The management of each railway system com prises a commission called )Commission de Reseau) (Railway Commission), composed of two members, a technical adviser (generally the manager of the line) and a military officer (a superior staff officer). This commission takes charge of the management of the line and acts as intermediary between the military au thorities and the railway under its management. It is assisted in its work by sub-commissions, which likewise comprise a military officer and a technical adviser, and by the station commissions consisting of an officer and a technical agent.
The staff of the companies subject to mili tary obligations is mobilized and go to form sections of field railways, officered by their proper chiefs. Each section constitutes an in dependent unit, comprising three departments: permanent way, traction and operation.
Moreover, each section comprises an active section to be placed at the disposal of the com inander-in-chief of the armies, and home sub divisions to be at the order of the War Office.
On the first day of mobilization, the mili tary authorities take over the management of the railways: the lines are controlled by the railway commissions and the employees are militarized in their respective duties. The ter ritory is divided into two zones: (1) the in terior zone which is under the control of the War Office, and (2) the army zone under the authority of the commander-in-chief.
Mobilization; Commencement of Hos tilities.— As soon as the order for mobilization is given, the ordinary train service is sus pended and mobilization trains are run, the timetable for which is drawn up before hand.
he declaration of war in 1914, the trans o f the troops which had been mobilized iced in the night of 1-2 August, after it The covering troops had already xxcentrated near the frontier. This con on, which was commenced on 31July clock, in the evening, was completed at n 2 August. The transporting of these on the "Est)) railway system .required order of mobilization required each ed man to be transported to his regi entre and, afterward, the concentration regiments so formed into army corps ie front. Now, the transporting of an :orps requires over 100 trains, without into account some 30 trains of equip etc. The trains comprise an average of tons.
transporting of the mobilized forces )rnpleted on 19 August — it had taken "18 The ((Est* line alone ran more than troop trains during these 18 days, and iffic at certain moments was exceptionally On three particular days nearly 1,200 ry trains were run on the °Est° line, on the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee, and on the Paris-Orleans. Three hundred
were dispatched from some stations in _ It is worthy of remark that, even dur le heaviest days of the traffic, the trans is; of the forces was effected with the est punctuality and that what delays oc d. were insignificant.
ie railways had, however, to cope with other difficulties. The requirements for oncentration of troops were much greater had been anticipated. About the middle .ugust, over 400 trains were required for .porting the English army from the Channel and the ocean on their way to Belgium, later on, 400 trains transported .in three the Indian troops from the south of ice to Orleans.
he German attack on France having been :ted by way of Belgium necessitated a ification of the original plan of concentra so that it extended from Longwy right up 'ourmies.
ileanwhile, the railways not only had to sport the food and munitions required for army, but also that necessary for the en tched camp of Paris. Hundreds of thou ds of head of cattle and as many tons of visions passed over the rails during the nh of August.
This traffic formed so to speak a series of nterrupted streams throughout the whole France, flowing toward the north and north t.
After the battle of Charleroi, it became :essary to look after the evacuation of the pf these regions fleeing before the aders and also remove the Belgian and ter locomotives and railway material in the rth and east of France, whilst at the same ie numerous trains followed the retreating nies, taking to the rear supplies, food, mum ns and a part of the artillery, to be central d at points fixed by the commander-in-chief 'ere the armies were to be reformed prior the battle of the Marne.
In the meantime, the government and the Dst important state administrations were provinces, and as' the enemy advanced toward Paris, thousands of Parisians, women and children mostly, quitted the capital. It has been estimated that some 50,000 people left Paris 3 September by the Orleans station alone.