's treason laws were not valid, outside itself ; and Governor Seward of New York refused to surrender persons charged with stealing slaves (though his predecessors had done so), on the ground that it was not a crime by New York law, by common law or the common consent of civilized nations. Even
the principles of decision are not agreed upon. In some States the courts hold,that the courts of the State making the demand are entitled to decide as to the sufficiency of the cause; in others their own courts make their own law without regard to that of the other States. Still another question is, whether the governor ,has any discretion in the matter, su_pposing his State law to demand extradition. The answer is somewhat startling; it is, that the governor legally has no discretion, that he is imperatively bound to issue the warrant, but if he does re fuse, there is no power to compel him and no punishment for the refusal. The Constitution, in other words, has issued an imperative man date with no provision for its enforcement. In deed, it is difficult to see how there could be any; the only remedy being a State impeach ment of its executive for malfeasance, which is out of the question in such c.ases. The forms of interstate extradition are provided in the act of 1793, The accused must be indicted in the State where the offense is committed; if the magistrate before whom the charge is brought is satisfied of its truth, he issues a warrant for the arrest of the criminal, and a copy is forwarded to the executive of the State, who makes requisition for the fugitive's surrender on the executive of the State to which he has fled. If the latter is satisfied of the legality of the process and the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, he is to issue a war rant for surrender; but habeas corpus proceed ings may always be interposed. The expense of the proceedings and transportation is borne by the State malcing the demand.