FREE WILL. This question is properly di vided into two sections, that of the metaphys ical basis and the doctrinal application; but the latter has so deeply affected the reasonings on the former, that it is almost impossible to sepa rate them.
The metaphysical problem is unique, from its presenting at the outset an irreconcilable contradiction between the phenomena of con sciousness and the operations of reason. In this respect it is different from the insoluble problems of time and space, where the conflict is between opposing conclusions of the reason with regard to the materials furnished by con sciousness; here there is a denial, by reason, of the validity of those materials. Consciousness appears to show us at every moment that we can dictate our actions mostly and our thoughts very largely; reason tells us that each follows on other phenomena, from whose invariable re lation of precedence we characterize them as cause and the former as effect. Consciousness tells us that our will is the active agent in pro clueing the phenomena which immediately suc ceed it; reason tells us that this fancied agency is an illusion and itself a part of the chain of sequences, and that the apparent relation is be cause, as Hobbes says, the so-called will is the last wish of the mind before determining. But what causes the determination? This involves the problem of the nature of the will as before, as well as of the by which, if a reality, it acts on matter; if not a reality, the reason why a mental resolve is invariably fol lowed by a physical movement or mental con ception. Of the coupling-pin no acceptable theory has ever been framed; the best expla nation of the association of will and act, sup posing the former an illusion, is still Spinoza s, that they are twin phases of the same ultimate reality, and of necessity change coincidently. But this leaves it still unexplained why our consciousness makes the will not coincident with the act, but invariably its predecessor: we do not will and act simultaneously, but in suc cession. The overwhelming weight of reason,
however, for 2,500 years, from the Greek decessors of Aristotle to Jonathan Edwards, has won reluctant acceptance to the doctrine of uni versal determinism, or in theological phrase, of necessitarianism: a chain of causation extend ing to all things and back to infinity, since no uncaused first act or idea can be fancied except as part of the First Cause of the universe. It is of course never claimed that all acts are volitional or all volitions deliberate, but only that the mind at will can interject uncaused determinations among the caused. It is evident, however, that to assume the possibility of un caused acts is to consign the universe to chaos and abolish the reign of law; that only on the theory of strict and unbroken causation (or tinvariable sequence)) can we reason at all concerning phenomena; that the mind must fol low the same law as other entities, and has no power, nor could even be endowed with such by omnipotence, of willing without motive that is, without a cause itself the resultant of an endless series of other causes. Indeed, as Professor Huxley puts it, for the mind fo cause itself implies that it has anteceded itself, which is absurd; the first mental action must have been part of the chain of causation, which sur renders the whole case, as there is no spot where it can be imagined that it was able to. throw down the ladder by which it had climbed, and cut loose from causes into a region of caprice.
To avoid this conclusion, a curious dilemma) —usually known as )Buridan's Ass,) though Buridan did not devise it — was invented by the medimval schoolmen. Suppose an ass between two bundles of hay, exactly alike, and with no motive for choosing which to bite first: it is absurd to suppose he would starve in the midst of food, and he must therefore act from free will. To this, however, it was answered that if motiveless he would so starve; and the ques tion remained as before.