Councils, or large consultative commissions, sit also at the Ministry, as well as the general inspectors of each of the officers' corps. The particular functions of these organizations are to advise the Minister on all questions concern ing the proper working of the departments and the strict maintenance of the military or pro fessional aptitude of the officers and men. Finally, the Minister is assisted by a staff of administrative and financial comptrollers, work ing exclusively under his orders, and responsi ble for the supervision of the material interests of the department and for the strict application of the regulations laid down to guarantee such interests. When the Minister is a political man, a member of Parliament, new, at any rate at first, to naval matters, it is necessary that, in conformity with his general views, which are really those of the government itself, a naval official should manage effectively the services of the Central Administration and co-ordinate its efforts. The vice-admiral placed at the head of the High General Staff is evidently best suited to be placed in charge, being better ac quainted than anyone with the requirements of the naval forces and the means by which this force can best fulfil its duties. But two con ditions stand out if full benefit is to be derived from such organization. In the first place it is necessary that the general officer in question possess the personal confidence, one might even say friendship, of the chief of the depart ment. In the second place this official must
have full authority over all the directors of the services of the Central Administration. How ever strange it may appear, it is nevertheless a fact that the problem of which these two con ditions form the essential factors has not yet been completely and definitely solved. More over, the civil ministers rather resent being kept under what they consider as a sort of guardianship, even temporary. Again, the chiefs of services, especially those of a purely technical nature, have done everything possible to avoid a subordination which affects their personal dignity. This is one of the chief reasons for the comparatively slow progress made in the French Navy during the last 20 years. In addition to this, the credits granted up to about 1908-09 were inadequate, and mat ters took a false route about the same period as a result of erroneous conceptions concern ing naval warfare, as we have explained in the commencement of this section. It is never theless true that, thanks to the high qualities of the personnel, the French Navy has rendered to the Allied cause in this war services, the full value of which will be better understood when, after hostilities, they be freely and openly discussed.