Departmental Affairs.— The Presidenes power and influence over the executive depart ments vary and in many respects are subject to Congressional limitation. He is the head of the National administration, is obliged to en force the faithful execution of all laws, and under Article II, § II, § 1 of the Constitution 6may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive depart ments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices); yet the departments, being organized by Congress, are subject to the will of Congress under statutory regulation, which situation somewhat curbs Presidential power over departmental heads and their sub ordinates. From a strictly legal standpoint, the President does not possess full authonty in re spect to the control and direction of adminis trative affairs but he can establish himself as the chief executive and administrative officer of the government and can make his will ef fective by removing an officer who refuses to comply with his wishes and appoint one who will do so—as was the case when President Jackson compelled the removal of government funds from the United States Bank. However potent this power may be, it could not be said to constitute the President's chief means of control over administrative affairs since his authority has been strengthened constantly b7 an .ever-broadening construction of the consti tutional provisions requiring him to execute the laws. His power to issue and enforce executive orders pertaining to administrative affairs has been sustained by numerous opinions and the courts seldom interfere to upset firmly estab lished precedents. When clothing the Presi dent with executive power the framers of the Constitution primarily intended that, besides en forcing the laws, he should perform acts of a political nature, such as conducting foreign af fairs, which are not subject to judicial review. Hence Congress seldom hampers the President in his conduct of foreign affairs through the State Department, and the extent of his per sonal supervision of such affairs depends largely upon the personality (and of course the capabilities) of the Secretary of State. But in respect to vesting authority for the administra tion of affairs (other than political), the intent of the framers was not clearly indicated in the Constitution, since one or more cif .the secreta ries is required to report annually direct to Con gress instead of to the President; furthermore, when it deems necessary or wise, Congress may provide for the management of certain services by joint committees of the two Houses, and may authorize subordinate officials to perform certain acts without the consent, approval or intervention of their superiors or the President.
(Arnong the administrative services outside the jurisdiction of the eiecutive dep:artments are the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Government Printing Office, the Commission of Fine Arts, the Smith sonian Institution, etc.). Congress maintains a close control and regulation over the Treasury Department and the administration of the finan cial needs of all departments. Although each secretary annually submits an estimate of his department's needs, Congress not only disre gards the secretary's recommendations but, if in the mood, appropriates vast sums which are not only not requested, but which are deemed by the secretaries and the President to be Un necessary and wasteful. Such oftentimes are appropnations for rivers and harbors and pub lic buildings, popularly lcnown as the °pork barrel.° See Ban= SYSTEM, AMERICAN.
The executive endeavors to cultivate har monious relations with Congress by complying with requests for opinions and advice, informa tion, documents, etc., partly because the success of the administration's legislative program de pends upon such harmony and partly because Congress controls the purse of the nation. This has resulted in bringing the executive and legislature together hy devious and extra-legal methods, but in one instance an opposite devel opment has occurred. In our early history Cabinet members sometimes appeared in per son before Congress to give information or to outline and advocate or oppose policies and this was not unconstitutional. Department heads cannot be members of either House though they are not excluded from the sessions, but the early practice was discontinued and seems un likely to be revived, though this course was ad vocated by a Senate cbmmittee in 1881 and by President Taft in a message 19 Dec. 1912.
See UNITED STATES-THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE; UNITED STATES-THE CABINET OF THE; UNITED STATES - BEGINNINGS OF EXECUTIVE DEPART MENTS OF THE; CABINET AND CABINET Gov ERNMENT ; CONGRESS; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT; and the various departments by name.
Presidential Influence over Legislation.— Under Article I, § VII, .11" 2 of the Constitution the President may veto an act of Congress and such act cannot become law unless repassed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. (See