In the course of a cruise to the Mediterranean the German Emperor cast anchor off Tangier and formally declared (31 March 1905) to rep resentatives of the Sultan who had come to meet him that he considered "the Sultan as an abso lutely independent sovereign?' Threatened in the execution of their secret design, France and Great Britain took umbrage at this action, and with alarming suddenness Morocco leaped into prominence as the burning issue of European diplomacy. The immediate tension caused by William II's visit to Tangier was in deed relieved by a general congress in Spain, at Algeciras, which was called together to discuss the Morocco question and which wrote the independence of the African sultanate into in ternational law (1906). With quiet tenacity, however, due to the pledged support of Great Britain, and on pretexts of maintaining order such as are the stock-in-trade of all imperialists, France worked her way from point to point into Morocco, and in 1911, by a sudden stroke, occupied Fez, the capital, with 20,000 men. The act signified, in spite of Tangier, in spite of Algeciras, the consummation of the Anglo French agreement, and if Germany intended to protest before the curtain fell upon the play she would have to be prompt about it. By hurrying the small gunboat Panther to Agadir, a Moroccan port on the Atlantic, she took em phatic and spectacular action similar to that of 1905. The sending of the Panther proclaimed that for her the status of Morocco was still that of a sovereign power as defined by the Act of Algeciras. Another period of fierce ten sion, under which the very foundations of Europe cracked and rocked, was at last relieved by an arrangement between the main contest ants, France and Germany, whereby Germany accepted French control in Morocco in return for certain French regions in tropical Africa. It was a poor quid pro quo from an imperialist standpoint, but the best to be had short of the hazard of war. War Germany was not ready to tisk nor really capable of undertaking, in view of the fact that Morocco was a sea-issue in which France would have to the uttermost the backing of England, the unchallenged mistress of the seas. On looking back from the height of 1911 over eight years of crisis connected with Morocco, Europe might well heave a sigh of relief, for a general war, threatened again and again, had been averted by compromise. But over -what Europe, had it been wiser than it was, would have remained profoundly anxious was that rancors had been created, so terrible they hardly admitted of appeasement. Hence forth a volcano was stirring underneath the continent which could not he extinguished by any amount of diplomatic hocus-pocus. Com pared with the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 caused hardly more than a ripple. Both Russia and Germany showed a conciliatory spirit, perhaps because they were genuinely alarmed by the spectacle of war so violently raised by the Mo roccan conflict. True, Germany could no more hinder the partition of Persia from being car ried out than she had been able to hinder the Morocco partition, hut she was successful in persuading Russia to recognize her as an inter ested power and to concede an exchange of fa vors. By the Potsdam agreement of 1910 Rus sia, on being promised undisturbed enjoyment of her Persian sphere, agreed to put no obstacles in the way of Germany's railroad policy in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Evidently the relations of Germany with Russia were easier than with the two Western members of the Entente. If the intimacy could be still further developed the whole embittered European situation would show a heartening improvement, since in the light of a series of imperialist concessions the complaint of German statesmen, repeated again and again, that the Triple Entente was forging an iron ring to lock Germany up in Europe and shut her off from the seas and outlying con tinents, would fall to the ground. The fear of encirclement or Einkreisung had become a national nightmare, on the dispersal of which the amicable solution of the imperialist rivalries mainly hinged. The Potsdam agreement con tained a gleam of promise which, though des tined to be miserably extinguished, needs to be fully understood. The treaty pointed to certain Turkish regions as proper areas for German exploitation and indicated that Turkey, following Morocco and Persia, was the next on the list of backward states to be taken over by the powers for a course of modern rehabili tation. But Turkey, occupying provinces of southeastern Europe as well as of western Asia and straddling the Bosporus and Dardanelles, was an infinitely more complicated issue than Morocco or Persia, and presently developed such inflammable problems, many of which had been smoldering for ages, that one sharp crisis followed another without interruption. The upshot was that the general war repeatedly threatened since 1904 but happily adjourned, came at last via Turkey and the small Balkan states, former dependencies of Turkey and since their liberation engaged in fierce national ist rivalries among themselves and with their neighbors, Turkey, Austria and Russia. At the time of the Potsdam agreement the German interests in Turkey were already more than a generation old. Beginning on a very modest scale and gradually enlarged through the me dium of banks arid ship-lines, they were not thrust into the foreground until the hostility of England, becoming settled, made all expan sion by the open sea highly problematical and underscored the advantage of a continuous land-route to the East. France and Great Britain boasted commercial houses and lucrative concessions in Constantinople, Smyrna and else where long before Germany put in an appear ance, but as they enjoyed openings in many other parts of the world which drew the atten tion of their business men and absorbed the capital of their financiers, Germany by concen trating on Turkey as soon as its many advan tages were manifest, was able to catch up with them. German enterprise turned presently to railroad development in Asia Minor and, just as the century was rounded, made its appearance with the famous Bagdad project. This was a plan to continue the railroad from Constanti nople to Konia, already under construction, be yond the Taurus Mountains to Bagdad on the Tigris and finally to the Persian Gulf. When, in 1903, the Sultan granted a German company the necessary firman, great rejoicings rang out from German imperialist circles. The British imperialist groups, however, rose as one man to vent a vehement protest. The English Foreign Office, unable to resist the pressure from the business world, threw every possible obstacle in the way of the Bagdad line, thereby confirming the German suspicion of a secret program encirclement, of which Great Britain was director. Though the railroad was delayed by this hostility it was by no means abandoned by the Germans, and as each new year added to its mileage and its fame it gave birth to ex pectations, intelligible enough though often foolishly extravagant, of a German movement into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia which would carry not only German capital and civilization but even German colonists into these desolate regions, once upon a time, under strong rule, the most prosperous of the earth. Intoxicated by this rosy dream, increasing seg ments of German public opinion consoled them selves for the Morocco and Persian fiascos and for the encirclement apparently effective in the West. The German hand held the Near-East and by this avenue Germany would realize her plan to be a world-power along with France, Russia and Great Britain. German influence, at Constantinople, due originally to an economic program, led in the course of time, as economic power in backward states inevitably does, to the exercise of political control. For over a hundred years before the appearance of Ger many in the Near-East, that is, through a part of the 18th and the whole of the 19th centuries, Great Britain and Russia had been engaged in a diplomatic duel on the Bosporus with the result that each had alternately swayed the Sultan and his ministers in its interest. From about the time of the Bagdad project the Ger man influence loomed so large that both older powers found themselves eclipsed. While this was a considerable German triumph from the point of view of a Near-East policy, it would amount to little or nothing if the situa tion among the small Balkan states, and par ticularly in Serbia and Bulgaria, became at any time so unfavorable to Germany as to cut the communications with Constantinople. Germany, Austria, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey sented the succession of territories which would have to maintain mutual goodwill and harmony if the German economic program in Asia Minor was to meet with success. .The Austro-German alliance assured a common policy toward the Balkan Peninsula on the part of Berlin Vienna, but Serbia and Bulgaria were uncer tain quantities and might prefer to play their own hand. While Bulgaria was at least not unfriendly, Serbia, after some hesitation, threw in its lot with Russia and the Entente. There with Serbia inevitably became a point where the rival imperial systems into which Europe was divided met in violent collision. The story of recent Serbian policy is inextricably bound up with the complicated tale of Balkan ment, to which only the barest reference is possible here. The outstanding fact of the peninsula throughout the last few generations has been the uninterrupted decay of Turkey. The fatal weakness of the Ottoman state was a constant temptation to its small but lusty Christian neighbors, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, to plan for their aggrandizement at Turkish expense, and all the great powers, and more particularly Austria and Russia because directly abutting on the peninsula, kept a sharp lookout lest some sudden displacement of forces occur derogatory to their interest. therefore had her own reasons, quite apart from German promptings, to cultivate good relations with her Balkan neighbors. Not to be outdone, the Tsar spread his net at Sofia and Belgrade, and because of racial and religious affiliations with the Serbs and Bulgars, he gen erally enjoyed a noticeable advantage over his Austrian competitor. Passing in review the Austro-Russian relations since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), it becomes apparent that they have gone through numerous and vehement changes. Periods of fair weather have been followed b'y foul until, beginning with 1908, a succession of crises was precipitated which ended by producing war —a Balkan war of course, which, however, because of the align ment of the powers into two bitterly opposed groups and their solemn engagements to each other, automatically expanded into a world war of unexampled dimensions. These Balkan events must now engage our attention.
The crisis of 1908 began in July with the so called Young Turk revolution at Constanti nople. While a Liberal movement aiming at internal reform, the revolution was also in spired by a fervid Turk nationalism and planned to cement firmly together all the remaining ter ritories of the Ottoman Empire. Such a move ment augured ill for the small Balkan states which had been looking forward to a Turk dissolution and it filled them with vague appre hension; it augured ill also for Austria-Hun gary which at the Congress of Berlin had ac quired Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey but only "to occupy and administer," not in.
full sovereignty. To be sure, for 30 years', Turkey had exercised no shred of authority it,; the two provinces; however, should the Young Turks take it into their heads to revive an' obsolete claim a very awkward situation was certain to result. To forestall trouble, Austria, in October 1908, issued a proclamation which annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and provoked a loud outcry from the patriotic Young Turks. When Austria stood pat, the uproar in the course of a few weeks subsided and amicable relations were resumed between the two powers. Far more violent and enduring was the outcry in Serbia, which country, though it did not, like Turkey, have a claim in law to the two provinces, looked upon them as destined 'to be ultimately united to Serbia in fulfilment of the national of the Serb state. For sonic decades prior to 1908 Serbia had been culti vating the view of itself as 'the Piedmont of the Balkans," called by fate to gather into one family all the scattered branches of the South Slays. On Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Serbs and Croats, it therefore looked, in spite of Austrian occupation, as earmarked ford absorption, and was fiercely disappointed by the act of annexation. As little Serbia by itself could do nothing, everything depended on the word of Russia, Serbia's Slav brother and pow erful friend. When not only Russia but also France and Britain drew up behind Serbia, Austria called on her ally, Germany, and a very breathless situation followed. It was re lieved only on Russia's yielding ground and advising Serbia to accept the annexation and promise Austria to live with her on terms of friendship (March 1909). The crisis passed, but would it not revive? Indeed would it not be sure to revive if Serbia felt emboldened to continue secretly the nationalist propaganda Which she had just pledged herself not to pur sue, and if, on the occasion of some fresh con flict, Russia undertook to back her little brother to the limit? The following years brought a steady flow of Balkan troubles, keeping the great *lowers in perpetual excitement and cul minating in the war of 1912 of the Balkan al lies against Turkey, and in the war of 1913 of the Balkan allies among themselves. In these two struggles Serbia played a prominent part, emerging from them with increased territory which carried her far southward into Macedo nia. Not only she but all the related groups of the South Slays very naturally felt puffed up by her achievements with the result that the agi tation over Bosnia was spontaneously revived. Bosnian secret societies sprang into being charged with spreading Serb propaganda; na tionalist societies located at Belgrade took it upon themselves to direct the underground movement and to supply money and literature. Agitations of this sort, appealing with particu lar force to the young, have a way of getting out of hand. On 28 June 1914, a group of youthful Bosnian conspirators took advantage of an official visit which the heir to the Austrian throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, paid to Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, and assassinated him and his wife as they drove through the streets. Here was the Serb crisis back again and in its most acute form! For the past six years the Balkan peninsula had been in wild ebulli tion, apparently incapable of finding rest ; for the past six years the two groups of European powers had confronted each other with waxing suspicion and waning good temper; for the past six years the Hapsburg monarchy had faced a subtle undermining of its control not only over the Bosnians but over its South Slav subjects generally in Hungary, Croatia and Dalmatia. The murder of the heir-apparent marked a climax and Austria resolved at any cost to end the long and insufferable tension. On 23 July 1914 the Austrian ambassador pre sented an ultimatum at Belgrade which planned to dig the grave of the nationalist agitation in Bosnia by binding Serbia to sweeping and humiliating guarantees. On the failure of Serbia to meet in full the Viennese demands, Austria on 25 July withdrew her ambassador from Belgrade and three days later, on 28 July, declared war against her little neighbor. In every phase of the terrible crisis which fol lowed the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia Ger many stood unwaveringly behind her ally for the reason that she shared in every particular Austria's view of the Serb danger. In German eyes Serbia had become a critical issue, perhaps it is not too much to say the issue, from the moment the Serb policy of a South Slav state, created with the aid of Russia on the ruins of Austria-Hungary, defined itself on the Balkan horizon. Such a policy, if crowned with suc cess, meant the blocking of the road to the Near-East. Once again the iron ring drawn by the Entente group rose before Germany's eyes and stiffened her determination to see the neigh bor monarchy through a situation which while challenging the integrity of Austria, no less certainly threatened with disaster Germany's cherished Turkish program. During the tense and nerve-racking diplomatic action which at tended the Austro-Serb developments Germany pursued.successively two objects. First, she used her influence to limit the issue to Austria and Serbia in order to enable Austria to achieve her purpose of putting a definite end to Serbian agi tation within the Austrian borders. This ac tion against a little but cantankerous neighbor was to be made palatable to the powers by the pledge given again and again beginning 24 July (Austrian Red Book, Dispatches 18, 26, 32, 38, etc.), that Austria contemplated no territorial changes and no infraction of Serb sovereignty. In this policy aimed at localizing the conflict Germany failed because Russia had gone so far in supporting Serbia that both her honor and interest moved her to interfere, not only diplomatically, which was proper and usual, but also in a military way, which was very danger ous. No sooner was Austria's purpose of pun ishing Serbia clearly seen than Russia ordered a limited mobilization beginning 25 July. This step intended to convey that Russia positively refused, in spite of the Austrian territorial pledge, to look upon the Austro-Serb conflict as a local issue. When the Russian mobiliza tion had. advanced to a certain stage and be come a matter of common knowledge, the Ger man government turned its attention to its second object, which was the exorcising of this new danger. It brought to the attention of Mr. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, that since Austria was mobilizing only against Serbia, the Russian mobilization exposed the Austrian flank and would inevitably occasion an Austrian counter-mobilization; further, that if the Russian mobilization grew in scope and reached the districts adjoining the German border, the German government would have to answer with a general mobilization order and that war would immediately result since Germany could not afford to wait while Russia drew her great masses of troops from the ends of her empire (German White Book, Exhibits 10, 11, 18, 23, 24). In spite of all warnings the Russian government, profoundly moved by the plight of Serbia and encouraged by the full support of France and the partial support of Great Britain, proceeded with its military plans and in the early morning hours of 31 July, took the decisive and fatal step of ordering a gen eral mobilization. When this action was re ported at Berlin, the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, dispatched an ultimatum to Petrograd, setting Russia a time limit of 12 hours to withdraw her measures. When Russia ignored the request, Germany in the late after noon of 1 August simultaneously mobilized her forces and declared war against Russia. Ow ing to the Franco-Russian alliance war between France and Germany was certain to follow the breach between Berlin and Petrograd. Merely to test the situation, the German chancellor on the same fateful day (31 July), which saw the dispatch of the ultimatum to Russia, requested France to declare ithin 18 h•Enirs whether in the event of a Russo-German conflict France would remain neutral. When the French Prime Minister answered on 1 August that France would act as her interests demanded, mobiliza tion was ordered also against France and war followed. In the general crash of the edifice of peace the British position was for a short time in doubt. On the evening of 2 August Germany requested at Brussels an unmolested passage for her troops through Belgium, and when this was indignantly refused on the ground of Belgium's neutrality guaranteed by the international act of 1839, Germany on 4 August committed an act of war against Bel gium by sending troops across the border. On that same day the German chancellor, in a speech before the Reichstag, freely admitted the illegality • of Germany's action but attempted to justify it by reason of military necessity, that is, Germany's military plight due to the simulta neous exposure of her two flanks. The violation of Belgian neutrality and international law on becoming known in Great Britain released a general storm of fury and outraged feeling. The British public was instantaneously converted to a policy of war, and when on 4 August the British government sent to Berlin an ultimatum on the subject of Belgian neutrality which met with rejection, neither Parliament nor people brooked further delay and the declaration of war was issued against Germany on 5 August. That the war, once unchained, became general, drawing a constantly increasing number of nations, both great and small, into its vortex was, in view of the close associations of the modern world, inevitable. That, as the un paralleled struggle developed, every purpose, every interest, every ideal dear to each member of the warring groups should be brought to the front and earnest hopes be voiced for their realization as fit reward for heroic effort was equally natural. A complex of exalted emo tions thus caused the original cause of the war to be lost from view, especially among the Entente allies. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster and revolving plans to make an end of war and of all other human ills by one great cure, their public men and journal ists multiplied the objects of the war almost ad infinitum, specifying, among others, the safeguarding of the small peoples, the over throw of Prussian militarism, the democratiza tion of Germany, the ejection of the Turks from Europe, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the sanctity of treaties, and a permanent league of peace, all voiced in the rhetoric and set purpose of a generous idealism. For her part Germany underwent a similar change in the public profession of the motives which kept her in the field. She stated again and again that she was fighting a defensive war, but by her actions, as distinit from her words, she made it clear as day that what she understood by defense was the right to figure as an imperialist power, chiefly by keeping open the communica tions to the southeast, to Constantinople and beyond. It was over competitive imperialism that the war began, and the historian may per haps without presumption declare that im perialism remains its leading content and that its rival claims must in some way be regulated and harmonized if a workable peace is to suc ceed the unexampled agony.