RELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS.
Separation of Powers.— When the Con stitution was framed the lielief prevailed that the executive, legislative and executive depart ments of government should be separate and in dependent, but nevertheless this separation was subject to some modifications in the Constitu tion as adopted and has been considerably changed by the practices which have developed since. The Senate was allowed to wield a cer tain amount of executive power in that it was entrusted with the confirming of appointments; Congress was given a considerable degree of control over the administration through its right to establish, regulate and maintain the various departments; and the President could participate in legislation through his right to address or send messages to Congress and through his power of veto. In recent years the contest for domination between the executive and legislative branches has resulted in a strug gle in which each has endeavored to strengthen its own position at the other's expense.
Under Article II, § II, ¶ 2 of the Constitution the President has power, °by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other pub lic ministers and consuls, judges of the Su preme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior offi cers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.* Though the fathers of the Con stitution probably intended that the Senate should refuse to confirm Presidential nomina tions because of unfitness only, the Senate has not hesitated to use its power in this respect for partisan purposes, chiefly to coerce the President. Under this senatorial power has arisen the practice known as °Senatorial courtesy* (q.v.), the extent and importance to which this practice may attain depending largely on the President's character and force fulness. The Constitution makes no provision respecting removals from office, but in 1867, at the time of the dispute between President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, Congress passed the Tenure-of-Office Act (q.v.), provid
ing that persons appointed with the consent of the Senate should hold office until their suc cessors were appointed in like manner; in other words, the incumbent could be removed only with the consent of the Senate. The doubtful legality of the act caused material alterations in 1869 and its final repeal in 1887. (See also DE Fac-ro GOVERN M ENT ) . Impeachments are rarely used, though all branches of the government have had occasion to employ this cumbersome procedure (President Johnson,Judges Picicering, Chase, Humphreys, Peck, Swayne and Archi bald; Senator Blount; Secretary Bellmap) and in the nine cases only three convictions have resulted (Pickering, Humphreys and Archi bald), while Blount and Bellaiap were out of office when their cases came up for considera tion. Save by the method of impeachment Congress cannot remove objectionable officials, though it may investigate and discredit them and thus compel their resignation or dismissal. See APPOINTMENTS ; UNITED STATES—THE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE SPOILS SYSTEM ; UNITED STATES — IMPEACH MENTS.
Treaty-Making.--The legislature is seldom allowed to participate in the negotiations of treaties, but to exclude errors and to prevent the possibility of abuse by an unwise, ambitious or unscrupulous executive, the legislature, or one branch thereof, usually possesses power of ratification before treaties negotiated by the executive may become the law of the land; hence the treaty-malcing power is neither purely executive nor legislative in character. The Sen ate practically controls the power of malcing treaties through the constitutional provision, as previously stated, that two-thirds of the Sena tors must approve the treaty; as a result of the encroachment of the legislature on the executive the Senate now to a certain degree participates in the negotiations through its committee on foreign relations. The House has often en deavored to exert some influence over the course of negotiations but the President is not obliged to heed the advice of the House, its concurrence being necessary only when legisla tion is required to render treaties effective. Sometimes, to circumvent the certain defeat of a treaty in the Senate, the President has entered into an °executive agreement° with the country involved, under which, by independent action, the chief provisions of the proposed treaty were carried out. See TREATIES.