Already in 1913, the railway 'systems taken as a whole showed an excess of expenditure over and above the earnings of over 42,000, 000 francs, resulting especially from the opera tion of the °Etat," °P. 0? and °Midi* rail ways. But owing to the war, the earnings fell suddenly from 2,017,000,000 francs ($403,400, 000) in 1913 to 1,670,000,000 ($334,000,000) in 1916 (according to the estimates made), but the total liabilities of the railways passed from 2,059,000,000 francs ($411,800,000) in 1913 to 2,015,000,000 ($403,000,000) in 1914, 2,019,000,000 ($403,800,000) in 1915 and 2,444,000,000 in 1916 4488,800,000) (estimated figures). It there fore follows that the deficit in the earnings of 42,000,000 ($8,400,000) in 1913, has risen suc cessively to 343,000,000 (08,600,000) in 1914, to 372,000,000 ($74,400,000) in 1915 and to 455,000, 000 ($91,000,000) in 1916. Consequently, it is evi dent that, notwithstanding the resumption of traffic and a constant growth in the receipts, the deficit continues to increase. This is undoubtedly due to the continual increase in the price of raw material, especially coal, as well as to an increase in expenditure in respect of staff. We have no reason to expect that, after the war, the cost of living, any more than that of raw material, will decrease sufficiently to re-estab lish the equilibrium which was already broken. An increase in tariffs will alone straighten out a financial situation, a prolongation of which would be prejudicial to the essential interests of the country. Moreover, several countries
have already some years back been obliged to resort to this measure rendered necessary by economic conditions, and from which there is no escape in France either.
It is also to be expected that as a result of the war, the opposition in England to the Chan nel tunnel scheme will disappear. It is not too much to hope that the union of the two countries, after having been cemented on the fields of battle, will continue after the war and will manifest itself particularly by an economi cal entente and closer commercial contact, which the construction of the tunnel would (greatly facilitate. We can already get some idea of the services it would have rendered during the recent war in transporting troops and munitions: the running capacity of the tunnel being estimated at 120 trains a day of 500 tons, i.e., 6 trains an hour, during 20 hours, it would thus have been possible to ensure the safe transportation of 30,000 men and 30,000 tons of goods a day. The great conflict has sufficed to convert several British military au thorities to the idea of the tunnel, and all the big, shipowners by the mouth of their princi pal periodical, The Shipping World, now ac knowledge the utility of the tunnel. Work on a tunnel had been started both from the French and English coasts in 1875 after an English corporation known as The Channel Tunnel Company obtained an act authorizing it to un dertake preliminary works, and The French