GREAT BRITAIN. The following series of articles dealing with the various aspects of British educational, religious, political and com mercial life, presents the history, development and rise of the United Kingdom to its promin ent position among the leading nations of the world. The peculiarities of British institutions make it impossible to understand them apart from their history, and the aim set before the contributors has been to furnish a well co ordinated section, reviewing the leading char acteristics of the British nation and its ad vance, as they are seen to be the natural out come of history.
The Greeks could not have played their de cisive role in history had they not dwelt in the centre of the lands, amid the islands and peninsulas between Europe and Asia. Nor is it likely that any race less happily endowed could have achieved what the Greeks achieved even in that favored environment. A like relation is true as between the British race and the British Isles.
The origins of the British race are recounted in the next article of this volume. It is the aim of the present article to analyse the geographi cal influences which have contributed to British history.
Popular philosophy, as embodied in Shakes pearian phrases such as the °moat defensive" and the °silver streak," would dismiss the mat ter as almost too simple and obvious for set discussion. The insularity of Britain has no doubt counted for more than any other single geographical cause, but the British polity and character are in fact the product of a very sin gular combination of geographical no less than historical circumstances. For the purposes of this short summary the major geographical con trols of British development may be grouped under the nine following heads: 1. Insularity.
2. Shallow surrounding seas.
3. Neighborhood to the Continent.
4. Relation to the chief linguistic frontier of Europe.
5. Climate determined by oceanic winds.
6. Internal natural divisions.
7. Adequacy of economic bases.
8. Geographical momentum.
9. The consequences of sea power.
1. Britain has not been success fully invaded since the defeat at Hastings eight and a half centuries ago. The Englishman is ever conscious of this fact — it is a frequent argument in 20th century political speeches. The victories over the Spanish Armada and at Trafalgar have served to increase the sense of security, and freedom at home and empire abroad are the twin results. At home there has been an ineradicable jealousy of a standing army, and there has therefore been freedom for the development of what Bagehot described as "government by talk?) The navy on the other hand has at most times been viewed with favor, for it has screened the experiments and mistakes by which popular government has been slowly nurtured. These mistakes were often such as would have involved a continental nation in the consequences of a Jena or a Sedan.
Insularity has also permitted of a concentra tion of purpose upon the sea which was im possible for the other maritime states along the western seaboard of Europe. England suc ceeded where Portugal, Spain, France and Holland failed, because, in the absence of a land frontier, her economic resources could be focussed on adventure beyond the seas. In this regard it must be borne in mind that sea-power does not rest on the navy alone, but on the co-operation of a mobile army with a dominant navy. An army limited to this subsidiary use has been possible for Britain because of her insularity. By her navy and amphibious army Britain won North America and the sovereignty of the Indies, while France and Holland were involved in continental wars. It was by the exhaustion of her enemies rather than by her victories that Britain achieved her empire. This is surely the truth which lies behind Seeley's famous utterance that Britain had °conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind." Behind her girdle of seas she fought with a limited liability and was immune at home though often defeated abroad.