The result was to make Americans suspicious of the designs of Germany — especially in re lation to interference in Denmark to prevent the ratification of the American-Danish Treaty of 1902 for the transfer of the Danish West Indies, interference in Colombia to prevent the conclusion of a treaty for the construction of the Panama Canal, and initiation of an assault against Venezuela to defy the United States and destroy the Monroe Doctrine which stood in the way of German designs in the Caribbean. Germany's relations with Latin America were especially regarded with watchful suspicions by the United States. In 1900, Senator Lodge, advocating the maintenance of a proper navy, referred to the possible future necessity of protecting the Monroe Doctrine in Brazil, in which country Germany had developed intimate relations through new postal and commercial arrangements.
To allay American suspicion, and remedy the growing alienation between the two coun tries, the Kaiser, becoming demonstrative in declarations of friendliness, diplomatically initiated attempts at reconciliation by sending his brother on a visit to the United States (pro fessedly on a friendly mission but also to solidify the German-American movement in be half of the fatherland), and by other acts, in cluding the ill-timed presentation of a statue of Frederick the Great to the United States, and the later arrangement for exchanges of university professors — thus providing a more pleasant atmosphere for negotiations on the question of German restrictions on American trade.
These acts, however, did not make the American government under Roosevelt less alert in scenting danger in the gravity of the events in Venezuela by which Germany sought to test the strength of the Monroe Doctrine. As the isthmian canal project developed into a possible certainty, Germany increased her efforts to obtain a foothold in the western hemisphere, and especially in the vicinity of the canal: In May 1901, Hay had information that Germany contemplated occupation of two islands off the coast of Venezuela as naval base, and later he learned of negotiations for the purchase of two harbors on the coast of lower California. About the same time the more real danger began to develop in Venezuela as a result of a German debt-collecting expedi tion and "pacific blockade" which sought a pretext for occupation of Venezuelan coast towns. On 11 Dec. 1901, the German Am bassador, in stating to the American govern ment that Germany found it necessary to use coercive measures against Venezuela for satis faction of claims, gave assurance that his gov ernment under no circumstances would con sider the acquisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory. Later, when Germany
declined to arbitrate the Venezuelan question, Roosevelt firmly applied pressure and took steps which seemed necessary to. prevent any occupation of Venezuelan territory, and thus induced the emperor to accept arbitration.
The formal German blockade of the Vene zuelan port was terminated in February 1903 by diplomatic intervention of the American government. At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, who declined an invitation to act as arbitrator, the question at issue was submitted to The Hague Court. In connection with the controversy the manly utterances of England's Premier (Balfour) in favor of the Monroe Doctrine were in striking contrast with the melodramatic performance of Germany's Chan cellor in the Reichstag to elicit applause of the gallery. British statesmen, dealing with Ameri can questions, had long learned that American public opinion is molded by the people, but Ger man statesmen remained ignorant of American democratic conditions.
Although Germany was 'victorious by the de cision in the settlement of the Venezuelan dis pute, she received a lesson in regard to Ameri can determination to maintain the Monroe Doc trine, against which Pan-Germanists have raged so furiously, and discovered that the American government will oppose encroach ments which might result from intervention in American States. President Roosevelt inter preted the Monroe Doctrine so clearly that there was no remaining excuse for misunder standing. In 1906, at the turning point in Ger man colonial policy, the Kaiser, in dictating that the American government must be invited to the Algeciras Congress to participate in the decision of the question whether Germany should have a foothold in Morocco, sought to embroil the United States in European affairs in a way that would compromise the Monroe Doctrine, but failed in his purpose. Germany felt a keen disappointment in the failure to secure a port at Morocco, which by its near ness to the southeastern coast of South America would have . given her a great advantage in trade competition with the United States in that region, and might have served as a valuable outpost in the realization of Pan-German am bition in Brazil where interference would have resulted in an inevitable collision with the United States.