25. THE FRENCH NAVY. Brief His tory.— During the few years, the French navy has undergone some rather important modifications, both before the war and after ward. In order to make the nature of these transformations clearly understood, it would perhaps not he out of place to give a short resume of the role played by the Navy, at least during the last century, and more particularly since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It is admitted that at the conclusion of the American War of Independence the French fleet could be con sidered as almost equal to the English fleet. Although it did not possess quite as many vessels and frigates, it was better organized than its rival, and its chiefs, officers and men had on. several occasions shown their worth. The French Revolution resulted in the disband ing of the General Naval Staff, disorder broke out amongst the men and the material was al lowed to deteriorate. The efforts made by Napoleon to regain the ground lost were almost a complete failure. This organizing genius was unable to understand — among other essen tial things — that squadrons are not formed by mere exercises while at anchor, but that to be able to fight well at sea, it is first of all necessary to know how to navigate without suffering too much damage. After Napoleon, the Restoration period (1814-15), which al though it inherited a large number of vessels and small ships in good condition, very nearly lost everything and was on the verge of "liqui dating" the entire navy, being unable to under stand the importance — for France of a fleet. The conquest of Algiers (1830) proved, how ever, that what remained of the French fleet could still be usefully and gloriously employed.
The July government (Louis-Philippe I) sought to reconstitute a navy worthy of France, and was able, during its last years of office, to take advantage of new inventions, i.e., steam, the screw-propeller and steel construction. It was, however, during the reign of Napoleon III, in the 19th century, that the French Navy reached its zenith. The boldness with which its chiefs, aided by a great engineer, Deputy de LOme, took advantage of the new fields opened tip to them through the progress made in ar tillery and especially in defensive weapons, gave for a time a marked superiority to the French fleet, of which, however, Imperial politics did not take full advantage. It can be stated that from about 1862 to 1868 the armor-plated French squadron had no rival, Great Britain merely following the movement with hesitation and tardiness. Unfortunately this fine fleet had one drawback which made itself seriously felt in 1870 when it became a question of at tacking the German coast. Many of the float ing batteries of 1855-60 were useless; neither the Onondaga, the Rochambeau* nor the spur ships of 1864 (of a rather low water displace ment) had any weapons capable of opening curved fire. Nearly everything concerning coast warfare—in which connection mines al ready played an important part —had been neglected. An ineffective blockade was the result. The weakening of France after the
Treaty of Frankfort had a serious repercussion on maritime organization. It has, in fact, been stated with reason that the state of this organization gives a precise and exact idea of the power of a nation. Not only the fleet of the Republic definitely lost the first place it had attained for some years in rivalry with the Eng lish fleet, but, little by little, it declined to the third rank, then to the fourth, while the Ger man, American, Japanese, Italian, even Aus trian, fleets rapidly sprang into importance.* For 12 years, however, great efforts were made to recover the ground lost. Programs for naval construction were drawn up, with perhaps more zeal than judgment. It was necessary, moreover, to overcome certain prej udices, technical controversies, deep-rooted dif ferences of doctrine and competitive influences between the various staffs of the Navy. There was a period when the Heads of Corps, of the ships' officers (fleet officers so to speak) were systematically looked upon with suspicion and when the Command might be considered as de prived of its essential prerogatives. This state of affairs, however, gradually improved, but not to such an extent as not to leave serious traces in the organization of the services at the Ministry and in those of the arsenals. At the Ministry, absolute authority, was not given to the chief of the General Staff over the direc tors of the service, resulting in serious difficul ties,' in the preparation and conduct of war. In the arsenals, autonomy in the management of the works caused continual obstacles to be placed in the executive authority of the mari time prefects, misnamed Commander-in-chief. Moreover, erroneous doctrines penetrated into the governing spheres of the Navy and were embodied in the high technical school training. It was proclaimed that the only thing to be considered was the war of squadrons and big battles fought on the high seas by large units, equipped with a unique weapon, powerful guns with a more and more extended range. The possibilities of a war of cruisers and all ques tions of an economic order connected therewith, however important in such a vital matter, were disregarded. Coastal warfare did not exist for these new theories of naval warfare on a large scale, and finally, to the amazement of those who knew that France possessed the first submarines, as well as the first seaplanes, submarine and aerial warfare was almost en tirely ignored. It was under these conditions — and other nations were in the same predica ment — that France faced the formidable con flict of 1914, the immediate lessons of which were to relegate to their proper place so many erroneous ideas. Scarcely a year had elapsed before the large dreadnought fleets took refuge in their protected waters and the sea was pa trolled by smaller ships, whilst in its depths submarines slyly navigated, laying mines and ready to discharge torpedoes, these submarines being eagerly sought for by seaplanes.