The Modern So much it seemed necessary to say to account for the appearance in English politics of a phenomenon so remark able as the Cabinet, and so difficult to refer, for an explanation of its origin, to any particular crisis or any official document. Indeed one of the most striking features of the Cabinet system is its wholly informal character — a feature which adds both to its utility and to its interest as an object of study. It is natural, no doubt, that no one but those who have taken part in its proceedings should be able to speak authori tatively of the details of the working of a great political organ. But it is none the less curious that, until the appearance of the masterly essay of Bagehot, entitled The Eng lish in 1867, even the general out lines of the system by which they had in fact been governed for upward of a century should have been unfamiliar to a people so keenly interested in politics as the British. And yet that such was the case is shown by the almost ludicrous difficulties experienced by the self governing colonies of Australia, when, in the 50's, they endeavored to introduce it into their new constitutions.
But here we must leave the historical method, passing by the vigorous but unsuccess ful attempt of George III to overturn a system which he thoroughly disliked, the brilliant new development introduced by Pitt in his gallant struggle against the coalition of Fox and North in 1784, the remonstrance made by Queen Vic toria against the application of its principles to the famous uBed-chamber" question in 1839, and the more successful vindication of her rights by the same monarch against Lord Palmerston in 1850. Let us make some attempt to enumerate the essential features of the system as it exists to-day.
Its Executive Character.— The first point to notice is, that the Cabinet is not a mere coun cil of political experts, but a body of working administrators. With one or two exceptions, each of its members is actually responsible to Crown and Parliament for the conduct of some department of State. It is true that he is. almost invariably, chosen rather for his general political importance than for his skill in the affairs of his department, i.e., an office is found for him because his presence in the Cabinet is desirable. But, none the less, the official char acter of its members gives the Cabinet a power which no mere advisory council could ever exert. Not only is the Cabinet aware of the awkward secrets of public business, and the practical difficulties of carrying out any line of policy, it is its own executor; for, except in the improbable case of disloyalty to his col leagues, the Minister to whose department the carrying out of that policy belongs, at once insists upon its adoption by his subordinates, the officials of his department.
Its Parliamentary the sec ond place, and still more important, the Cabinet wields vast Parliamentary influence. In effect, its members are invariably members of Parlia ment, though, legally speaking, no one of them need be; and most of them are men of com manding personal weight in the House of Com mons. We have seen how the necessity of conciliating Parliament was forced upon the Ministers of George I and George II. It is now fairly well understood that the influence exer cised by those Ministers was obtained by means not the most creditable. But the death-blow to Parliamentary corruption, already checked by the Place Act of 1742, was dealt when Pitt appealed from the House of Commons to the country in 1784; and the coup de grace was given by the Reform Act of 1832. Since that
date the place of the old sinister influence of the has been taken by the organization of the party system (see POLITICAL PARTIES) ; and the substitution of examination for patronage, in the vast mass of appointments to the permanent civil service (q.v.) has rendered the working of the party system comparatively pure. For the most part, Ministers control Parliament by the support of followers who honestly believe their policy to be good, or, at least, the best available; and such corruption as exists is confined to the polling booths.
The Escape of One of the most curious facts in the whole history of the Cabinet is that this control of Parliament by Ministers was very nearly becoming, so far at least as the House of Commons was concerned, a legal im possibility. The Act of Settlement of 1701 (so often alluded to) contained a clause expressly excluding from the representative House all holders of office under the Crown. This part of the act, however, was not intended to take effect until the accession of the House of Han over ; and, before that date, it had been repealed by another act of the year 1705. But neither the statesmen of 1701 nor those of 1705 appear to have had any idea of the importance of the question.
Dependence of the Cabinet on the House of But it is of the first importance to remember that the influence of the Cabinet on Parliament is at least counter-balanced by the influence of Parliament on the Cabinet. Apart from the general attitude of the House of Com mons toward Ministers, which is, of course, vital, the opportunities which occur in both Houses for criticizing every action of the Executive are of daily occurrence during the session of Parliament. In fact, one of the chief cares of the Prime Minister in forming his Cabinet is to provide acceptable champions of its acts in either House. It is a constitutional maxim, that every department must be repre sented in both Houses, so that there may always be present some responsible Minister to ex plain and give information upon any point of administration which any member of either House may. choose to raise. This explanation and information are rendered chiefly in the form of answers to questions of which due notice has been given; and a glance at the Question-Paper for any day will reveal the vast and detailed mass of information which Ministers must be prepared to supply to Parliament. A Minister can, of course, plead °reasons of for withholding information. But such a plea is apt to provoke suspicion; and if, for that or any other reason, the reply of a Minister is not considered satisfactory, further steps can be taken (such as a motion for adjournment, a proposal to reduce the estimates, or even a vote of want of confidence), in order to impress upon a Cabinet the error of its ways. The discus sion on the budget is the grand opportunity for criticism of the executive by Parliament; and, though the power is sometimes abused, it can not be denied that the constant liability of Ministers to justify their conduct in Parliament is one of the most valuable principles of the Cabinet system.