About 1883, just before Germany was ad mitted to colonial possessions in Africa, Ger man professors begah to attack the American Monroe Doctrine. Soon thereafter, Americans, observing the increasing German immigration and business relations in Latin-America — es pecially ih Brazil, Patagonia, Venezuela and Mexico — began to be concerned lest Germany would extend her colonial ambition to South America. In March 1883 the American Minister at Berlin called the attention of the government at Washington to the disposition of the German government to take possession of Patagonia and other South American ter ritories. German hate of the Monroe Doctrine grew in a ratio proportional to the growth of the German navy. Even Bismarck, who claimed to be friendly to the United States, and opposed the inauguration of the German colonial em pire, characterized the doctrine as "an inter national impertinence? In October 1897, drew D. White, the American Minister at Ber lin, informing his government that Germany was anxious to increase her colonial posses sions, stated that efforts were being made to direct German immigration to South America, especially with a view of taking advantage of the anticipated eventual breaking-up of the United States of Brazil, and therefore that Germany was opposed to any international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine and dis pleased with any reiteration of the doctrine by the American government.
Although, as early as 1871, the German gov ernment was reported to have considered the question of the acquisition of Samana, the first actual evidence of territorial rivalry with the United States appeared in the Pacific. The American government — following the German absorption of the northern side of New Guinea in 1884, the dispute between Germany and Spain for the Carolinas in 1885 and the Ger man occupation of other islands by imperial decree in 1886— decided to maintain rights to which the United States had become entitled in any of the few remaining unappropriated Pacific islands which were under independent and autonomous native governments, and so notified the German government. It was es pecially determined to preserve Samoan inde pendence.
In Americo-German diplomatic relations, the question of the Samoan Islands attained a prominence disproportionate to its importance. In 1887, American interests and responsibility in the islands, under a treaty of 1878, came in conflict with German intervention. In 1885, the German consul, on pretext of an agreement 1884 with the native king, precipitated a crisis by raising his flag over the royal hut at Apia and taking possession in the name of his government. In the following year, the Ameri can consul, in order to counteract German in fluence, proceeded to raise the American flag, and proclaimed a protectorate which the Amen can government later disavowed while speak ing in a determined tone regarding the protec tion of American rights in the Pacific. In 1887, a conference at Washington failed to agree upon a plan of adjustment. The real obstacle to agreement was the traditional American be lief in the right of self-government. A second
crisis was reached when Germany forced King Malietoa to abdicate, imprisoned him on a Ger man war vessel, carried him to Berlin and de clared war on Samoa. A new crisis, resulting from rival warships at the islands, was averted by a providential hurricane. Relations were decidedly strained until, by invitation of Bis marck, earlier unsuccessful conferences were resumed at Berlin, resulting in a treaty of 1889 which recognized the independence of the islands under a tripartite, hybrid system of government of the islands under joint pro tection of the United States, Great Britain and Germany. Ten years later, this cumbersome government was abandoned and terminated by a treaty of 1899 providing for a division of the islands between the United States and Germany, each with jurisdiction in its own territory. Thus, Germany obtained a colony and the United States a coaling station.
At the opening of the Spanish-American War a more serious international situation arose in connection with the appearance and action of the German squadron under Admiral Diedrichs at Manila Bay, which precipitated a controversy with Admiral Dewey of the Ameri can fleet. The incident indicated an apparently unfriendly attitude of Germany, and produced strained relations, which but for the attitude of the commander of the British fleet might have degenerated into actual conflict. The report of the affair awakened many Americans to the necessity of larger naval preparation for de fense against German designs. The chief fac tor in determining the American government to decide upon the acquisition of the entire Philip pine group was the apprehension that whatever was left would be taken by Germany—an ap prehension which was justified by the previous action of the German fleet during the American occupation of Manila harbor, and which was later proven not without foundation by the prompt German purchase of all remaining pos sessions of Spain in the Pacific (the Carolines and the Ladrones) in 1899.
Relations with Germany became more strained each year after the Spanish-American War, and additional evidence of German greed and jealousy, already shown in the German seizure of Kiau-Chau, appeared in the apparent purpose of Germany to secure the partition of China by the instigation of Russian aggression, and in the severity of German policy following the Boxer uprising in China —all of which were opposed by the United States. Especially after Cleveland's warning relative to the Mon roe Doctrine the German government watched for an opportunity to humble the United States while the emperor used various forms of flat tery and seduction to establish in America a wide German influence through agents, advo cates and promoters of the glory of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Although Germany in 1899 signed The Hague treaty which was to lead the way to disarmament, she proceeded without delay to spend millions in increasing her navy.