FRANKLIN, Battle of. On 12 Nov. 1864 General Sherman turned back from his pursuit of Hood to begin his march from Atlanta to the sea, leaving General Thomas to act on the de fensive in Tennessee or to take the offensive in Alabama. Hood was at Florence and Tuscum bia, on the Tennessee River, threatening Nash ville, with -an army of 44,000 men. Thomas' command, much smaller, was widely distributed from Chattanooga to Nashville. General Scho field was at Pulaski, Tenn., 80 miles smith of Nashville. With the Fourth corps under cral Stanley, a part of the 23d corps, under General Cox, and a division of cavalry, instructed Schofield to delay Hood, should he advance, until the army could be concentrated and Nashville reinforced. On the 21st Hood moved on Schofield's right. Schofield withdrew from Pulaski on the 22d, reached on the 24th, and remained there until the 27th, when Hood forced him to withdraw to the north bank of the river. On the 28th Scho field learned that Forrest's Confederate cavalry threatened his line of withdrawal through Spring Hill, 11 miles in his rear, and early on the morning of the 29th all his trains and three divisions of infantry were put in motion for Spring Hill. Stanley led, and arrived at Spring Hill just as Forrest reached it. Stanley checked Forrest and took defensive positions. Hood fol lowed Forrest, and during the night Schofield's entire army passed through Spring Hill, in sight of Hood's bivouac fires, for Franklin, 12 miles distant, which the advance reached before day light of the 30th. Being unable at once to cross to the north bank of the Harpeth River, Scho field, who was closely followed by Hood, had to fight to save his trains, with a river at his back. He threw up a line of entrenchments, and a division of the Fourth corps under Stanley crossed to the north bank of the river, all those remaining in the works south of it being under command of General Cox. By noon the trains were in, and most of them crossed to the north bank. Not anticipating a general attack, Schofield gave orders for the withdrawal of the troops at sunset. He was mistaken as to the intention of Hood, who had closely fol lowed his rear with Forrest's cavalry, and when Wagner's division, acting as Schofield's rear guard, had halted and thrown up barricades about 280 yards beyond the main line, Hood rapidly advanced his infantry and ordered a desperate assault to drive the Union forces into the river. Two of Wagner's' brigades
were on either side of the Columbia road; Op dycke's brigade had come into the main line and was massed 200 yards in rear of the entrench ments. Wagner's orders were "to develop the enemy, but not to attempt to fight if threatened by too strong a force." Hood formed his lines with celerity on either side of the Columbia pike, Cleburne's and Brown's divisions of Cheatham's corps on the east and west sides of the road respectively, in two lines of battle. When within 400 yards of Wagner's line, at 3.30 P.M., the charge was ordered and, with a wild shout, they rushed forward. Wagner was enveloped on both flanks and fiercely attacked in front, the Confederates rushed over his barri cades and his men gave way in the greatest dis order, closely pursued by the exultant enemy. When within 100 yards of the main line the Union artillery and infantry opened fire. Cle burne, who was leading his division, was shot dead, great gaps were made 'in the ranks, but the line pressed on, carried the centre of the 23d corps' line for the length of a brigade, went over the works, captured two batteries and many prisoners, reached an inner line of en trenchments, 68 yards in rear of the main line, and here they were checked. Colonel Opdycke, who had massed his brigade in rear, when he saw Wagner's men falling back in disorder, and that the works, in front had been captured, ordered his men forward. Deploying as they advanced, they rushed upon the Confederates, and a desperate hand-to-hand encounter took place, resulting in the retreat of the enemy to the outer line of works, the capture by Opdycke of nearly 400 prisoners and nine battle-flags, and the recovery of the captured batteries. General Thomas says Opdycke's prompt action "saved the day." Meanwhile the battle had ex tended to the right and left, involving all of the 23d corps and the left brigade of Kimball's division. The Confederates reached the works in many places, but were unable to carry them. On both sides the fighting was most gallant. At midnight the Union army crossed to the north bank of the river and marched to Nashville.