GERMANY AND THE WAR. When the German Empire was created in 1871, it straightway became a factor in the attrac tions and repulsions historically existent among the ruling powers of Europe and making them selves felt not only in Europe but over prac tically the whole earth. Since the German Empire carried pushing and expanding per sonality into an established group, the members of which, in spite of their riper years,. showed no abatement of watchfulness and vigor,an international situation was created which, amidst bewildering shifts of relation and numerous diplomatic incidents bearing witness to the constantly growing competition of the governments, carried Europe along with ever increasing momentum until its statesmen lost control of its fate and stood helplessly by while it plunged into the cataract of the Great War. Only a rehearsal of the story evaluing the main elements of conflict can at all make clear how the catastrophe occurred. First, to recall the situation created by the Franco-German War: the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany gave her a permanently embittered neighbor on the west. German public opinion had in sisted on the cession of the two provinces on the ground that they had been originally Ger man and were appropriated by France in victorious wars. France for her part con sidered herself the victim of an unjustifiable violence and nursed a sentiment of revenge which dug an unbridgable chasm between the two countries. Bismarck, eager above all to safeguard the empire which he had founded, entered into various diplomatic agreements, all of which looked to making Germany secure and which culminated in 1883 in the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. Its purpose, so far as Germany was concerned, was to isolate and checkmate France, and this purpose may be said to have been fully achieved until, begin ning with the year 1890, France drew close to Russia and gradually perfected, as a diplomatic counterweight to the Triple Alliance, the Dual Alliance between Russia and herself. Mean while Germany had begun to take increasing part in a movement which has given her the place she holds in the modern political world. The movement has been called by various names and may as well be called imperialism, if it is understood that imperialism means the expansion of life which has been effected by modern science, trade and industry, and which has gradually gained dominance among all those nations endowed with the energy and elasticity necessary to bring about a social, economic and political adjustment to the new world forces. Imperialism aims to carry the products of the home industries, cheapened and multiplied by the factory system, to the markets of the it is ambitious to plant its flag over unoccupied or backward regions in order tp rule or settle them as dependent colonies; it is keenly on the lookout for raw products for profitable investments, for it is identified with the capitalist classes which are everywhere the real agents of imperialism and reap, if not the exclusive, at least the chief benefits from an expansion policy.
European imperialism is an ancient move ment and has only gradually assumed its present developed and intensive character. It was an early, youthful imperialism which in the days following the discovery of America drove Spain, France and England out upon the high ways of the sea to seek the fabled wealth of the Indies and to appropriate, much in the spirit of careless adventure, whatever lands they found. In the long conflicts for. mastery which followed, England ended by gaining a decisive victory, giving her control of the seas and a colonial empire on which the sun never sets. By the middle of the 19th century only two other countries counted in the colonial world at all, France and Russia, but each in only a limited sphere determined by physical proximity. France reached an arm across the Mediterranean to northern Africa and Russia pushed her huge bulk clear across northern Asia to the Pacific. On the wide ocean spaces, controlled by the British navy and dotted with innumerable British areas, France and Russia had little to say, for they had no means at their disposal for challenging British ascendancy. Nevertheless they nursed imperialist ambitions and would have to be given respectful consider ation in any further distribution of the earth's lands and markets. In this connection the fact must be kept in mind that while the colonial movement had, in the 18th century, been brought to a certain conclusion by the settlement of the Americas and the victory of England in India, the appropriation of the tropical regions of Africa and the command of the markets of such backward countries as Persia and China still awaited a decision. It was not till the last two or three decades of the 19th century that the industrial organization of Europe advanced to the degree required for broadening these fur ther issues. Therewith the world embarked on the newest and latest phase of imperialism of which the living generation of men has been the witness. The late birth of the German Empire made it impossible for Germany to enter any but this last stage of the imperialist development and for a while it was doubtful whether, be cause of the heavy handicap of the delayed start, the German government cared to enter the race at all. Bismarck, the foreign minister, possessed, as was natural enough, a prevailingly continental outlook, and only in the '80s, and then very reluctantly, yielded to the pressure of the merchant classes of Germany to enter the colonial field. The partition of tropical Africa was the question of the day and Germany regis tered a claim to the general booty just in time to secure consideration. She acquired Togo, Kamerun, and German Southwest Africa on the west coast and the province of German East Africa on the east coast. For good measure, as it were, she was at the same time acknowl edged mistress of certain island groups in the neighborhood of Australia, particularly of a large section of unexplored New Guinea. These gains were made possible only by the goodwill of Great Britain, which from its high eminence welcomed rather than otherwise the appearance of Germany among the colonial powers. Re newed friction had recently developed between Great Britain and her older rivals, France and Russia, and under the circumstances the British government naturally enough inclined to the opinion that Germany, favored by Great Britain and colonially harmless, might prove a valuable support. The Anglo-German treaty of 1890 regarding Africa is the documentary witness of this English attitude. The world spoke of an Anglo-German honeymoon, though not for long, since the next decade quickly dissipated every vestige of goodwill between the two Northern powers. The '90s were characterized by a sur prising development of Germany in industry and commerce which awakened in her capitalists the hope and resolve of invading every profit able market of the world. Carefully con sidered, this domestic development was at the bottom of the colonial movement which, as we have seen, had put forth its first feelers in the '80s and which in Germany as everywhere proved to be the unfailing concomitant of busi ness expansion. The business men of Great Britain, already comfortably ensconced in the centres of trade of every continent, began to feel the ever growing competition. The British government, more deliberate than its traders, ignored the situation until a new German sover eign, William II, the grandson of Queen Vic toria, who had come to the throne in not only identified himself with the imperialist policy but seized every occasion, in season and out of season, to proclaim his intention to carry Germany into the realm of world politics monopolized hitherto by Great Britain, France and Russia. It meant not the belated and oppor tunist imperialism of Bismarck but a set pro gram steadily pursued. While the emperor's forceful language— and it was often offen sively forceful — might be discounted and ridi culed as music of the future, the eloquence of the bare figures of the German exports and im ports and the growth of German merchant ton nage could not be gainsaid nor the conclusion controverted that they formed a very genuine basis for a German Weltpo/itik. The *Haves' are never distinguished by much goodwill for the and it is not to be wondered at that neither London, Paris nor Petrograd appreciated the assertive attitude of the German 'newcomer. But when all is said, Great Britain was the power particularly affected, for it was she and not France or Russia who boasted a world trade based on ocean routes and who was most acutely exposed to the German compe tition. While Great Britain was still deeply
pondering the German commercial phenome non, Germany embarked also upon a naval policy. Every country with trade and bottoms desires to protect its floating interests and col onies, and that Germany should, toward the end of the .19th century, have begun the build ing of a navy was but to fall in line with es tablished precedent. For England, however, it signified the confirmation of her mounting sus picion that the lusty power across the North Sea was a dangerous rival and that in support ing the German colonial cause in its earliest stage she had reared a serpent. The German navy which, once undertaken, grew rapidly, lent weight to German diplomatic action and was, at least by the patriot section of British public opinion, regarded as nothing less than a challenge of the English sea and world supremacy. Con cerning the maintenance at any cost of their great position, won by a score of famous wars and a thousand unremembered little heroisms, all Britain was practically unanimous. Early in the 20th century the rift, long apparent, had widened to a chasm and the two countries were threatened with permanent estrangement. True, earnest efforts at reconciliation on the part of notable groups of intellectuals, merchants and workingmen were not lacking, and these efforts were heartily endorsed by the liberal section of the press, hut every fresh diplomatic encounter blew the latent national excitement into new flame and invalidated the efforts of the well-dis posed. Thus, inspite of the courageous flutings of peace societies, trade and naval rivalry con tinued to sow their insidious poison; but since issues of trade affect a limited upper group, whereas the navy, visible symbol of pride and prestige, appeals to the whole nation, the naval issue was pushed more and more, and with wax ing resentment, into the foreground of discus sion. By steadily enlarging their own naval program the British easily maintained their traditional ascendancy. This had long since crystallized into the doctrine of the two-power standard, by virtue of which Great Britain aimed at a tonnage in first-class battleships as great -as that of any two possible enemies combined. After a decade of feverish competi tion, in which all the powers joined, each with a naval program of its own, Britain made a re markable effort to call a halt: she made over tures to Germany proposing a limitation of armaments on the basis of the existing British superiority. The German viewpoint was stated by Chancellor Buelow in the Reichstag (24 March 1908) : "We do not dispute England's right to draw up her naval program in accord ance with the standard which its responsible statesmen consider necessary for the mainte nance of British world supremacy, and similarly it can not be taken amiss that we should build those ships which we require." The answer of the British naval secretary, Mr. Churchill, to the effect that the German navy was °a luxury" showed how irreconcilable the two gov ernment attitudes had become. The rock-bot tom facts, determinative alike of policy and sentiment, were that Great Britain was an over whelmingly industrial nation depending on food imports made secure by a navy, while Germany, rapidly becoming industrialized, required in creasing food imports and, for purposes of in surance, the protection of an efficient fleet. The food shortage in both England and Germany was the inevitable result of the modern indus trial development and of the imperialism brought in its train; imperialism, Involving national prestige and provocative of passion, in its turn led to an exasperated state of mind which was only too likely on some sudden oc casion to release an explosion. Early in the 20th century the British government, which throughout the previous century had acted on the assumption that its potential enemies were France and Russia, definitely saw Germany in this sinister light and accordingly resolved to court the friendship of its older rivals and bring the outstanding disputes with them to a settlement. The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 inaugurated the change and was followed in 1907 by a treaty with Russia. By the treaty of 1904 France, in return for leaving England in undisturbed possession of Egypt, acquired a lien on the vast territory of Morocco, while the Anglo-Russian agreement practically partitioned Persia between the two signatories. It should be kept in mind that Morocco and Persia were two wholly independent Mohammedan states. The criticism occasioned by this procedure in certain English Liberal circles was drowned in the chorus of satisfaction elicited by the draw ing together of Great Britain and her former foes. The treaties meant not an alliance but an understanding, which might the more easily ripen into an alliance since France and Russia were already bound by the firmest mutual ties. The new alignment came to be known as the Triple Entente, under which firm-name the three asso ciates henceforth presented a solid front against the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. It goes without saying that the division of Europe into two hostile, all-inclusive camps greatly reduced the possibilities of mediation in future disputes. While the formation of the Triple Entente signified a general reduction of German influence in Europe, the really important feature for Germany was the disposal of such immense territories as Morocco and Persia without her being called into consultation. For here was the capital issue of the age, the issue of imperialism. The distribution of lands, un occupied and backward, and the conquest of markets capable of absorbing manufactured goods had been proceeding apace, and Germany, though a latecomer, had won a place at the board which she was resolved to maintain. That Great Britain, France and Russia, on the ground of prior claims, should, as it were, form a Colonial Trust and crowd her from the table she was not minded to allow. Her leaders with the instinct of men involved in a struggle for power saw clearly that if they submitted without protest in the crucial cases of Morocco and Persia, they would permit a precedent to be established that would work automatically to eliminate Germany from all other world issues and reduce her to the status of a purely European power. But for better or worse she had developed the will to be a world-power, exactly like the members of the Triple Entente, and firmly asserted her right to "a place in the sun? In the name of the imperialism, at whose shrine she worshiped like the rest, she claimed the privilege to share in the distribution of all remaining opportunities throughout the world for colonial and capitalist enterprise. This general position the German government an nounced on the very morrow of the Morocco agreement and frequently repeated its warning during the following months. On 28 Nov. 1905, for instance, it made this statement in the Reichstag: "The difficulties which have arisen' between us and France in the Morocco ques tion have had no other origin than an inclina tion to settle without our co-operation affairs in which the German Empire also had interests to maintain." But though Germany had what she considered a grievance, she was confronted with an accomplished fact and the question was what practical steps were open for her to take in order to win consideration for her views. The Morocco issue was made particularly diffi cult by the fact that the open and published treaty of 1904 affirmed and emphasized the inde pendence of Morocco. Great Britain and France could therefore profess that they harbored no designs upon that state. In secret treaties, however, to which Spain was a party, Morocco had, with British participation, been partitioned between France and Spain. To be sure, the world, and more particularly, Germany, sus pected the existence of a land bargain but in the face of the upright professions of the con spirators could prove nothing. In fact it was not till 1911, that is, till after Morocco had been gobbled up, that the secret treaties were revealed. Germany waited a year after the Anglo-French treaty of 1904 had been arranged to have matters cleared up, and then in the face of the cloud darkening over Morocco took ac tion which left no doubt as to where she stood.